Balochistan: Silencing the moderate voice
By
Rashed Rahman
July
17, 2010
The
assassination of the moderate nationalist, secretary general of the Balochistan
National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), Habib Jalib Baloch, in broad daylight in Quetta
reflects what may be an emerging pattern in the conflict-ridden, largest but
poorest province of Pakistan. Three days before Jalib’s death, the
assassination of another moderate nationalist leader, Maula Bux Dasti of the
National Party, proved to be a portent of things to come.
Balochistan
exploded in the aftermath of Jalib’s death, enveloped in protest, clashes with
police, and followed by a complete shutter-down strike. The BNP-M has declared
40 days of mourning and a three-day strike in memory of their martyred leader.
Balochistan
has been subjected to military suppression since Pakistan came into being. The
1948 accession of the province to Pakistan was obtained under duress from the
Khan of Kalat, the head of the Baloch tribal confederacy. Revolts took place in
1948, 1958-62, 1963-69 and then in 1973-77. The last insurgency, like the others,
ended in a military stalemate, general amnesty for the rebels and political
compromise with the Centre. In its wake, the moderate tendency amongst the
Baloch nationalists, of which Jalib was a part, won the day and dominated the
nationalist discourse for the next 25 years, having convinced the Baloch people
that armed struggle was not the way and that the parliamentary road would yield
better results by fighting politically for the province’s rights within the
federation. However, the results of this peaceful political engagement only led
to greater frustration, despite moderate nationalists being elected to the
provincial assembly and even forming governments. None of the issues agitating
Balochistan since 1947, foremost amongst them being control of their natural
resources — gas, arguably undiscovered oil, coastal potential and minerals —
were even remotely addressed, except as lip-service.
Frustration
amongst a new generation finally boiled over and a fresh guerrilla struggle
broke out in the mountains of Balochistan in 2002. This low level,
sputtering
insurgency, the fifth since 1947, received an exponential fillip when Nawab
Akbar Bugti, a pro-federation chief of the Bugti tribe (one of the two largest
tribes, the Marris and Bugtis), was killed by the Musharraf regime. Following
this development, Balaach Marri, the son of longtime nationalist leader and
chief of the Marri tribe, Nawab Khair Buksh Marri, was also killed in
suspicious and unexplained circumstances near the Afghanistan-Balochistan border.
His body was never recovered, while that of Bugti was buried hastily in a
sealed coffin without even being shown to his family. These killings came
against the continuing backdrop of ‘disappearances’ of nationalist dissidents,
who form the bulk of the ‘missing persons’ conundrum currently before the
Supreme Court in a case that promises no closure because the intelligence
agencies, suspected of responsibility for these disappearances, refuse to
cooperate or divulge the whereabouts of the thousands of ‘disappeared’.
One
such prominent but moderate dissident was Habib Jalib, who emerged as a student
leader during the 1970s. He was subsequently forced into exile in the erstwhile
Soviet Union because of the repression of the Zia-ul-Haq military dictatorship.
Upon his return after Zia met his maker, Jalib practised law with emphasis on
human rights law and the question of the ‘disappeared’. He was a thorn in the
side of the authorities in Balochistan for his impassioned oratory and
courageous advocacy of the ‘missing persons’ as well as the rights of his
people.
His
death is a grievous blow to the moderate nationalist cause, apart from being a
tragedy of great proportions.
Jalib’s
assassination is likely to strengthen the appeal of the insurgents and the
armed struggle school amongst the Baloch nationalists. If the pattern of
disappearances (reports of torture camps and worse have been filtering into the
Pakistani media sporadically) and now, assassinations, of prominent Baloch
nationalists becomes a fact, even moderate nationalists will be compelled to
revisit their faith in parliamentary politics to wrest their rights within the
state of Pakistan. Militant trends, including armed struggle, will probably
achieve greater resonance amongst the Baloch youth, and separatist sentiment,
which was not universally the anthem of the nationalists, may overtake all
other political tendencies in the province.
The
logic of repression and the inability of the state to address the essentially
political problems in Balochistan in a political manner rather than through
heavy-handed military means will ensure the destruction of the bonds that still
tenuously bind Balochistan to the rest of the country, becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy, and all in the name of saving Pakistan. A classic
short-sighted case of cutting off the nose to spite the face, this.
Source:
Indian Express, New Delhi
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