Middle East Press On: Kebabs, Couture, Culture, Israel, Turkish, London: New Age Islam's Selection, 12 April 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
12 April 2025
With Friends Like These: Israel Is Collateral Damage In Trump's Trade War On The World
How Past Wars Influence Fitness Culture In Israel
Indonesia’s UAE Gamble On Palestine Is Misguided
Israel's Concerns Regarding Turkish Influence In Syria
Iraq's Sectarian Legacy, Regional Tension And Development Road Potential
From Kebabs To Couture: Turkish Brands Transform London’s High Streets
Iraq’s Electricity Crisis: Turning Point Or Tipping Point?
Turkiye Aims To Align With Damascus And Baghdad
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With Friends Like These: Israel Is Collateral Damage In Trump's Trade War On The World
By Tamar Uriel-Beeri
April 12, 2025
The Jerusalem Post Economics and Domestic Affairs correspondent, Eve Young, is a good friend of mine. As I began to write my column for this issue of the Report, she rubbed her forehead in concern – and I understand why.
US President Donald Trump announced late last month that he would impose a 10% baseline tariff on all trade partners, with additional duties for many countries, which includes 17% tariffs on Israeli goods.
Many were shocked, but I cannot say that I was. Trump’s reputation as a staunch supporter of the Jewish state was just that – a reputation, key to maintaining his stronghold among Jewish conservative voters. In reality, it was a means to an end, and this end – the tariffs – is ridiculous.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-849775
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How Past Wars Influence Fitness Culture In Israel
By Zach Nahum
April 11, 2025
During times of security instability, fitness culture becomes a survival tool, both mentally and physically. In Israel, where wars and military conflicts are an inseparable part of reality, physical activity is not merely a means to maintain health but an anchor that helps individuals cope with stress and anxiety. Past wars and the experience of dealing with them have shaped the way Israelis perceive fitness – not only as a method for improving combat readiness but also as a tool for maintaining personal and social resilience.
During the Cold War, the emphasis on physical fitness was an essential part of the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. US president John F. Kennedy called on citizens to take care of their physical fitness as a way to “strengthen the nation” and “demonstrate superiority” over the Soviet bloc. Kennedy even published an article in Sports Illustrated, where he said that Americans had become “soft” and that there was a need to improve physical fitness to maintain US superiority in the world. This phenomenon led to a new wave of physical activities such as running, aerobic exercise, and the development of the modern fitness industry, which became a part of American popular culture and later spread worldwide. The Cold War transformed fitness into an ideological battleground, where sports and physical activity were used as tools to demonstrate power and national dominance. At the same time, in the Soviet Union physical fitness was viewed as a way to showcase communism’s superiority and present the USSR as a model for a strong and united society.
Over the years, it has become evident how global emergencies, such as those in Israel, have led to significant changes in the fitness and health habits of citizens. From major wars to military operations in recent decades, trends in the fitness market have evolved in accordance with the times. In the complex reality of wartime, when anxiety, uncertainty, and daily stress become an integral part of Israeli life, fitness centers and group workout classes have become a significant refuge for many. Physical activity is not only a way to maintain physical health but also a crucial tool for preserving mental well-being. In situations where overwhelming headlines and security tensions weigh heavily on the public’s sense of calm, fitness provides an island of sanity – a space where individuals can disconnect from the outside world and focus on themselves.
The contribution of the fitness industry during wartime is twofold. Firstly, fitness classes help reduce stress and alleviate anxiety created by security threats through intensive physical movement, which has been proven to be calming and shifts the brain’s focus to different concerns, grounding individuals in the here and now. Secondly, fitness classes create a supportive social framework that strengthens the sense of belonging and community. People who attend group workouts not only train together but also share moments of human connection in a reality where loneliness and pressure can take over. They find comfort in the shared experience, realizing that many others are going through the same challenges and difficulties. This sense of solidarity fosters a feeling of community that encourages participants to maintain their fitness routines as a way to preserve mental well-being alongside physical health.
The combination of physical activity with social support provides the foundation for coping with the challenging reality of wartime. Instructors and fitness trainers offer tailored classes that focus not only on physical training but also on relaxation and stress relief. These spaces become environments where people can feel safe and protected, even if only temporarily. Group fitness sessions serve as an informal therapeutic tool, helping people manage difficult realities and maintain both mental and physical resilience during tough times. This can be observed in past wars, as well as in the current conflict, where soldiers and reservists on standby utilize their free time for workouts and strengthening unit cohesion through various sports activities, such as lifting improvised weights like jerry cans filled with water; adding extra weight using combat vests; or running laps around the base to release stress.
Additionally, physical activity is known for its positive impact on the brain – an area that has been extensively researched in recent years. Even short bouts of exercise encourage the release of endorphins, which improve mood and help individuals manage anxiety and depression. During crises like the one we are currently experiencing, this effect is especially critical. Fitness classes allow people to take a break from the constant news cycle and stress, dedicating an hour to themselves – to their bodies and minds. Recent studies show that physical activity helps reduce stress and depression and contributes to better sleep – an issue many Israelis struggle with during wartime.
During crises, such as wars, this effect becomes even more crucial. Fitness classes provide an opportunity to step away from the continuous exposure to news broadcasts that induce stress and anxiety in many Israelis, allowing them to dedicate time to themselves – their bodies and minds. Research has shown that even moderate-intensity exercise, such as walking or cycling, can lead to a significant reduction in symptoms of depression and anxiety. Additionally, activities such as yoga and Tai Chi, which incorporate mindfulness elements, have proven to be particularly effective in reducing stress and depression.
How fitness has impacted the Israeli mentality
The impact of fitness on Israeli mentality also stems from the cultural and social context of exercise in Israel. Past wars and the challenges they posed shaped the way Israelis perceive fitness – not only as a means to enhance combat readiness, which has historically been a requirement for men and women seeking to join certain military units, but also as a tool for maintaining personal and social resilience. Fitness has become ingrained in Israeli culture, symbolizing strength and endurance. It plays a central role in sustaining both personal and communal resilience during times of crisis. This was particularly evident in the most recent war, where many Israelis made a conscious decision to disconnect from the endless notifications and news updates and take time for their physical and mental well-being, even if just for a brief period.
Moreover, fitness facilities in Israel have undergone significant adaptations due to the country’s complex security situation. Many gyms have been constructed in or relocated to secure areas, adhering to safety guidelines set by the Home Front Command. This adjustment showcases the flexibility and rapid adaptability of the fitness industry and its participants in Israel, as well as the determination to stay active and maintain a healthy lifestyle even during crises such as war or pandemics like COVID-19, when gyms were forced to close for extended periods.
In recent years, many outdoor fitness projects have been established in parks and open spaces across the country, featuring a variety of exercise equipment. These facilities are particularly appealing to street workout practitioners and those who prefer outdoor training over traditional gyms. Cities like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv offer outdoor fitness stations equipped with strength training and cardio machines, ninja-style obstacle courses, core-strengthening equipment, and designated tracks for running and cycling. These facilities provide an opportunity for individuals to maintain a fitness routine safely and accessibly, even when indoor gyms are unavailable. Municipalities actively encourage residents to use these public spaces for exercise.
The adaptation of fitness facilities to changing security and health realities highlights the ability of the fitness industry to evolve and adjust to new situations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, many gyms began offering online classes and home workout programs to enable people to continue training safely. This shift demonstrated the industry’s capacity to adapt to dynamic circumstances while continuing to provide healthy and safe services, even when face-to-face training was not possible. This adaptability is crucial in a country like Israel, where security and health conditions can change rapidly, proving that Israeli fitness enthusiasts are determined not to abandon their training routines easily.
Past wars in Israel have left a profound mark on the country’s fitness culture, turning it into an important tool for coping with security emergencies. Over the years, physical activity has been perceived not only as a means of improving fitness and general health or as preparation for military service but also as a psychological anchor that helps individuals manage stress, anxiety, and uncertainty. In a reality where wars are a patent part of life, fitness has become a symbol of personal and social resilience, providing people with a stable framework amid security chaos. Gyms and group fitness classes serve a dual role – they offer a physical and mental refuge while reinforcing a sense of community and belonging.■
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-849526
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Indonesia’s Uae Gamble On Palestine Is Misguided
By Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat
April 11, 2025
Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Abu Dhabi this week and his overture to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to find solutions to the Palestinian genocide raise serious ethical and strategic questions. While diplomacy and global partnerships are central to Indonesia’s foreign policy identity, the choice of partner and the political motivations behind these efforts matter deeply — especially when the lives of Palestinians are at stake.
By reaching out to the UAE — a country that normalised relations with Israel through the 2020 Abraham Accords — Prabowo risks aligning Indonesia with actors complicit in the ongoing suffering of Palestinians. The UAE’s close relationship with Israel is not a secret. Abu Dhabi has deepened economic, military and technological cooperation with Tel Aviv over the past five years. It is disingenuous, if not outright cynical, to frame such a state as a neutral humanitarian partner in Gaza while its ties with Israel have arguably emboldened Israeli impunity.
What makes Prabowo’s move even more troubling is the timing and context. His call for UAE assistance came amid a series of bilateral agreements — eight in total — ranging from security cooperation to renewable energy and livestock investment. That these agreements were sealed during a visit ostensibly framed around Gaza paints a picture of humanitarian concern being used as a tool for economic diplomacy. Indonesia must not treat Palestinian suffering as a bargaining chip to enhance ties with a wealthy partner.
During the visit, Prabowo also asked for the UAE’s support for his evacuation plan of Gazans to Indonesia. While perhaps well-intentioned, this proposal plays directly into the hands of Israeli and .. agendas. Evacuation, under current circumstances, is not a neutral act. With Israel having taken control of more than half of Gaza and having repeatedly bombarded refugee camps and hospitals, any evacuation plan would require Israeli approval. That permission comes at a cost — and it is often spun into propaganda.
Evacuation risks legitimising Israel’s long-standing ambition: the permanent removal of Palestinians from their land. US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have repeatedly pushed ideas to depopulate Gaza under the guise of humanitarian necessity. Prabowo’s plan, however inadvertently, could be co-opted to give international cover to this agenda. Worse, it could aid Israel in reframing its brutal campaign in Gaza as a humanitarian success story of “safe passage” facilitated by its regional allies.
There is also a looming domestic backlash. Indonesia, facing budget deficits, sluggish economic growth and widespread layoffs, can ill afford to commit substantial resources to a large-scale humanitarian airlift — especially one whose motives are increasingly being viewed with skepticism. In the absence of clear national consensus, this proposal risks being seen not as an act of compassion but a desperate political manoeuvre to recover Prabowo’s declining popularity.
Even among those who support Indonesia’s firm stance on Palestine, there is concern that this kind of high-level theatre dilutes the authenticity of Indonesia’s solidarity. Real solidarity means advocating for justice, accountability and the right of return for Palestinian refugees — not relocating them under duress to third countries or refugee camps with no future.
Prabowo’s statements about “consulting with regional leaders” and seeking “peaceful solutions” echo standard diplomatic language, but they fall short when the chosen interlocutors are part of the problem. Instead of turning to the UAE, Indonesia should be strengthening alliances with countries and movements that have consistently stood for Palestinian self-determination — not those who normalised relations with Israel while Gaza burned.
There are alternatives. Indonesia can play a far more constructive role through international forums, humanitarian relief via neutral NGOs, and continued political pressure on Israel through the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Jakarta should also rally support among Global South partners — many of whom are growing weary of Western double standards on human rights
To be clear, Indonesia has long been a champion of the Palestinian cause. It is one of the few Muslim-majority countries that has consistently refused normalisation with Israel, and public sentiment remains strongly pro-Palestinian. But that moral high ground is at risk if our leaders begin to blur the lines between diplomacy and opportunism.
Prabowo still has time to correct the course. His overtures to the UAE as a partner in addressing the Palestinian genocide are profoundly misguided. A state that normalised ties with Israel and continues to strengthen that relationship cannot be trusted as a credible actor in the Palestinian struggle for justice. Indonesia must not lend legitimacy to such actors under the pretense of humanitarian diplomacy.
Indonesia’s legacy of principled support for Palestine should not be traded away for economic deals or diplomatic prestige. Indonesia’s voice in the world carries weight not because of its wealth, but because of its moral clarity — especially when it comes to standing with the oppressed. That voice must remain uncompromised.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250411-indonesias-uae-gamble-on-palestine-is-misguided/
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Israel's Concerns Regarding Turkish Influence In Syria
By Ismail Yasha
April 11, 2025
In recent days, Israeli officials have been expressing their displeasure at the growing Turkish influence in the Levant, amid reports that Turkiye is preparing to establish military bases near Syria’s border with occupied Palestine and to deploy air defence systems there. Israeli media outlets are also discussing on a daily basis the possibility of a military confrontation with Turkiye in Syria. Moreover, the Netanyahu government is holding security meetings to discuss ways to limit Turkish influence in Syria and avoid any military clash with it.
Last week, the Israeli army launched air strikes on two bases and military infrastructure sites in Damascus, Hama and Homs. An Israeli force also infiltrated the western countryside of Daraa, killing and wounding several Syrian civilians. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz warned Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, commenting on the attacks: “You will pay a heavy price if you allow hostile forces to enter Syria and threaten Israeli security interests.” Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar was more explicit than Katz when noting the aim of the air strikes and the meaning of hostile forces. He said that Israel is concerned about the “negative role” Turkiye is playing in Syria, Lebanon, and other areas, adding that the Turks are doing their utmost to turn Syria into a “Turkish protectorate”, as he put it.
Israel has always wanted Syria to remain weak and divided, exhausted by its internal issues, and it has always preferred that the Syrian regime remain in power. The fall of the regime and Russia’s withdrawal from Syria certainly upset its strategic calculations. Israel now wants freedom to act as it pleases in Syrian territory, and it believes that the presence of Turkish forces near its border will restrict this freedom, which it considers part of its natural rights. It also fears the formation of a strong army in Syria that would protect its national security, rather than protect a dictatorship based on the Alawite minority that is hostile to the Sunni majority.
No one can deny Turkiye’s role in the success of the Syrian revolution. However, Turkiye does not seek to control Syria or any part of it, or to transform it into a “Turkish protectorate”, as Israel claims. It does not want to impose custody over the will of its people. Rather, Turkiye says that “Syria belongs to the Syrians,” respects its sovereignty, supports the Syrians’ efforts to protect their country’s territorial integrity, and believes that achieving security and stability in Syria serves the interest of Turkiye’s national security. It does not plan to turn Syrian territory into an arena for a conflict with Israel or any other country. As for the Turkish military presence, signing agreements to establish military bases in Syria, or the training and arming of the Syrian army, the decision rests first and foremost with the legitimate Syrian government, which represents the will of the people, and no one has the right to interfere.
Within the framework of this strategic vision, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has asserted that “Turkiye does not want any confrontation with Israel in Syria, and that if the new administration in Damascus wishes to reach certain understandings with Israel, that is its own business.”
Israel knows that the Turkish army is the second largest in NATO after the US army, and that it possesses military capabilities and expertise that must not be underestimated. Based on this knowledge, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during his visit to the White House that they do not want to confront Turkiye in Syria. Netanyahu requested mediation by US President Donald Trump to resolve Israel’s problems with Turkiye and to use his relationship with Erdogan to limit Turkish influence in Syria. However, Trump urged him to act rationally and praised the Turkish president, saying he had accomplished an unprecedented matter, referring to the success of the Syrian revolution in toppling the Assad regime with Turkish support.
The Netanyahu government wants to offer Turkiye the option to divide areas of influence in Syria, with Russia on the west coast, Turkiye in the north, Israel in the south, and the US in the oil-rich east. It is also seeking to communicate with Ankara through diplomatic means and mediation via countries that have good relations with both Israel and Turkiye, such as the US, Azerbaijan and Hungary, to avoid a military confrontation between the two in Syria.
It is likely that Ankara and Tel Aviv will reach certain understandings, but the idea of sharing influence is unacceptable to Turkiye for several reasons. First, it would lead to dividing Syria, something Ankara categorically rejects. Turkiye is also unlikely to back down from its support for Syria, fearing Israeli threats. This is because current regional circumstances, shared interests, and the challenges facing both neighbouring countries (Syria and Turkiye) require coordination and cooperation in all areas.
Regardless of how valid Trump’s statements are about his admiration for Erdogan, Erdogan’s admiration for him, and Turkiye’s control over Syria, they suggest that the US has given Turkish influence in Syria the greenlight. The US administration is trying to reassure Israel, but the latter’s fears over its future cannot be dispelled, despite all the reassuring messages. Israel has seen firsthand how the Turkish-Syrian partnership, embodied in the Idlib experience, succeeded in uprooting the former regime, even after a decade.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250411-israels-concerns-regarding-turkish-influence-in-syria/
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Iraq's Sectarian Legacy, Regional Tension And Development Road Potential
By Mehmet Rakipoğlu
Apr 12, 2025
Iraq occupies a strategic position in Middle Eastern politics, making it a pivotal axis for regional and global powers. There are at least three key factors that underline its relevance: its unique geopolitical and historical profile, its disproportionate influence on Arab politics, and its cosmopolitan demography and vast hydrocarbon reserves. Iraq's civilizational strength is evident in the ruins of ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, including Babylon.
Historically, Iraq has symbolized Arab resistance, exemplified by Saddam Hussein's assertive foreign policies and the country’s protracted war against Iran (1980-1988) and confrontation with Israel and the United States. The country's diverse sectarian and ethnic identities – Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and others – have made it a focal point for political, economic and military interventions.
My field research conducted in Baghdad, Fallujah and the Najaf-Karbala corridor included interviews with political actors, academics and local stakeholders that provided a first-hand perspective on Iraq’s internal dynamics and regional entanglements. These insights reveal how Iraq’s fractured governance and competing external influences continue to shape its post-2003 trajectory. The Development Road project is particularly interesting, a significant infrastructure initiative symbolizing Iraq's search for regional agency and economic recovery. Framed within Iraq’s sectarian legacy and foreign interference, this analysis explores how domestic fragmentation, Iranian-Turkish competition, and regional rivalries intersect to shape the country’s future. The Development Road is not merely a logistical project but a barometer of Iraq’s capacity to move from conflict to cooperation.
The legacy of authoritarian governance, foreign interventions and ethno-sectarian engineering continues to shape Iraq's fractured political landscape. Saddam Hussein's regime marginalized the Shiite population, excluding them from critical roles in state institutions. The 2003 U.S. invasion triggered a dramatic shift, leading to the establishment of a Shiite-centric order under the 2005 Constitution. While framed as democratization, this American-led transformation reproduced the logic of exclusion in reverse, this time marginalizing Sunnis.
What emerged was not inclusive governance but a new form of sectarian authoritarianism. Many Sunnis became politically alienated, contributing to the radicalization that enabled the rise of extremist groups like Daesh. The U.S. occupation entrenched sectarian divisions and accelerated the collapse of state cohesion. This vacuum allowed external actors to exploit Iraq’s vulnerabilities for strategic gain.
Contested landscape
Among Iraq’s most influential external actors are Iran and Türkiye, two powers with distinct strategies. Iran’s influence, especially among Shiite groups, is deep-rooted and cultivated through religious, ideological and educational networks. In contrast, Türkiye’s approach emphasizes development, infrastructure, trade and education, illustrated by initiatives like the Maarif Foundation schools.
While Türkiye avoids framing Iraq as a zero-sum arena, Iran’s hardline factions pursue a more assertive posture to counter Turkish influence. Yet, field interviews indicate that anti-Turkish sentiment remains limited among Iraqi Shiites. Notably, forecasts suggest that Shiite political dominance may weaken in the 2025 elections. This is a shift that could redefine Iranian leverage in Iraq.
The Development Road initiative between Türkiye and Iraq aims to create a multi-modal corridor connecting Basra's Grand Faw Port to the Turkish border and European markets. It presents Iraq with a historic opportunity to become a logistical hub linking Asia and Europe, offering an alternative to maritime routes like the Suez Canal and Haifa Port.
Yet, this promise is entangled in Iraq’s internal divisions. Disputes between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the route and economic benefits have stalled progress. The KRG demands that the corridor pass through Kurdish-controlled areas to ensure equitable participation, while Baghdad remains noncommittal. These tensions mirror unresolved issues like oil revenue sharing and reflect deeper dysfunction within Iraq's federal system.
Regionally, the project has triggered strategic concerns. Egypt fears competition with the Suez Canal. Israel, reliant on the Haifa Port, sees its regional relevance waning, especially after Oct. 7. Iran’s reaction has been more reserved; although the corridor bypasses its territory, Tehran may benefit indirectly.
Who offers what?
Iran’s silence on the Development Road should not be mistaken for disinterest. Tehran’s cautious stance reflects a strategic calculation. First, the project could stabilize Iraq by creating shared economic interests across sectarian lines, aligning with Iran’s desire for a secure western flank. Second, it may stimulate growth in Shiite-majority cities like Najaf and Karbala, which have strong religious and cultural ties to Iran. Third, Iran retains strategic leverage through its control of the Strait of Hormuz and regional trade routes. Tehran’s reaction contrasts with its vocal opposition to the Zangezur Corridor in the South Caucasus, suggesting that Iran views the Development Road as complementary rather than competitive, as long as it does not undermine Iranian economic interests.
Türkiye has emerged as the leading architect and guarantor of the Development Road. Its diplomatic strategy emphasizes multilateralism and avoids excluding key Iraqi stakeholders, including the KRG. Ankara frames the corridor as a win-win venture, consistent with its broader regional normalization strategy, as seen in its rapprochements with Gulf states and pragmatic relations with Iran. Türkiye’s counterterrorism operations in northern Iraq and Syria, alongside its domestic political recalibrations, also contribute to the corridor’s security framework. International actors, including former U.S. President Donald Trump, have voiced cautious optimism about Türkiye’s stabilizing role in the region.
Field research and regional analysis highlight that Iraq is in a precarious position between domestic fragmentation and geopolitical competition. Iraq’s sectarian power dynamics and exclusionary politics post-2003 undermine national cohesion. In this context, Iran and Türkiye’s competing engagement models are critical and Türkiye's Development Road involvement represents more than infrastructure; it is a litmus test for Iraq’s ability to rebuild national unity, recalibrate regional relations and reassert strategic agency. Yet at the same time the Development Road, despite its economic promise and opening new possibilities, is vulnerable to internal gridlock and regional rivalry.
Iran could stabilize Shiite heartlands. For Türkiye, it aligns with an economic integration strategy. If implemented inclusively, the corridor could foster interdependence and reconciliation. Ultimately, Iraq’s recovery depends not just on infrastructure but on political will and institutional reform. The Development Road offers a pathway toward regional relevant, but only if Iraq can traverse its internal divisions and reclaim control over its future. Only through reconciliation can Iraq shift from a geopolitical battleground to a regional bridge.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/iraqs-sectarian-legacy-regional-tension-and-development-road-potential
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From Kebabs To Couture: Turkish Brands Transform London’s High Streets
By Tülay Kalyon Haznedaroğlu
Apr 11, 2025
In recent years, a quiet revolution has been unfolding – largely unnoticed – on the U.K.’s high streets. From the scent of aromatic kebabs drifting through city centers to the familiar hum of Turkish barbershops in suburban neighbourhoods, Turkish enterprises have carved out a dynamic presence in the U.K.’s high streets. But this isn’t just a trend – it’s a reflection of entrepreneurship, cultural exchange and the growing global appreciation for quality and authenticity.
Turkish brands in London are far more than niche businesses serving an expat community. They are cultural ambassadors, reshaping the city’s cosmopolitan identity. From fashion to fine dining, these enterprises blend tradition with modernity, infusing London with a distinct Turkish flair that bridges centuries-old heritage and contemporary sensibilities.
Turkish cuisine, long celebrated in the U.K. for its bold flavors and communal spirit, has won a devoted following. At its heart lies a rich cultural heritage that resonates with British consumers. Take Efes Restaurant & Bar, for instance. Named after the ancient city of Ephesus in Aegean Türkiye, Efes was founded in 1974 by Kazım Akkuş – also known as “Kazım Chef.” Now over 50 years in operation, it’s one of the U.K.’s best-known döner establishments. Efes has become synonymous with Turkish culinary excellence and was even honored by Queen Elizabeth for its contribution to gastronomy.
Another standout example is Sofra, a restaurant chain established by Hüseyin Özer. He began his culinary journey in a humble döner kebab shop in Mayfair before expanding across London. Today, Sofra’s restaurants are recognized by the Michelin Guide, offering British diners a window into Türkiye’s diverse food culture.
While many of these pioneering Turkish businesses began in London, the movement now stretches well beyond kebabs and grills. A new wave of Turkish brands – rooted in Türkiye itself – is now setting up shop in the capital to attract a global clientele. London has become a proving ground for these companies to declare: “We’ve arrived.”
Historically, Turkish brands were often perceived as affordable but unremarkable. That perception is shifting. Today, a growing number of Turkish firms are showcasing luxury, exclusivity and craftsmanship – offering haute cuisine, fine accessories and premium goods to an international audience.
One notable newcomer is Hafız Mustafa 1864, which recently opened its 20th branch in Knightsbridge, directly across from Harrods. Having already expanded from Türkiye to Dubai, the brand now brings a taste of Ottoman elegance to Britain.
Shortly after, Cafer Erol 1807 – a confectionery brand with over 218 years of history – opened its flagship European store just steps away from Harrods. Its colorful windows display and traditional sweets offer visitors a sensory journey to the lively streets of Istanbul.
Then there’s Elvish Honey from Artvin, one of Türkiye’s most exclusive exports. This rare and highly prized honey is now a fixture at Harrods, priced at a staggering 6,000 pounds ($7,758) per kilogram. Harvested in caves in the Black Sea region, it represents the peak of artisanal Turkish production and is now finally being appreciated at its true value.
Karaca, a well-known Turkish homeware brand, has also expanded in London, reinforcing the growing impact of Turkish craftsmanship in the U.K. This marks a turning point: Turkish ceramics, whose roots date back to the Uyghur period of the eighth and ninth centuries, are claiming their rightful place in Britain’s design-conscious homes. It’s not all about British porcelain anymore.
And in the realm of luxury, Kismet by Milka has joined London’s jewellery elite. The brand opened its 16th global store on New Bond Street, securing a 10-year lease for a 1,100-square-foot space alongside some of the world’s most prestigious names. Drawing from Türkiye’s rich trove of natural resources – gold, silver, gemstones, enamel and glass – Kismet’s designs scream design and quality, coming from the land of Ottomans and fit for sultans.
Behind this success lies economic resilience. Turkish firms weathered post-Brexit uncertainty and the COVID-19 pandemic with remarkable agility. Many tapped into established diaspora networks to streamline supply chains, while others capitalized on Britain’s hunger for handcrafted, artisanal goods – like handwoven textiles from Gaziantep or organic olive oil from Ayvalık. These ventures do more than fill storefronts; they create jobs, pay taxes and enrich communities. A boutique or kebab house in Birmingham or Manchester is more than a business. It’s a community anchor, a cultural bridge and an economic contributor.
Of course, challenges remain. Post-Brexit trade regulations continue to complicate logistics and drive up costs. But Turkish entrepreneurs persist with characteristic tenacity, adopting e-commerce, embracing innovation and blending Turkish and British flavors in creative new ways.
The expansion of Turkish businesses in the United Kingdom is a win-win. For consumers, it offers access to authenticity and quality. For the economy, it means diversification and resilience. And for society, it serves as a reminder: diversity, when paired with opportunity, enriches everyone. These enterprises are not just selling products. They’re weaving Turkish heritage into the very fabric of British life.
After all, London has long served as the launchpad for global brands. With over 20 million annual visitors, many from middle and high-income groups, the city remains a strategic hub for international growth. Turkish brands are not just setting up shop. They’re reshaping London’s urban experience, adding new textures to its retail, dining and business sectors. As the city continues to evolve as a melting pot of ideas and cultures, Turkish entrepreneurs are using it as a stage to offer bold perspectives, showcase world-class products and elevate the daily lives of both Londoners and their guests.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/from-kebabs-to-couture-turkish-brands-transform-londons-high-streets
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Iraq’s Electricity Crisis: Turning Point Or Tipping Point?
Jessica Obeid
April 11, 2025
Iraq’s electricity crisis has reached a critical juncture, significantly worsened by growing geopolitical tensions and shifting US policy. For years, the country has relied on Iranian electricity and gas imports to meet about 30 percent of its power supply. This arrangement has been sustained through temporary US sanctions waivers, which have allowed the imports to continue despite the broader sanctions regime. However, these exemptions are now ending. In early March, Washington rescinded Iraq’s waiver to purchase Iranian electricity as part of its policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran and urged Iraq to reduce its reliance on Iranian energy.
Iraq now faces an urgent challenge: to either develop sustainable domestic solutions or deepen its dependency on diesel generators and Iranian gas imports. The latter approach is risky, as Washington has signaled that the remaining exemptions may be revoked. Acknowledging the need for a long-term solution, Iraq has taken significant steps to address its electricity crisis. Reforms to energy infrastructure and policies will be required to ensure Iraq’s energy future is sustainable and secure; otherwise, it will be increasingly vulnerable to supply disruptions and power shortages.
For decades, Iran has been a lifeline for Iraq’s power sector, which struggles to maintain a stable electricity supply due to decades of conflict and persistent mismanagement. The available capacity of the national grid is estimated at less than 28 gigawatts, compared to a peak demand of 48 GW. Iranian energy imports play a vital role in bridging this gap; however, Tehran’s frequent cuts to gas supplies — often due to its own domestic shortages or political motivations, particularly following the implementation of US sanctions on Iran in 2018 — have made this lifeline unreliable.
With Washington now calling on Baghdad to “eliminate its dependence on Iranian sources of energy,” Iraq will need to find alternatives or risk further deterioration of its already unstable grid.
Recognizing the need for a sustainable solution, Baghdad has taken concrete steps to reduce its dependence on Iranian energy and strengthen its energy security. As a result of its efforts, power generation capacity has expanded by an average of 1 GW to 2 GW annually; however, this remains insufficient to meet rising demand. The key initiatives that the government is currently focused on — expanding domestic gas production and infrastructure, diversifying gas suppliers, deploying renewable energy and connecting to regional power grids — come with significant challenges, ranging from a lack of investment to bureaucratic and political hurdles. Overcoming these will be essential for Iraq to establish a stable and self-sufficient power sector.
One of Iraq’s most immediate needs lies in increasing domestic gas production and infrastructure. A key inefficiency lies in gas flaring. While the country produces significant amounts of natural gas, much of it is burned off because the country lacks the facilities to process it into fuel for local consumption. Iraq has committed to end this practice by 2028 — a long-term solution that will require substantial investment and political commitment. Successfully harnessing this resource could reduce the country’s reliance on Iranian imports and strengthen its energy security.
Iraq is also moving forward with an offshore natural gas platform and transmission line to fuel power plants in Basra, as well as a new 40 km pipeline to carry gas from the southern oilfields to power stations. However, building infrastructure in Iraq has historically been subject to bureaucratic delays and political roadblocks, making the execution of these projects uncertain.
In the meantime, the country is seeking to diversify its gas supply by importing gas from countries such as Turkmenistan and Turkiye. In October 2024, Iraq signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to supply up to 20 million cubic meters per day of gas, though the gas will be transported via Iranian pipelines. While this is a step toward diversifying Iraq’s energy sources, it is still dependent on Iran’s infrastructure — a key vulnerability that Iraq must address if it is to ensure energy sovereignty.
Renewable energy also presents a viable long-term alternative. The country has abundant solar resources and has signed contracts with major developers like TotalEnergies to build large-scale solar projects. However, to implement such projects successfully, Iraq will need to invest in upgrades to its grid infrastructure to accommodate intermittent power. Additionally, ensuring the process is efficient will require targeted policy reforms.
Regional integration also offers a vital alternative to Iran’s power supply. In 2024, Iraq started importing electricity from neighboring countries, including Jordan (150 megawatts) and Turkiye (300 MW). A 1,000-MW interconnection with Saudi Arabia is being created, with Iraq expected to start importing electricity from the Gulf by late 2025. Iraq is also working to double its import capacity from Turkiye, which will help reduce its reliance on Iranian imports and provide additional sources of power.
While these initiatives are crucial, they are only part of the solution. The electricity sector’s challenges are not only due to the shortage in gas and power supply, but also elevated subsidies resulting from political dynamics, as well as high transmission and distribution losses, which are estimated at up to 50 percent. These losses are driven by grid inefficiencies, illegal connections and non-billing practices. Iraq’s ability to build a sustainable power sector ultimately hinges on whether it can implement comprehensive reforms and establish reliable infrastructure that can address these systemic issues.
Iraq’s electricity crisis is not just a technical challenge, it is a reflection of broader geopolitical struggles and internal dynamics. The country’s ongoing dependence on Iran, its internal political divisions and the vested interests that benefit from the status quo all present significant obstacles to achieving energy independence. Iraq’s plans are ambitious, yet the country’s success will depend on its ability to tackle the root causes of its electricity challenges.
This crisis represents both a turning point and a tipping point. The failure to implement reforms and establish a sustainable power sector could push the country deeper into crisis, further eroding trust in the government and worsening its dependence on costly short-term fixes, such as diesel generators or additional Iranian imports.
However, the crisis also presents an opportunity. If Iraq can harness its gas reserves, diversify its energy sources and build stronger regional ties, it could build a more sustainable energy sector for the future.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2596706
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Turkiye Aims To Align With Damascus And Baghdad
Dr. Sinem Cengiz
April 11, 2025
US President John F. Kennedy once said of American-Canadian relations: “Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies. What unites us is far greater than what divides us.” This also describes the relationship Turkiye is cultivating with Syria and Iraq: they are becoming economic partners, and allies in the face of shared threats.
With the collapse of the Assad regime, Ankara has intensified its efforts to build bridges between Damascus and Baghdad. Behind the scenes, Turkiye has been preparing for an important meeting between Syria’s new leader Ahmad Al-Sharaa and Iraqi officials, possibly at the Antalya diplomacy forum this weekend. However, it is not clear whether Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani will meet Al-Sharaa.
While Iraq initially took a cautious approach to Syria’s new leadership, recent developments indicate a shift. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Baghdad last month, which helped in a change of heart in Iraq toward Damascus. In Ankara, there is an understanding that constructive relations between Baghdad and Damascus not only serve its interests — particularly counterterrorism efforts and economic cooperation — but also align with the broader regional interest. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underscored this when he said: “No power can overcome Turkiye, Syria, and Iraq when we unite.”
Since last year, there has been remarkable progress in Ankara’s relations with Baghdad. During President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Iraq, his first since 2011, 27 agreements were signed. Since then, dozens of meetings have taken place on water, energy, security, and trade.
Turkiye’s approach to Iraq rests on five strategic pillars: transforming Iraq into a regional cooperation platform, advancing the Development Road Project to boost economic connectivity, ensuring unwavering cooperation against terrorism, counterbalancing Iran’s political influence in Iraq, and fostering a diplomatic bridge between Iraq and Syria’s new leadership. This strategy also appears to align with Washington’s objectives in the region. While Turkish-American relations have been strained in Syria, their interests in Iraq seem to converge. Washington seems keen to bring Iraq closer to the Gulf states and Turkiye, in a bid to contain Iran’s influence.
At the heart of the Turkish-Iraqi interests lies the Development Road Project — an ambitious regional infrastructure initiative designed to enhance economic integration. Ankara expects to finalize an agreement with Iraq on the project soon. With funding expected from Gulf partners such as Qatar and the UAE, Turkish officials anticipate that the first parts of the project could become operational by 2027. When asked about Syria’s possible inclusion in the project, Fidan responded: “I think it is possible. It would be good. I think Syria can be a part of this project with certain formulas.”
There was a flurry of diplomatic activity last week between Ankara and Baghdad. An agreement was signed between the Iraq Development Fund and the Turkiye Wealth Fund on a strategic collaboration alliance. Iraqi officials noted that, for the first time, Iraq and Turkiye are going beyond mere trade to embark on long-term strategic initiatives. On the Turkish side, there is optimism about progress on two major projects — one involving Iraq and the other connecting Turkiye to Syria.
Beyond the economic stakes, a significant shift in Turkiye’s Iraq policy took place at the security level. One of Turkiye’s long-standing goals has been to secure firm support from Baghdad in its fight against the Kurdish separatist PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkiye, the US, and the EU. That goal was finally realized last year when Iraq banned the PKK. In return, Turkiye signed an agreement with Iraq to improve water management in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, committing to “fairly and equally” allocate shared water resources between two neighbors. Turkiye and Iraq also signed an agreement on military and counterterrorism cooperation, focusing on eliminating the PKK threat. If all these stars align, Turkiye is also hoping to secure Iraq’s support for a long-term Turkish military presence in northern Iraq to prevent PKK infiltration across the border.
The Iraqi army also plans new bases near the Turkish border to enhance security, highlighting the close collaboration with the Kurdish Regional Government’s peshmerga forces. The mountainous landscape has long posed a challenge to securing the border, making regional cooperation essential. In the broader perspective, Ankara is working to forge a regional security alliance that includes Jordan and Lebanon, along with Syria and Iraq, aimed at countering the Daesh threat, particularly along the Syrian-Iraqi border.
For Iraq, pitching itself as a regional actor depends on getting its domestic political landscape in order. Turkish-Iranian rivalry plays a significant role in shaping Iraq’s political landscape, which influences Turkish calculations. From Ankara’s perspective, a cooperative relationship between Syria and Iraq is vital — not only for Turkish national security and economic interests but also for the broader region’s stability.
Turkiye’s ability to bring Iraq and Syria together, if it succeeds in doing so, would certainly mark a fundamental shift in the three-way relationship.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2596699
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