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Middle East Press (12 Aug 2017 NewAgeIslam.Com)

Will Child Marriages Ever End? By Ghasan Badkouk: New Age Islam's Selection, 12 August 2017

New Age Islam Edit Bureau

12 August 2017

Will Child Marriages Ever End?

By Ghasan Badkouk

Is The ‘Kurdistan Referendum’ A NATO Project?

By Deniz Zeyrek

GCC Crisis: Why Is Kuwaiti Mediation Not Working?

By Ali Bakeer

Turkey Corners Kurds along the Border with Syria

By Sinem Cengiz

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia between Two Crises

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Bassel Safadi, the Symbol of Syria’s Injustice

By Diana Moukalled

Making ‘Women’s Work’ Count

By Bharati Sadasivam

Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau


Will Child Marriages Ever End?

By Ghasan Badkouk

12 August 2017

A member of the Shoura Council recently submitted a recommendation to the council calling for a ban on the marriage of girls under 15 years of age. This recommendation was submitted by a Shoura Council member and not by the Ministry of Justice, which has not resolved the thorny issue of underage marriage for decades and has not done anything about it.

Dr. Latifa Al-Shalan, who is a member of the Shoura Council, said child marriages are against the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Children and Women, adding that the Kingdom is signatory to all of the above agreements. Although child marriages are a crime in all countries, the Ministry of Justice has so far not taken any action to deal with this issue.

The ministry’s inaction can be explained from a religious perspective because Islam does not set a specific age for marriage. The majority of senior Saudi scholars permit marriages for girls under 15, based on the saying reported on the authority of the wife of the Prophet, Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her), in which she says that she got married to the Prophet (peace be upon him) when she was six years old and that the marriage was consummated when she was nine.

However, lifestyles and traditions at that time were different from those of today. For example, many of the prevalent traditions and customs that were acceptable then are frowned upon today, especially those related to marriage. How can a 12-year-old child carry a baby, give birth and take care of a child when she herself is a child and in need of care and nurture?

Advanced countries consider child marriages as a crime because the little girl will be deprived of her right to enjoy her childhood and to receive an education. She would also be exposed to medical risks related to pregnancy.

Based on the above, I kindly ask Minister of Justice Dr. Waleed Al-Samaani to consider issuing a decision prohibiting the marriage of underage girls. Such a decision would save young girls from various injustices and prevent them from becoming victims of greedy men. Moreover, the decision would improve our image globally, especially in terms of human rights.

Source: saudigazette.com.sa/article/514901/Opinion/Local-Viewpoint/child-marriages


Is The ‘Kurdistan Referendum’ A NATO Project?

By Deniz Zeyrek


These days there is a single item on the agenda of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq: The Sept. 25 independence referendum. KRG President Masoud Barzani has started a public relations campaign. On the one hand, he is making visits, and on the other, he is frequently giving interviews, cultivating the “no retreat from the referendum” perception.

The Turkish translation of his interview on Al-Ahram newspaper was published on news portal Rudaw, known for its affinity to Barzani. When asked about what his message to Ankara was, Barzani said, “Kurdistan is a secure and a prosperous place.”

Asked about Turkey’s attitude toward the referendum, Barzani said remarks in the media were contradictory. “But generally they are not against the Kurdish people’s rights,” he added. 

Barzani was also asked about his relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and what he requested from him on his last visit to Turkey, to which he said, “Our Turkish friends, looking from their perspective know very well that the Kurdistan region is very important... [Erdogan] does not want anything else but to strengthen and develop our relations.”

Barzani tried to reassure Turkey in an interview with London-based Al Hayat newspaper, saying, “Our referendum does not mean a war against any of our neighbors. We want good relationships with them and especially with Turkey.”

When you read Barzani’s comments, you get a feeling that he has trust in something. What he trusts appears between the lines in his conversations.

For example, he said the U.S. and Russia will not ignore the Kurdish people who “paid big prices in protecting themselves in the last 100 years and inflicted a big defeat against terrorism.”

Barzani also frequently uses former American diplomat and advisors’ statements that say, “The U.N. agreement entitles this right to the Kurds” and mentions their expectations from U.N. members, including Turkey, that they will show respect to the Kurdish people’s given rights.

At the same time, developments are happening in the area and especially in Syria that lends credence to Barzani’s “freedom idea is supported by the U.S., Russia and the Western” claim.

For example, Col. Ryan Dillon, the spokesman of the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) coalition under the guidance of the U.S., said they trained 17,000 Peshmergas. At a military ceremony at the “14th Peshmerga Infantry Command,” a German commander said they work with the Peshmerga forces on a brigade level and give them training at a NATO level. One Peshmerga commander gives details about the training they give, which are war tactics of NATO and to identify the enemy targets (along with the NATO coordinates) on the map and intervention techniques in a short span of time.

If Barzani goes ahead with the referendum, which holds the key to his political future, and if the answer is “Yes,” this will not necessarily mean that a “Kurdistan state” will be founded.

But it will be too late and in Syria, where the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) controls the People’s Protection Units’ (YPG) armed components, a similar discussion will start.

While an Iranian diplomat said, “We and Turkey must not give permission to this, it will give the biggest damage to both of us,” and as an American diplomat said, “Turkey must make a decision and stop criticizing us. If they do not take a stand against the deeds of the ‘Good Kurd’ Barzani, the group in Syria which they say is terrorist, will be encouraged to take similar step.”

After hearing this striking comment, I looked at the statements made in Turkey about the “Kurdistan referendum.” I could not find a sufficient reaction apart from Erdogan’s “I do not find it right” statement, besides the usual “reason for war” and “red lines” phrases we keep hearing.

This subject influences not only Iraq but also Turkey directly, as well as Iran and Syria. Therefore, Turkey must develop a reasonable attitude toward the Kurdish problem together with its government and opposition, and more precisely with a “common sense” and put it into practice as soon as possible.

Source: hurriyetdailynews.com/is-the-kurdistan-referendum-a-nato-project.aspx?pageID=449&nID=116643&NewsCatID=531


GCC Crisis: Why Is Kuwaiti Mediation Not Working?

By Ali Bakeer

12 August 2017

Kuwait has long played a constructive role in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by bringing opposing parties together. It also enjoys strong relations with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. So when Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Bahrain cut ties to Qatar in early June, Kuwait was seen as an acceptable mediator that can mend the latest rift within the GCC.

Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah served for 40 years as foreign minister (1963-2003), and then as prime minister before becoming the emir of Kuwait in 2006. The vast experience he had in these positions and the intensity of his involvement in the issues that affect the region as a whole made him the right man for this hard task.

So when the crisis erupted, both the Saudi-led bloc and Qatar turned to Al-Sabah. But they had very different motivations for doing so.

For Qatar, Kuwait is a trustworthy neighbour that has no vested interest in any kind of internal GCC conflict. Also, Sheikh Al-Sabah is praised in Doha as a wise and experienced statesman. Most importantly, Kuwait - as a small country - knows very well from its own experience with Iraq what it is to face aggression from a big and powerful neighbour. Thus Doha believes that Kuwait can easily understand and help to solve the current situation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and its allies.

On the other hand, the Saudi-led bloc has a very different perspective regarding the nature of the role Kuwait can play in this crisis. Although they also seem to be welcoming Kuwaiti mediation, their motivation for doing so is to lessen the influence of outside actors in the crisis. They seem to be unwilling to solve the crisis which is posing serious challenges for Kuwait.

Blocking Mediation Efforts

Even though there is a broad regional and international consensus to support the role of Al-Sabah as a mediator in the crisis, Kuwait was unable to be effective and three rounds of mediation didn't lead to the desired outcomes yet. US President Donald Trump's toxic influence also played a role in the failure of Kuwait's efforts; however, the most important reason behind it was the Saudi-led bloc's refusal to participate in and show any enthusiasm for a meaningful mediation process.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the Saudi-led bloc imposed serious restrictions on the role Kuwait can play in the crisis. By doing so, they wanted to ensure Riyadh's strong influence over small GCC countries and to force Qatar to comply.

At the very beginning of the crisis, on June 5, Prince Khalid Al-Faisal, adviser of the Saudi King Salman, visited Kuwait to deliver a message to its Emir. Kuwait's state-run news agency KUNA didn't disclose the contents of the message; however, one source with knowledge of the situation told me that "The purpose was to discourage the Emir [of Kuwait's mediation efforts]".

The same source said that at that time: "The Emir of Qatar was preparing to deliver a strong speech with retaliatory measures in response to the measures taken against his country." But, despite Saudi efforts to discourage mediation, "al-Sabah called [Qatar's Emir] Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and urged him for restraint".

The Emir of Kuwait was interested in avoiding a vicious cycle of destructive actions and reactions by both sides. And Qatar's Emir aided his mediatory mission by not delivering the strong speech he had prepared. However, actions of the US President Donald Trump disrupted Qatar and Kuwait's efforts to de-escalate the situation.

On June 6, a tweet by Trump implying that Qatar is "funding a radical ideology" empowered the Saudi-led bloc, and made Kuwait's job much harder. Following the US president's now infamous tweet, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE escalated their attacks against Qatar. UAE's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, said: "There is nothing to negotiate with Qatar," thus sabotaging the first round of the Kuwaiti mediation efforts.

During this first round of efforts, the anti-Qatar quartet also refused to disclose the real causes that triggered the crisis and did not present any proof for the serious allegations they had raised against Doha. Furthermore, they did not present a list of demands, guaranteeing the failure of Kuwait's mediation efforts.

Just a Mailman

The second round of the Kuwaiti efforts started over a month later, when the Saudi-led bloc finally prepared its list of 13 demands. At this stage, however, the Saudi-led bloc limited the role of Kuwait to a mailman. 

Adel Al-Jubair, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, once again made it clear that there would be "no negotiations" with Qatar. Kuwait was only allowed to deliver the list of 13 demands to Doha and receive Qatar's response in a period of 10 days. These restrictions made any Kuwaiti effort for mediation completely futile.

During this time, the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made visits to the region to help Kuwait in its mediation efforts, and slight progress was achieved.

According to one Gulf official, "Kuwait asked Doha not to disclose its response on the 13 demands to the public in order to help its efforts in mediation". The same source told me: "A roadmap and a set of principles were conveyed to the Saudi-led bloc after Doha signed an agreement with US on combating terrorism."

However, at this point of the process, a set of agreements made between Gulf countries between 2013 and 2014, known as Riyadh Agreements, were leaked to American broadcaster CNN, which has regional headquarters in Abu Dhabi. This leak was widely seen as another attempt to block the joint efforts of Kuwait and the US Secretary to solve the crisis.

Despite the Saudi-led bloc's reluctance to help the mediation efforts, on July 22, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani showed willingness and readiness for dialogue in his first speech about the crisis. Yet, only a week after his speech, top officials from the Saudi-led bloc met in Bahrain and reasserted that there would be no negotiations with Qatar unless it fulfils the 13 demands.

For Kuwait, this was like going back to square one again.

At this stage, there is still no direct communication between the opposing sides of the GCC conflict. Kuwait is deprived from an effective mediation role and the UAE seems to be content with the idea of a stalemate. Because of all this, Kuwaiti efforts for mediation remain fruitless. The bottom line here is that without at least neutralising Trump's negative influence in the crisis and applying pressure on the Saudi-led bloc to participate in meaningful negotiations, Kuwait will likely have no chance to succeed in its mission.

Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/gcc-crisis-kuwaiti-mediation-working-170807093244546.html


Turkey Corners Kurds along the Border With Syria

By Sinem Cengiz

12 August 2017

Developments are taking place along Turkey’s borders that will likely have significant implications. A few days after the replacement of army, navy and air force commanders, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated warnings of possible military action against Kurdish forces in northern Syria that operate under the banner of the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

“We are determined to push deeper the dagger we drove into the heart of the terrorist formation’s project in Syria with new advances,” he said. The dagger refers to Operation Euphrates Shield, which Turkey launched in August 2016 and ended in March. Many speculate that Syria will be the initial focus of the new commanders, and that the countdown has already started for a new operation named Euphrates Sword.

Also, this week Prime Minister Binali Yildirim chaired a security meeting in which Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and intelligence chief Hakan Fidan also attended, among others. No statement was made afterward, but there was much speculation that the focus was on possible plans regarding northern Syria.

As yet, there has been no official statement on a possible military offensive against the YPG in the town of Afrin in northwest Syria. But media outlets circulated reports that Ankara is preparing for another operation against Daesh and the YPG in Syria. Whether this happens or not, Turkey once again said it would be ready to respond to any hostile move from across the border.

Recent military developments point to preparations in this regard. The military has recently built up its presence near the southern border and in the northern Syrian town of Azaz, which served as a base during Operation Euphrates Shield. In June, Turkey’s defense minister said 690 km out of a planned 828-km wall had been completed along the frontier with Syria, and border security measures would be raised to the highest level once construction is complete.

While Turkey is trying to minimize threats from the Syrian border, it also wants to do so from the Iranian and Iraqi borders. Ankara has begun building a security wall along part of its border with Iran to prevent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants from moving easily between the two countries. Turkey is mired in a bloody war with the PKK domestically, and has taken significant steps to neutralize the terrorist group within its borders.

But in response, the PKK is constantly searching for new ways to continue its attacks. Turkey’s army has significantly reduced PKK infiltration from the south. But the group also has camps along the Iranian-Turkish border, and carries out attacks in Turkey then crosses back into Iran. So a wall between two countries will deal a serious blow to the PKK.

Ankara’s strategy regarding the years-long Syrian war and subsequent regional threats has reached a new phase. Turkey is shifting to tight border controls and cornering the Kurds and Daesh via border walls. It would not have faced such risks had it taken such steps earlier.

For the time being, it seems unlikely that Turkey will launch another operation in Syria against the YPG, given US and Russian support for the group despite Ankara’s objections. Instead, Turkey will likely focus on building a security zone along its border to corner terrorist groups such as the PKK and Daesh.

Source: arabnews.com/node/1143336/columns


Kuwait, Saudi Arabia between Two Crises

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

12 August 2017

Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, may he rest in peace, could have done what Qatar’s then-Crown Prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa did following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Back then, during a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Doha, Sheikh Hamad tried to blackmail the five GCC leaders at the summit by refusing to discuss liberating Kuwait unless they acknowledged Qatar’s rights to the Hawar and Fasht Al-Dibal islands from Bahrain.

King Fahd was the first to storm out of the room, considering this an insulting bargain.

Saudi Arabia saw its support for Kuwait as being loyal to pledges, respecting GCC principles and protecting states from chaos, no matter the reasons or motives behind the disputes. Of course, it was in Riyadh’s interest to defeat Saddam, but the less risky option would have been to coexist with him.

It would not have been possible to confront the invasion without Saudi Arabia’s desire and approval. The Kingdom hosted half a million troops, including 200,000 from the US, who liberated Kuwait in four days. King Fahd is a historic figure because he is the one who tolerated threats and managed the confrontation with Saddam, who was quick to cancel Kuwait’s identity and flag, destroy its legitimacy and replace its currency.

The king was keen to maintain the ruling Al-Sabah family and its unity, given that it is the symbol of Kuwait’s legitimacy. He hosted the family in Taif, a secure location away from Saddam’s attacks and intelligence agents. The king allowed Kuwait’s government in exile to fully operate from the city, and contributed to reviving Kuwait’s symbols by issuing the dinar, publishing some dailies and re-establishing its channels.

Kuwaiti military personnel, including the pilots who heroically fought from Ali Al-Salem air base against Saddam’s invasion, all gathered in Saudi Arabia. King Fahd supported the resistance against the invasion. His most dangerous decision was summoning US troops to the Kingdom; this was a huge personal responsibility. Several high-ranking Saudi royals asked him whether he was sure of his decision, and if he was able to get them out later on.

As US troops arrived and war preparations were underway, Saddam’s supporters in Saudi Arabia protested. Led by Sudan’s Hassan Al-Turabi and Tunisia’s Rached Al-Ghannouchi, the Muslim Brotherhood launched incitement campaigns against the Kingdom, accusing it of apostasy. Saddam’s ally in Yemen, then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, threatened Saudi Arabia, prompting the king to freeze relations with him and deport around 2 million Yemenis.

For the first time in Riyadh, protests erupted against the Saudi government, and young clerics spoke out against fighting to liberate Kuwait because it was not governed by Shariah law. People protested in several Arab capitals against Saudi Arabia, not against Kuwait. Many Arab governments supported Saddam. During an urgent Arab League session in Cairo, only a thin majority of 12 countries supported Kuwait’s cause.

Despite objections, then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak played a significant role in rejecting attempts to confuse the cause, and imposed voting by raising hands instead of reaching a consensus.

King Fahd risked his country’s stability, given that the chances of liberating Kuwait were slim, that there might not be a war, or that it would last a long time, like the Iran-Iraq war. There was the possibility of defeat, incomplete victory, Saddam not entirely leaving Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia not coming out of the war safe.

King Fahd could have copied Sheikh Hamad and bargained with Saddam in exchange for Kuwait, but he did not. He was a brave leader who made a historic decision to stand by Kuwait; we are all proud of this. As such, it is surprising to hear some Kuwaitis supporting Qatar today, instead of condemning its actions that threaten the security and existence of four countries. Kuwait has a moral debt to repay, and we expect it to do so.

If interests rather than morals are driving support for Qatar, we advise Kuwaitis to open their eyes and think about their future interests. Kuwait is not stable. It is the country that needs the GCC’s unity and stability the most. Saddam is gone, but his successors are much worse and more evil.

Source: arabnews.com/node/1143341/columns


Bassel Safadi, the Symbol of Syria’s Injustice

By Diana Moukalled

12 August 2017

Bassel Safadi Khartabil, the Internet guru who opened up the online world to plight of the Syrian people, was abducted by the Assad regime in March 2012 and taken to Adra prison in Damascus. A few months later he disappeared.

Until a few days ago, Bassel’s family lived in hope that they would see him again. Now they know that they will not. His parents are consumed with grief. His wife, the lawyer and human rights activist Noura Ghazi, is a widow.

They now know that after months of torture, Bassel was executed by the regime in 2015, as a global campaign to release him gathered strength.

The world found out about Bassel’s torture and death in the way it has always found out about the half a million killed, the arrest of thousands, the disappearance of more than 100,000 and the displacement of millions.

This is almost a textbook definition of injustice, and it is why Carla Del Ponte has resigned from the UN commission of inquiry into Syria after five fruitless years trying to prosecute Syria’s war criminals. “I am frustrated, I give up,” she said.

Del Ponte says obstruction in the UN Security Council means there can never be an indictment, and in any case Syria has deteriorated to the extent that one side is as guilty as the other. There is no support or political will to achieve justice for Syria, she says.

It is no coincidence that her resignation comes at the same time as demands grow for political dialogue with Bashar Assad that may help him to stay in power.

It is true that the Syrian situation is not easy, but we always find ourselves returning to square one, which is the existence of an unjust regime that oppresses its people through imprisonment and torture, which led to the uprising in the first place. The regime has escalated its methods, using the most horrific means to suppress the revolution and turn it into an international sectarian conflict. “Either Assad remains in power, or we will burn the country,” his supporters have said repeatedly. Now that is what is literally happening.

The irony is that while the regime jails, tortures and kills peaceful activists, young men and women, it deals differently with another group of prisoners, the Islamist opposition. Many of those who now lead extremist groups in Syria and Iraq were previously in Syrian prisons. Some were released after a pardon by the regime in 2011, others set free in deals between the regime and armed factions during the course of the conflict in the past few years.

These deals are part of the regime’s tactics. For example, battles between Hezbollah and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham (JFS) militants in the barren areas near the Lebanese border ended after a deal to exchange prisoners and allow militants to travel to opposition-held Idlib. Among those who travelled was the JFS leader Abu Malek Al-Talli — a former prisoner released in 2011.

This has been Assad’s cynical strategy from Day 1: Release the hard-liners, and then tell Syrians: “You have no other choice, it is either me or the hard-liners.” There is no such deal available to Bassel Safadi and those like him: They are imprisoned, tortured and killed. While international leaders turn a blind eye to these atrocities, there will be no justice for Syria.

Source: arabnews.com/node/1143366/columns


Making ‘Women’s Work’ Count

By Bharati Sadasivam

12 August 2017

Over the next few months, the 12,000 employees based at Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, California, will complete their move to an extravagant new campus. The “spaceship,” covering 2.8 million square feet, includes a two-story yoga studio, running paths, and even revolutionary pizza boxes that keep slices crisp. But one thing it does not have is child care.

When it comes to ignoring the importance of day care for working parents, Apple is far from unique. That omission places a powerful drag on parents’ ability to achieve their economic potential, with women suffering the most.

Worldwide, women carry out twice as much unpaid domestic and care work — including raising children, caring for sick or elderly family members, and managing the household — as men do. In Mexico, India and Turkey, women do three times more care work than men. This “gender chore gap” limits women’s choices, as it impedes their ability to obtain formal education, secure good jobs and achieve equal pay.

Though women worldwide do more paid and unpaid work than men in total, they earn a quarter less on average, hold only a quarter of executive positions in the private sector, and occupy less than a quarter of all seats in national parliaments. Only half of working-age women worldwide are in the paid labor force, compared to more than three-quarters of men.

This situation is slowly starting to change. Unpaid household and care work is gradually shedding its reputation as “women’s work,” and men today are assuming more household responsibilities than their fathers and grandfathers did. Some countries, particularly in Europe, are revising traditional leave policies so parents can choose how to allocate time off after the birth of a child.

More broadly, the value of unpaid household and care work — not just for children and family members, but also for the long-term health of societies and economies — is increasingly being recognized. Efforts to measure the contribution of care work to national economies have produced estimates ranging from 20 to 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

In 2015, UN member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which call for recognizing, reducing and redistributing unpaid care work — a measure long proposed by feminist economists and gender-equality advocates. The question now is what can actually be done to meet this objective.

The responsibility will lie, first and foremost, with governments. After all, while businesses or neighborhood associations may offer child care options to working parents, costs and quality vary widely. Government action is needed to ensure that care services cover all who need them — from preschool children to the sick, disabled and elderly — and that they are universally accessible and affordable.

But beyond services, achieving the SDGs’ targets will require policy change. Most important, governments must establish requirements for parental and family leave programs. Together with private companies, they can also provide monetary incentives for men and women to share household and care work more equally.

Such policies have proved effective not only in northern Europe — the most commonly cited model — but also in eastern European countries such as Lithuania, Estonia and Hungary, demonstrating that they can be applied anywhere. At a time when many governments, particularly in the developing world, face severe fiscal constraints, such interventions may seem farfetched. But spending on the care sector should be seen as an investment, not a cost.

A recent study in Turkey showed that $1 of public money invested in the care sector could create 2.5 times as many jobs as $1 invested in the construction industry. More than half of those jobs — decent jobs that could raise incomes and living standards, particularly for poor households — would go to women.

International institutions can play an important role in helping governments seize the opportunities presented by investment in the care sector. In Macedonia, the UN Development Programme undertook an initiative that helped women who had mostly worked at home their entire lives find jobs in the care sector. This enabled them to make use of their skills, by caring for children and for young adults with disabilities, while earning an income.

As populations grow and age, the care sector will only increase in importance. Adapting to these new circumstances now will give countries a considerable advantage as it bolsters women’s rights and freedoms, generates jobs, and makes societies more equal. So what are we waiting for?

Source: arabnews.com/node/1143406/columns


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