An unending conflict: Chronicle of the resurgence of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and central Asia
By CHINMAYA R. GHAREKHAN
DESCENT INTO CHAOS — How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia: Ahmed Rashid; Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 11, Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi-10017. Rs. 495.
This
topical book by a well-known Pakistani journalist is a well-informed and
intimate account of the events leading up to and after the U.S. and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Afghanistan following the
terrorist attacks on September 9, 2001. Ahmed Rashid, whose earlier work Taliban,
which was published before 9/11, earned him a well-deserved reputation as a
keen observer and analyst of Afghanistan and of the terrorist network of
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has written a racy and honest narrative of some of the
momentous developments in south and central Asia, with repercussions going
beyond what the author refers to as the “region”. He was part of a small expert
group which advised Lakhdar Brahimi during his stewardship of the negotiations
relating to the Afghan issue and, as such, had a ringside view of the
happenings and excellent contacts with all the principal players involved in
what he has called “descent into chaos.” The book has useful chapters on
central Asia, but this review is confined to the situation in Afghanistan.
Lost
opportunity
Rashid’s
thesis is that since all the three external governmental players — the U.S.,
Pakistan and NATO — were following their own agendas, which were not in harmony
with each other, and without any coordination among them, the experiment at
nation building in Afghanistan has been a failure and the field has been left
clear to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to regroup and reorganise themselves and to
re-emerge as a potent force for destabilising the region. The Americans, who
had abandoned Afghanistan once the Soviet Union was forced out of Afghanistan,
and whose sole interest, after 9/11 was to capture Osama bin Laden and destroy
his organisation, did practically nothing, at least until 2007, to check the
growth of the Taliban. They systematically turned a blind eye, to put the
matter charitably, to Musharraf and the ISI going to great lengths to protect
the Taliban. At the battle of Kunduz in November 2001, hundreds of Pakistani
military and ISI personnel were trapped. Musharraf made a personal plea to
President Bush, following which nearly a thousand persons, including several
hundred Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, were airlifted out of Kunduz into
Pakistan. The Taliban were anxious to surrender to the Americans or to the U.N.
or to the ICRC rather than to the Northern Alliance (NA). It seems that
American General Tommy Franks could easily have deployed a few hundred men to
accept the surrender of the non-Pakistanis, but refused, thus missing out a
unique opportunity of capturing many key Al-Qaeda fighters. More Taliban and
Al-Qaeda people escaped from Kunduz than from Tora Bora later. Pakistan had the
measure of the Americans and drew the right conclusion that the Bush
administration, particularly the Pentagon, desperately needed them on their
side in their war on terrorism and that Pakistan could pretty much act as it
pleased, so long as it satisfied the U.S. from time to time by capturing and
handing over a few Al-Qaeda operatives.
Taliban’s
comeback
For
Pakistan, the priority was always India. The author asserts that Pakistan let
go of a certain opportunity in 1988 to get the Durand line recognised by
Afghanistan at the time of the agreement ending Soviet occupation, despite the
U.N. prodding Pakistan to do so and mentions Yaqub Khan as stating that the
military deliberately did not seek recognition in order to gain “strategic
depth” against India. When the NA was poised for marching into Kabul, Musharraf
prevailed upon the Pentagon to ask the NA not to take over Kabul, since it
would be a great victory for India which, along with Iran and Russia, had
consistently supported the NA. The NA, having promised not to take over Kabul,
did just that, to the consternation not so of much the U.S. as of Pakistan.
From then on, the ISI had only one interest—how to prevent India from
consolidating its position in Afghanistan. In its bid to limit and eliminate
what it regarded as India’s growing influence in its backyard, the ISI
systematically helped the Taliban by letting it establish itself on the
Pakistan side of the border, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). The ISI distrusted Karzai, a sentiment fully reciprocated by the
latter. Shortly before 9/11, the ISI asked Karzai to leave Pakistan, where he
had been living since 1983, to oblige the Taliban which had assassinated
Karzai’s father. Initially Karzai had been a supporter of the Taliban, and
according to the author, had given them a sum of $ 50,000 and handed over a
cache of arms which he had hidden near Kandahar. The ISI actively protected the
Taliban, knowing fully well the nexus between them and the Al-Qaeda.
Washington, which poured in $10 billion of aid between 2002 and 2006, refused
to use its clout with Islamabad to weaken the Taliban, anxious as it was not to
upset Musharraf at any cost.
Diminishing
support
The
author maintains that once the Bush administration declined NATO’s offer to
collectively fight the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the members of
the latter never got over their dislike of Washington’s arrogant attitude. The
European governments also have had to deal with a more sceptical public opinion
which remains indifferent and even hostile to the idea of putting their
citizens in harm’s way in faraway Afghanistan. The number of caveats — 71 until
2007 — practically rendered their participation meaningless since they are
tantamount to declining to serve in the south where all the fighting has to be
done. The diminishing public support, coupled with the fact that those contingents
that are deployed in the danger zones, such as Canada, are suffering
significant casualties, has raised serious doubts about the possibility of the
NATO members sustaining their engagement over the long term.
As for
Karzai, the author basically admires him, especially for his courage in the
early days of his taking on the Taliban. However, the author frequently
expresses his disappointment with Karzai for his indecisiveness, his
inclination to take the easy way out instead of squarely confronting the
challenges and his failure to tackle corruption. He is particularly critical of
Karzai for his compromises with the warlords to the point of sacrificing the
authority of, and hence weakening the central government.
State
of affairs in FATA
Rashid
is objective in his references to India, which are not too many. He is open
about ISI’s support to the cross border terrorist attacks being launched from
territory under Pakistan’s control. He believes that Indian intelligence has
been active in supporting anti-Pakistan dissident and insurgent activities in
Pakistan, just as Pakistani intelligence agencies have been in India, he adds.
He regards highly India’s aid effort in Afghanistan. In his words: “India’s
success had stirred up a hornet’s nest in Islamabad, which soon came to believe
that India was ‘taking over Afghanistan’. India had implemented a $500 million
reconstruction strategy that was one of the best planned from any country. It
was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high
profile with the Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage, and of course
undercut Pakistan’s influence.” But, he adds: “Excessive Indian arrogance
provided the complaints that Musharraf used with Western leaders to explain
away his reluctance to befriend Karzai. The ISI generated enormous
misinformation about India’s role…”
Rashid’s
description of the state of affairs in FATA leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the Taliban have complete control over them and, in effect, is a state
within a state, more than the PLO ever was in south Lebanon in the 1970s. It is
strange and ironical that the same Baitulla Mehsud, with whom the Musharraf
regime signed a truce a little while before Benazir’s assassination, was held
responsible for it by the regime. So long as the Taliban’s hold over FATA
continues — and this is likely to continue for a long period — the West’s fight
against Al-Qaeda will not be won. A frightening prospect not just for the U.S.,
western countries, the world at large and India, but most importantly for
Pakistan.
Source:
http://www.hindu.com
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