declarations of victory characterize the American fight against groups such as
the Islamic State and al Qaeda. President Donald Trump announced that the
Islamic State in Syria would be “gone by tonight,” pointing to the remaining
speck of red on an assessment of Islamic State territory in March 2019, and
President Barack Obama asserted that Osama bin Laden’s death was “the most
significant achievement to date” against al Qaeda in May 2011.1 These
declarations, politically motivated as they were, portray an understanding that
the war on terror will end once the United States defeats certain groups.
American efforts against certain groups or targeting of individuals, such as
Osama bin Laden or now Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, affect only a fraction of the full
threat, which is the Salafi-Jihadi movement.2 This movement has expanded
rapidly since 2011 and persists beyond the rise and fall of groups or any
imminent threat it poses to the United States.3 The relationships that the
Salafi-Jihadi movement has built with local Sunni communities serve as its
Salafi-Jihadi movement is the collection of individuals, groups, and
organizations operating in pursuit of shared overall goals. Salafi-Jihadi
ideology coheres this movement and defines its objectives. This ideology
combines the Salafi trend within Islam—the return of religious practices to the
days of early Islam—and a Jihadi belief that the use of armed force is
incumbent on Muslims to restore this practice within Muslim lands and then to
spread it globally. The modern movement sprang from the anti-Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan in the 1980s and has since evolved in form and practice. It has
adapted to changing circumstances to better penetrate and eventually transform
local Sunni communities under Salafi governance.4 These adaptations have
enabled the Salafi-Jihadi movement to strengthen by better positioning it to
build bridges to Sunni populations.
counterterrorism operations have not had lasting effects. Groups that were
defeated, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, have reconstituted in more dangerous forms.
Al Qaeda seems able to emerge and threaten from new territory after the US has
targeted it in other places. The US has not adopted an approach that applies
pressure to the Salafi-Jihadi movement globally. Instead, it has gone after the
nodes that seem most threatening at any given moment: al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
then Iraq, then Yemen, then the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—all the while
eliminating high-value individuals as they surfaced. Indeed, the US has played
a global and unwinnable game of whack-a-mole.
efforts focus on reducing the terrorism threat from the Salafi-jihadi movement.
Yet the Salafi-Jihadi movement threatens not just violence, but a complete
revolution in the international order if successful. It seeks to reorder the
Muslim world under its vision of Islam and governance and then expand into the
West. The vision was laughable 20 years ago, and it remains highly implausible
today. Yet the convergence of efforts among bad global actors—including Russia,
China, and even Iran— has weakened the international order as the US and Europe
look inward. These conditions have created opportunities for the Salafi-Jihadi
movement to advance its objectives in places where any success seemed
impossible previously. The US must therefore transform its approach in face of
the new reality.
the enemy is fundamental to crafting a strategy to counter it effectively. The
deficiencies in America’s counterterrorism strategy stem from the
characterization of the enemy as a terrorist group, which defines Salafi-Jihadi
groups by only one of the activities that they undertake to achieve their
objectives. The October 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy outlines a
strategy that “pursues terrorist threats to their source” using all available
means.5 The efforts prescribed in this strategy target the terrorist
capabilities of the Salafi-Jihadi movement through military, financial, and
political pressure on individuals, groups, and threat networks. It also
emphasizes the development of partners’ counterterrorism capabilities.
Terrorism is a tactic that the Salafi-Jihadi movement uses to pursue its
long-term objectives. Terrorism remains the Salafi-Jihadi movement’s primary
threat to the West, but Salafi-Jihadi efforts to erase Western influence over
the Muslim world and to break the current governments also challenge Western
analysis, an analytical methodology drawn from the intelligence community,
provides a framework to identify and evaluate the strengths and vulnerabilities
of the Salafi-Jihadi movement as a whole. The enemy, the Salafi-Jihadi
movement, is evaluated according to four key characteristics of any
organization: critical capabilities, critical requirements, critical
vulnerabilities, and center(s) of gravity. These characteristics and the
analytical process for identifying them are described in more detail below. The
center-of-gravity analysis assesses vulnerabilities of the Salafi-jihadi
movement, which a successful strategy to counter the movement could attack or
Salafi-Jihadi movement’s strategic center of gravity is its relationship with
Sunni communities. This relationship is the means by which the Salafi-Jihadi
movement intends to impose its version of Islamic governance on Muslims. The
relationship, which varies extensively across different communities, is the
source of the Salafi-Jihadi movement’s strength today.
Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure,”
White House, March 20, 2019; and Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on
Osama Bin Laden,” White House, May 2, 2011.
Katherine Zimmerman, America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Critical
Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute, July 18, 2017.
Katherine Zimmerman, “The Salafi-Jihadist Movement Is Winning,” RealClearWorld,
February 12, 2019,
Katherine Zimmerman, Terrorism, Tactics, and Transformation: The West vs the
Salafi-Jihadi Movement, Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise
Institute, November 15, 2018.
House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, October 2018.