
By Seth G. Jones
Jan 13, 2019
In discussing the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Afghanistan at a cabinet meeting on January 2, 2019, President Donald
Trump drew a parallel between the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. “The reason Russia was in Afghanistan was because
terrorists were going into Russia,” he said. “They were right to be there.”
President Trump went on to say that the war in Afghanistan helped trigger the
collapse of the Soviet Union. “The problem is it was a tough fight,” he said.
“And literally, they went bankrupt. They went into being called Russia again,
as opposed to the Soviet Union.” The public outcry was immediate and animated.
In an editorial titled “Trump’s Cracked Afghan History,” the Wall Street
Journal responded caustically: “Right to be there? We cannot recall a more
absurd misstatement of history by an American President … The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan was a defining event in the Cold War, making clear to all
serious people the reality of the communist Kremlin’s threat.”
What are we to make of this debate? Why did
the Soviets invade Afghanistan? Soviet archives and other evidence indicate
that the Soviet leaders were primarily motivated not by terrorism, but by
balance-of-power politics, particularly concerns about growing U.S. influence
in Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviets withdrew military forces primarily for
domestic political reasons, not because they were bankrupt. Nor did the Soviet
Union collapse because of the war in Afghanistan. When history helps guide
policy, it is important to get the history right.
To understand Soviet concerns about
Afghanistan, it is helpful to go back to 1973, six years before the Soviet
invasion. On July 16, 1973, Muhammad Daoud Khan overthrew King Zahir Shah, who
had ruled the country since 1933, in a coup d’état. Moscow, which had been
providing military aid to Afghanistan since at least 1955, grew increasingly
alarmed about instability in Afghanistan. In April 1978, Daoud was assassinated
during a coup led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, further increasing Soviet fears about
their southern flank.
The next year, it was Washington’s turn to
become alarmed after its ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolf Dubs, was kidnapped
by armed extremists posing as police. When Afghan security forces attempted to
rescue him, Dubs was shot and killed. President Jimmy Carter’s national
security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, blamed the incident on “either Soviet
ineptitude or collusion.”
Afghanistan headed toward the abyss.
Demonstrations erupted in cities like Herat, and, as one top-secret Soviet
assessment concluded, key parts of the Afghan Army “essentially collapsed.” In
June 1979, there was yet another coup, as Taraki was replaced by Hafizullah
Amin. This was the last straw for Moscow. As the Soviet archives indicate,
Moscow’s leaders believed that Amin was growing too close to Washington. A
top-secret report to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned: “It is known, in
particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts
with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change
in the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to
Washington.” The KGB came to similar conclusions and assessed that Amin would
likely turn to Washington for aid.
On December 8, 1979, Brezhnev hosted a
meeting with several trusted Politburo members, including ideologist Mikhail
Suslov, KGB head Yuri Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko. Andropov and Ustinov argued that Washington was trying
to expand its influence in Afghanistan. The group tentatively agreed to direct
the KGB to remove Amin and replace him with the Babrak Karmal. They also
deliberated about sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan. On December 12,
Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko met again. The group assessed
that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan threatened the security of the
Soviet Union’s southern borders, which the United States and other countries
could take advantage of by aiding the Afghan regime. In addition, Afghanistan
could become a future U.S. forward operating base situated in the Soviet
Union’s “soft underbelly” in Central Asia.
On Christmas Eve 1979, elite Soviet forces
began flying into Kabul airport and the military airbase at Bagram. The 357th
and 66th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan from
Turkmenistan and began advancing south along the main highway. The 360th and
201st Motorized Rifle Divisions crossed the Amu Darya River from Uzbekistan.
The Soviet invasion created an immediate
global uproar. In response, over five dozen countries—including the United
States—boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics, which were held in Moscow. The
Soviet invasion increased already-high tensions between Washington and Moscow.
Terrorism had nothing to do with all this.
While Soviet leaders were concerned about “religious fanatics” that were
involved in Afghan protests, the Soviets were overwhelmingly worried about U.S.
power and influence. To argue that the Soviets were “right to be there,” as
President Trump remarked, is either to misunderstand Cold War history or, even
worse, to legitimize Brezhnev’s cold-blooded, anti-U.S. strategic rationale for
invading Afghanistan.
In response to the Soviet invasion, the
United States conducted one of its most successful covert action programs
during the Cold War. U.S. aid to the Afghan mujahideen began at a relatively
low level under Carter, but then increased as the prospect of a Soviet defeat
appeared more likely. The CIA provided about $60 million per year to the Afghan
mujahideen between 1981 and 1983, which was matched by assistance from the
Saudi government. Beginning in 1985, the United States increased its support to
the Afghans to $250 million per year, thanks to U.S. Congressman Charlie
Wilson, CIA Director William Casey, and growing support from within the United
States. This shift culminated in National Security Directive 166, which was
signed by President Ronald Reagan and set a clear U.S. objective in
Afghanistan: push the Soviets out. The CIA provided cash, weapons, technical
advice on weapons and explosives, intelligence, and technology like wireless
interception equipment.
By the mid-1980s, Soviet leaders had
enough. The historical evidence shows that Moscow’s decision to withdraw its
forces came over half a decade before the collapse of the Soviet Union and
centred on domestic concerns. While early Soviet assessments of the war in
Afghanistan were hopeful, they eventually turned gloomy. At a Politburo meeting
on October 17, 1985, Gorbachev read letters from Soviet citizens expressing
growing dissatisfaction with the war in Afghanistan—including “mothers’ grief over
the dead and the crippled” and “heart-wrenching descriptions of funerals.” For
Gorbachev, the Soviet withdrawal was primarily about domestic politics. The
downsides—including in blood—were too high and now outweighed any geostrategic
benefits. Over the course of the war, nearly 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed
and another 35,000 wounded.
On April 14, 1988, the Soviets signed the
Geneva Accords, which were designed to “promote good-neighbourliness and
co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the
region.” As part of the accords, the Soviets promised to withdraw their forces
from Afghanistan. On February 15, 1989, the last Red Army units crossed the
Termez Bridge into the Soviet Union, ending what Gorbachev had referred to as a
“bleeding wound.”
Almost two years later, in December 1991,
the Soviet Union collapsed and the hammer and sickle flag was lowered for the
last time over the Kremlin. The Soviet Union crumbled because of a complex set
of reasons that included: political and ideological factors, including years of
relentless suppression of political opposition followed by Gorbachev’s policies
of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring); economic challenges
from a state-run economy; military factors, including the country’s exorbitant
defense spending; and social factors like endemic corruption and the desire of
ethnic communities in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Western republics, and
the Baltics to become independent. The war in Afghanistan was not a primary
cause of the Soviet collapse, though it was an example of Moscow’s military
overreach. Nor will the United States suffer a similar fate today because of
its involvement in Afghanistan. It is foolish to compare the two countries on
this basis.
As the United States weighs the costs and
benefits of withdrawing from Afghanistan, it is important to examine the Soviet
experience—including the many differences. The United States went into
Afghanistan in 2001 following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. At
the time, al-Qaeda was headquartered in Afghanistan with the aid of the
Taliban. There was substantial global support for the U.S. campaign, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Today, terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State operate in
Afghanistan, making a complete U.S. withdrawal risky without a viable political
settlement or further weakening of terrorist and insurgent groups.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
invaded Afghanistan because of inflated concerns about U.S. meddling. As Graham
Fuller, the CIA’s chief of station in the late 1970s, told me, “I would have
been thrilled to have those kinds of contacts with Amin, but they didn’t
exist.” The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion was roundly condemned by world
leaders. Instead of countering U.S. influence in the region, the Soviet
invasion had the opposite effect: It led to an increase in U.S. involvement. As
Soviet leaders realized by the mid-1980s, a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
would likely trigger a U.S. withdrawal from the region—which it did.
In addition, the war in Afghanistan did not
cause the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, Moscow’s ideology and system
failed. As President Reagan predicted nearly a decade before the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, democracy would “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of
history.” It did. If President Trump was attempting to draw parallels between
the Soviets going “bankrupt” because of Afghanistan and the U.S. experience
today, it is a misplaced analogy. The Soviets did not go bankrupt because of
Afghanistan. Nor will the United States today.
As the recent firestorm following President
Trump’s remarks should remind us, getting history right is imperative. But
getting history wrong is dangerous and ultimately counterproductive if the
United States wants to make informed policy decisions.
Source:
lawfareblog.com/soviet-experience-afghanistan-getting-history-right
URL: http://www.newageislam.com/islam-and-the-west/seth-g-jones/the-war-in-afghanistan-did-not-cause-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union,-instead,-moscow’s-ideology-and-system-failed/d/117456