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Why It's So Difficult To Decipher the Gulenist Network: New Age Islam's Selection, 03 August 2016

New Age Islam Edit Bureau

03 August 2016

 Why It's So Difficult To Decipher The Gulenist Network

By Metin Gurcan

 Dividing Syria: A Difficult Mission

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

 US Starts Its Long-Awaited Anti-ISIL Campaign In Libya

By Olivier Guitta

 The Mirage Of The Meek Muslim Women

By Khaled Diab

Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau

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Why It's So Difficult To Decipher The Gulenist Network

By Metin Gurcan

August 2, 2016

After the July 15 attempted coup in Turkey, the Gulen movement became an important item on the global agenda. The movement has been active in Turkey for 40 years and operates in 130 countries employing hundreds of thousands of people in the fields of education, health and trade with annual revenue exceeding $50 billion.

Most of the international media insist in depicting the Gulen network as an Islamic civil society organization that defends moderate Islam, advocates democratic values and that is open to dialogue with other currents, although about 250 security personnel and civilians were killed defending democracy on July 15.

The resentment felt abroad against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan must have a role in this persistent misreading of the developments. This anger and the concern that Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies will be institutionalized in Turkey after July 15 no doubt influences the view of the Western media about the Gulen movement.

In Turkey, following the December 2013 corruption operations and the government’s sustained and well-organized media counterattacks, the public had begun to identify the Gulen movement as a "parallel state" inclined to terror. The vital question now asked is whether Gulenists are behind the July 15 coup attempt.

How Can International Public Opinion Be So Misguided?

Above all, we tend to see the Gulenist structure in a modern paradigm as a hierarchical body, with rigid internal discipline and followers who are strongly devoted to its highly charismatic leader. This is where we make mistakes when analyzing the Gulenist structure.

According to Kahraman Sakul of Istanbul Sehir University who spoke to Al-Monitor, the Gulenist network is based on much more complex relations. He said, “Contrary to sustained media comments, I don’t think the network model of Gulenists emulates the classical pyramid model of terrorists. The Gulen movement has transparent, overt networks of trade, finance, education, media, health and social media and secret, covert networks of military and intelligence bureaucracy.”

Until now, international opinion focused on overt Gulenist networks. But the testimonies of soldiers detained after the coup make it clear there are enormous differences between the overt and covert networks of the Gulenist movement.

In their official narratives used by overt networks, Fethullah Gulen is portrayed as an “opinion leader.” We are told that his basic goal is to spread his service worldwide, to serve global peace by doing business all over, to overcome prejudices between religions and culture, and to ensure interfaith dialogue. But what we hear from testimonies of pro-Fethullah Terror Organization (FETO) military officers, the narrative used in secret networks is quite different.

Here you are told of the coming of a global Islamic salvation. You are told to carry out instructions without questioning to achieve the sacred goal. This was their way of saying ends justify the means.

Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, who was taken hostage by his closest associates on the night of the coup attempt, has said he was approached by air force brigadier Hakan Evrim, who told him, “If you wish, we can arrange for you to talk to our opinion leader Fethullah Gulen,” which proved their absolute obedience to Gulen.

Soldiers in the covert networks are obliged to carry out the orders passed on to them by their civilian “older brothers.” No Gulenist in uniform knew any other officer of the same affiliation. This is best explained by the testimony of Muhammed Uslu, a civilian working in the private secretariat of the prime ministry who was also the “older brother” of Lt. Col. Levent Turkkan, the senior aide to Akar. We were amazed to hear how Uslu received the daily recordings of the office of the Chief of General Staff and passed them on to another civilian brother he didn’t even know.

The group that constitutes the core of the secret network would spread the unquestionable instructions to lower levels, where the only requirement was to carry them out. This blind obedience also meant that many bright Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) officers with master’s and doctorate degrees were passing on what they learned to “older brothers” they didn’t even know.

Investigations have revealed that the “older brothers” of secret networks and imams on the ground have proved their skilled use of social media for communication. In addition to live couriers, their favourite communication means were messaging applications CoverMe, which erases messages after they are read, and WhatsApp.

Secret cells of Gülenists do not operate on a hierarchical pyramid model. Their nets don’t operate on the basis of perpendicular hierarchies of command and control but on horizontal hierarchy. For example, there are reports that on the night of July 15, many generals were ordered around by colonels and even more junior ranks. An air force non-commissioned officer is said to have issued orders to generals to apprehend Erdogan.

Why didn’t this secret network succeed on July 15? Their absolute secrecy in a way was the basic cause of their failure. The coup attempt that requires coordinated actions, a common ideology, a joint operations center and a leader became a fiasco because of their addiction to absolute secrecy. Now some critical questions:

1. Are all ranking officers who were detained or discharged from the TSK members of a secret cell? Did this network also influence officers who had other motivations, such as simply opposing the government or those pursuing their own self-interests such as career advancement?

2. Will massive purges of military judiciary, police and intelligence services ensure total eradication of FETO secret cells?

3. How will overt networks of FETO in Turkey and the world change after July 15? Will these networks go deeper underground or become more transparent?

4. Does FETO have sleeper cells that have infiltrated critical official bodies in the United States and other countries?

Source: al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-coup-attempt-who-difficult-to-decipher-gulenists.html

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Dividing Syria: A Difficult Mission

By Abdulrahman al-Rashed

2 August 2016

Since the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011 against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, some have predicted the country’s division along ethnic and sectarian lines due to fears over the wellbeing of minorities. The uprising turned into a civil war, then into military interference by foreign powers such as Iran, Russia and Hezbollah.

Foreign and local jihadist groups - such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham - emerged and resided in Syria. Some 12 million Syrians have been displaced, a third of them seeking refuge abroad.

Talk of dividing Syria has resumed because U.S. officials have recently said they are not ruling out such a scenario. Some consider this the beginning of a new division of the Middle East, this time as agreed by the United States and Russia rather than Britain and France. I do not think there is an agreement to divide Syria, mainly because Washington and Moscow lack the power on the ground to impose borders in the Middle East, old or new.

Russia and Iran have been trying for a while to implement a less difficult mission, which is enabling Assad to govern areas under his control. However, they have not even succeeded at this yet, let alone at creating new entities that will compete for resources and borders.

Kurds

An example of chaos and war is Iraq, Syria’s neighbour. Since 1990, Iraqi Kurds have lived in a semi-autonomous region following the war to liberate Kuwait. What has prevented the establishment of a Kurdish republic in northern Iraq is not Baghdad, Turkey or Iran - the three parties usually opposed to Kurdish independence - but the international community, specifically the permanent U.N. Security Council members.

The council refuses to give the Kurds the right to independence. No one wants to change the map of the region due to the uncontrollable chaos and divisions that may ensue. Regarding Syria, the international community may have become convinced that division is better than a failed state. Executing this may have been possible during the first two years of the revolution, but this has become harder today due to mass displacement of people.

I do not think there is an agreement to divide Syria, mainly because Washington and Moscow lack the power on the ground to impose borders in the Middle East, old or new.

For example, after ISIS occupied the city of Manbij, many of its residents fled. When militias affiliated with extremist Syrian forces went there to expel ISIS with international support, they expelled many residents for ethnic reasons, and around 200,000 escaped.

It is also impossible to ignore the regional factor, and the fears of countries such as Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Syrian ethnic and sectarian components have extensions in these countries, and any acknowledgment of entities based on ethnic considerations will threaten their territorial integrity.

Turkey strongly opposes attempts at Kurdish self-rule along its border. Even Iran, which does not border Syria, fears that such attempts may stir separatist sentiment among its own Kurdish population of some 8 million.

Regarding Syria’s Alawites - the sect to which the Assad family belongs - many of their young men have fled the country to escape mandatory military service, and thousands of families have sought refuge elsewhere out of fear of vengeful acts.

To divide any country, citizens must be able to return to their areas. This happened in Yugoslavia following the civil war and its subsequent division into four republics upon international sponsorship.

The situation in Syria, however, is like a broken vase that has scattered into small pieces. Maintaining the state via a new political system under international sponsorship would also be difficult, especially amid the Iranian and Russian occupation of Syria on Assad’s behalf.

Source: alarabiya.net/en/views/2016/08/02/Dividing-Syria-A-difficult-mission.html

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US Starts Its Long-Awaited Anti-ISIL Campaign in Libya

By Olivier Guitta

02 Aug 2016

On August 1, the United States began a new military air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) in its stronghold of Sirte in Libya. This has come as an unsurprising move.

The bombing was in response to the request of the Government of National Accord (GNA), whose Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj had previously said Libya did not need foreign intervention.

In fact, for many this is exactly the expected scenario: the GNA - set up by the United Nations and wanted by the West - is turning out to be, among other things, an instrument to legitimise military strikes against jihadist groups.

Now that the US may have opened the Pandora's box, multiple issues are springing up: How long is the military intervention going to last? What is going to be ISIL's response? What about other jihadists? What will be the role of General Khalifa Haftar and his leading military force in Libya?

US warplanes target ISIL in Libya for first time

Nothing New

It is quite notable that this is not the first US strike against ISIL in Libya. On February 19, the US carried out air strikes on an ISIL camp in Sabratha in concert with the UK, France and Italy, killing dozens, Tunisians for the most part.

In the past few months, the US has beefed up surveillance of ISIL in Libya to gather intelligence, most likely in preparation for air strikes. In the meantime, US Special Forces have been stationed at two outposts in the country.

Special Forces from other countries have also been deployed in the country. UN Envoy to Libya Martin Kobler has already confirmed the "open secret" that France has been operating in the country along with the US.

Additionally, British Special Forces have been fighting alongside the Misrata Brigades against ISIL and, more surprisingly, the Jordanians have also joined.

While it is undeniable that ISIL has suffered military defeats in Sirte, it could be employing a tactical retreat and go underground to fight an asymmetrical war consisting of suicide bombings and car bombs, following its recently changing tactics in Iraq and Syria.

Just two weeks ago, France suffered its first casualties in Libya. Three Special Forces soldiers were killed when their helicopter crashed because of a "mechanical failure".

A far-fetched explanation of France's mission from General Haftar's spokesman was that France had been gathering intelligence on Boko Haram, after some Malian members had arrived in Libya.

In any case, what ensued after the announcement of the death of the three French soldiers is telling, and could spell trouble for the US as well.

Libya's mufti called France's actions a declaration of war, and jihadist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb condemned and threatened France. There were also massive demonstrations in Tripoli against France's presence in the country.

The Real Conundrum

Will the US follow the same fate now? The difference with France is that the US attacked ISIL targets at the request of the GNA, but for many Libyans the attack was still a foreign intervention.

Indeed, on the domestic front, the GNA still has to gain recognition and earn its legitimacy from many - including the powerful eastern tribes and, last but not least, the most powerful man in the country, General Haftar.

That is where the real conundrum lies: Most Western nations - along with Russia and China - support and work with the only viable military force, General Haftar's, which is at odds with the GNA.

The fighting between various groups is still very acute: Libya's new defence minister recently survived an assassination attempt by a car bomb while one of his guards was wounded.

Sadly, one can expect more political assassinations in the next few months in Libya, especially against the GNA officials.

Now the question remains: What is the real status of ISIL in Sirte? Even the estimated number of ISIL fighters in Libya has varied widely over the past few months.

The figure varied from 2,000 to 10,000, and now it has supposedly been halved. The inaccuracy tells us that this is a game of guessing - nobody actually knows for certain.

In any case, it seemed too easy when Libyan forces claimed to have taken Sirte back, leaving ISIL reportedly with no more territory in the country.

Making the Same Mistakes?

If that was really the case, why would the US be called to the rescue and launch air strikes against ISIL?

While it is undeniable that ISIL has suffered military defeats in Sirte, it could be employing a tactical retreat and go underground to fight an asymmetrical war consisting of suicide bombings and car bombs, following its recently changing tactics in Iraq and Syria.

ISIL will certainly use the US air strikes as a propaganda tool to draw more foreign recruits to fight against the "infidels" that have come once again to Muslim lands.

So far, ISIL's recruitment efforts in Libya from the West have been disappointing. Allegedly only 20 British and a handful of French joined their cause. This may quickly change if ISIL makes Libya even more of a focal point of its strategy.

After the disastrous 2011 Libyan intervention that yielded the current situation, the US has to be careful of the unintended consequences of a new military campaign.

Especially at a time when even one of its top generals recognises that its current strategy against ISIL in Libya makes no sense.

Source; aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/starts-long-awaited-anti-isil-campaign-libya-160802131907056.html

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The Mirage of the Meek Muslim Women

By Khaled Diab

02 Aug 2016

George Washington once opined that "offensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only … means of defence".

In his campaign to become president of the United States, Donald Trump seems to have been inspired by Washington's idea - common in modern warfare - but, with his questionable command of the English language, has misinterpreted the word "offensive".

Ever since he began his bid for the presidency, the Republican nominee has managed to offend an untold number of individuals, not to mention groups as diverse as women, Muslims and Mexicans - and yet, somehow, stay ahead.

Trump's Polemics

The latest victims of his outrageously offensive campaign are Khizr and Ghazala Khan, the bereaved parents of Captain Humayun Khan, who was killed while serving in Iraq.

In response to Khizr Khan's criticism of Trump's politics of hatred and division at the Democratic National Convention, all the Republican candidate could rouse himself to say was "I'd like to hear his wife say something.

"If you look at his wife, she was standing there. She had nothing to say," he elaborated in a later interview. "She probably, maybe she wasn't allowed to have anything to say."

Unsurprisingly, such a callous attack against a grieving "gold star" mother, in a country where the military is regarded as sacrosanct, sparked outrage, even among conservatives.

Trump was recycling one of the most common stereotypes about Islam in Western Islamophobic circles: the notion that Muslim women are silent, submissive, subservient creatures living under the thumb of their menfolk.

In a moving article, Ghazala Khan explained that her silence was not because she was some kind of downtrodden Muslim woman, but was down to grief because "every day I feel the pain of his loss … The place that emptied will always be empty."

Offensive and insensitive as Trump's comments were, he was bringing nothing new to the table.

Tapping into what seems to be his family's knack for "borrowing", Trump was recycling one of the most common stereotypes about Islam in Western Islamophobic circles: the notion that Muslim women are silent, submissive, subservient creatures living under the thumb of their menfolk.

Picking Up The Wrong Fight

Earlier in the campaign, Republican hopeful Ben Carson, the neurosurgeon who was out to prove, but failed, that running for president wasn't brain surgery, made a similar point: "[Muslim] women must be subservient," he insisted.

I wondered if Carson would have the guts to tell Hind Wajih - Egypt's first female bodyguard - to her face that she is subservient to men. I should warn him that she is a champion martial artist and a bodybuilder.

While Islam, like all major world religions, is patriarchal, Muslim women - who come in all shades of conformity and rebelliousness - are far from silent and submissive.

Were my maternal grandmother around today, she would have shown Trump and Carson just how coy and obedient Muslim women are with a few deft, well-targeted lashes of her tongue.

Although my grandmother was raised in a traditional Egyptian milieu, she was a formidable character who was queen of her castle, and woe betide anyone who trespassed on her turf.

My gran raised birds on her rooftop. One time, a burglar had the audacity - and misfortune - to land on my grandmother's roof.

Sensing that her precious birds were in mortal danger, she grabbed a knife from the kitchen and a stick.

Looking out of the window, she ordered the burglar to stay where he was because she was coming to teach him a lesson. The terrified man leaped to a neighbouring rooftop and ran as if his life depended on it.

Strong Muslim Women

Her daughter, my mother, perhaps partly inspired by this role model of strong womanhood at home, and how it belied the idea that men were superior, grew up to become a firm believer in gender equality.

A promising young writer and activist, my mother, in the 1960s, was inspired by the leftist, pan-Arabist dream of female emancipation.

My mother's was the first generation of Egyptian women to gain equal access to higher education, employment, the right to vote - meaningless as that was in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt - and the right to run for public office.

While many Western critics of Islam are convinced that Muslim women must either choose between Islam and feminism, for my mother, this was a false choice.

Mum was convinced that the essence of Islam was one of egalitarianism and equality between the sexes, and that women should be involved in its reinterpretation.

Women have long been fighting hard for their rights. In recent years they have regained the lost momentum and are pressing for complete equality - in every walk of life and profession, even if it occasionally costs them their lives, as it did the Pakistani blogger and activist Qandeel Baloch.

Trump's snarky, ignorant, bigoted remarks are an insult not just to Ghazala Khan but also to the millions of Muslim women around the world bravely fighting for their rights every day.

Source: aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/mirage-meek-muslim-women-160802080206995.html

URL: https://newageislam.com/middle-east-press/so-difficult-decipher-gulenist-network/d/108160


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