Pakistan Terrorism: Problems and Solutions

By Najam Sethi

22 Feb, 2013

Two types of terrorists have laid Pakistan low. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan comprises over a dozen outfits/commanders in FATA and has killed over 30,000 civilians and 3000 military personnel since 2008. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a monolithic anti-Shia sectarian organisation headquartered in the Punjab that is lethally active in Karachi and Quetta, and has target-killed over 500 Shias in 2012.

On the face of it, their methods - IUDs, suicide missions, ambushes - are similar. But their motives and objectives are different. The TTP is waging war against Pakistan, its people, constitution, political system, government and security agencies. It is focused on FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa even though its presence is ominous in other parts of the country like Islamabad and Punjab. The LeJ, however, is only targeting Shias. It is focused on Sindh in the south, Balochistan in the centre and Gilgit-Baltistan in the north. Only 10% of its attacks are in the Punjab.

In reality, however, there is an umbilical link between the TTP and LeJ. Both use the services and expertise of imported Al-Qaeda militants from Central Asia and the Middle East. Both are hard-line Sunni (Salafi and Takfiri) extremists. Both have significant former Jihadi elements from the Punjab in their rank and file. Both have direct and indirect, past and present, operational links to the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and FATA. Most significantly, both have operational links to Pakistan's military intelligence agencies because of their past anti-India Jihadi politics in Kashmir and current anti-American tactical alliances with Afghan Taliban in Waziristan.

In order to combat them effectively, it is important to understand their strategic alliances and tactical links. Thus, for example, a forceful combination of political will, police action, strong anti-terrorism laws and civil-military intel can yield dividends against the LeJ. But challenging the TTP requires, in addition, a degree of conventional military force and administrative resourcefulness. Unfortunately, however, the political will to confront either terrorist organization is lacking, the military force to subdue them is not forthcoming and administrative lethargy and due legal process are major stumbling blocks in prosecuting them.

Two recent developments explain the civil-military problematic. The military would like to crush the TTP. However, it doesn't want to pit its forces against the TTP Islamists without government approval. But the government is wary of extending approval for a military operation because public support is not forthcoming. Indeed, most Pakistanis are still in favour of negotiating peace deals with the TTP because they mistakenly believe that the TTP phenomenon is a direct backlash of US drone strikes and will melt away once the Americans exit the region by 2014. Imran Khan and a powerful section of the media have had a big role to play in nurturing such misplaced concreteness. This explains why the ANP, an avowedly secular and anti-TTP party that has long advocated military action against them, felt the need to organize an All Parties Conference in Peshawar last week that unanimously approved of talking to the TTP and negotiating peace with them instead of using military force. A more opportunist strategy cannot be imagined.

Much the same dilemma exists in the battle against the LeJ. There is no effective national counter-terrorism unit with physical, financial or forensic training to take on the LeJ. Therefore the politicians and police of the Punjab have turned a blind eye to the LeJ in exchange for an implicit understanding that the LeJ voter in as many as 40 constituencies will vote for the PMLN and PMLN leaders will not be targeted.

The situation is more complicated in Karachi where the police and government are ill-organised, ineffectual and weak-kneed, while the city is terrorized by half a dozen militant organizations with overlapping criminal, ethnic and sectarian agendas. In Balochistan, the consequences of the End Game in Afghanistan (Balochistan's contiguity to Taliban strongholds in Southern Afghanistan), Pipeline Politics (US opposition to Iran's quest for energy outlets via Balochistan), and the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia (which is a source of funding for the LeJ) and its Gulf allies (like Bahrain which is recruiting hard line Sunni LeJ supporters into its repressive police and security apparatus as an insurance policy against its radical pro-Iran majority Shia population) additionally impinge on the local situation. Matters are worsened by the Pakistani military's suspicions of the Persian-speaking Shia Hazara community in Balochistan that is both anti-Afghan Taliban (Pakistani assets) and pro-Iran. It doesn't take much to deduce from this that a blind eye is turned to the Hazaras' massacre at the hands of the LeJ.

Faced with angry protests and dharnas across the country, the government has responded with face-saving administrative transfers and postings and a couple of raids. But this is too little too late. Until Pakistan is able to establish well-funded, trained and motivated counter-terrorism force-units along the line of Western countries, backed by a national consensus and full civil-military cooperation, terrorism will increase and exact a heavy toll.

Source: http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20130222&page=1

URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-terrorism-jihad/pakistan-terrorism-problems-solutions/d/10513