Muslimophobia in India: Reasons and Remedy (Part Two)

By A. Faizur Rahman

27 May 2023

(With Permission from the author to publish this chapter ‘Muslimophobia in India: Reasons and Remedy’ from the Book 'Politics of Hate -Religious Majoritarianism in South Asia' Edited by Farahnaz Ispahani - Published by HarperCollins Publishers India.- )

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Hindutva

Hindutva owes its popularity to Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), the Hindu Mahasabha leader who had made it the pivotal theme of his 1923 essay ‘Essentials of Hindutva’ (retitled ‘Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?’ in 1928). The idea itself, however, had been introduced in Bengal during the 1890s by Chandranath  Basu (1844–1910) in his Bengali essay ‘Hindutva—an Authentic History of the Hindus’, which extolled the superiority of Hinduism over other religions.

Around the same time, another Bengali writer, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), invoked Hindutva to arouse the Hindus. His provocative 1882 novel Anandamath fictionalized Hindu nationalistic sentiments in Bengal by narrating how ‘everyone was angry with the Muslims for the anarchy and lawlessness of their reign’, and how Hindus were keen to establish a sense of Hindutva because ‘Hindu rule of life had disappeared’ (Hindudharmer Bilope Anek Hindui Hindutva Sthapaner Janya Agrahacitta Chila). Interestingly, even the concept of Bharat Mata and the Hindus-are- in-danger notion appear to have had their origins in nineteenth- century Bengal.

However, it is Savarkar’s interpretation that forms the basis of Hindutva today. It ideologically links Hindutva with the term Hindu, which Savarkar defined as one who (1) regards the entire subcontinent as his fatherland (Pitrubhu), (2) is descended of Hindu parents and (3) and considers this land holy (Punyabhu).4

These three conditions signify a common nation (Rashtra), a common race (Jati) and a common civilization (Sanskriti), respectively. And together they form the foundation on which Hindutva rests.

This understanding has a lot in common with the theory of Aryanism which postulates that the Hindu race, because of its pre- eminence in every department of human activity, is the greatest nation that has flourished yet on this earth. And the religion of this nation, unlike ‘other religions’, is not a confession of weakness or an admission of human helplessness that relies on an external power for salvation. It is an embodiment of the dignity and independence of the ‘supreme manhood’ of its adherents.

Their land (India) too is masculine (Pitrubhu). In Aryan terms, it is called Aryavarta (the abode of the Aryas) and encompasses the Gangetic plains of north India, Rajasthan and Punjab, where the Aryas settled after defeating various local savage people. They are believed to be the descendants of the nomadic pastoralist people mentioned in the Rig Veda who came to India around 2,000 BCE. However, for a section of the Hindu right today, the Aryas were not outsiders. The ‘eternal and unhistorical’ nature of their religion makes them the autochthonous inhabitants of Aryavarta.

The emergence of India after Independence as a secular, democratic republic under Nehru saw the advocates of Hindu nationalism go into a state of political quiescence, especially after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948, which led to the ban on the RSS, a prominent Hindutva organization, on suspicion of being involved in the killing. This dormancy lasted beyond the assassination of Indira Gandhi, who had also banned the RSS during the infamous Emergency (1975–77).

But Hindutva could not be suppressed for long. It was back on form in the 1980s when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), another Hindu nationalist organization, started a movement for the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya at the very spot where the sixteenth century Babri Masjid stood, claiming it to be the place where Lord Ram was born. The VHP’s campaign came soon after the formal launch of the BJP in April 1980, which lost no time in announcing its support for the movement, perhaps as an act of political expediency. One of the BJP’s prominent leaders, Lal Krishna Advani, embarked on a provocative pro-temple Rath Yatra (chariot journey) in 1990 to Ayodhya from Somnath in Gujarat. Since then, Hindutva has dominated the national discourse.

On 6 December 1992, the Babri Masjid was demolished by a huge mob, sparking riots across the country. Although commitments were made to restore the status quo ante of the disputed site and rebuild the mosque at the same place, they were never honoured. Meanwhile, thanks to Hindutva, the BJP widened its political footprint and found itself in the seat of power with a landslide victory in May 2014.

After assuming office, the party did try to arrange an out-of-court settlement of the mosque–temple imbroglio, but in vain. Finally, in November 2019, within months of the BJP winning a second term, the Supreme Court of India decided the case in favour of the temple being built there. This was followed by the acquittal of all the thirty-two accused in the Babri Masjid demolition case, including L.K. Advani.

Although this brought closure to the longest Hindu–Muslim dispute in the history of India, legal scholars criticized both judgments. RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat was, however, certain that ‘Hindutva is the essence of this (Hindu) Rashtra’s ‘swa’ (selfhood). We are plainly acknowledging the selfhood of the country as Hindu.’ Soon, huge rallies were launched to collect funds for the construction of the new Ram temple in Ayodhya.

In one such VHP rally organized in Delhi in January 2021, provocative slogans were raised invoking Hindu Talwarein (swords) and Trishul (tridents) as a warning to those who presumed Hindus to be weak, but not just that—Kar Sevaks (volunteers) from the locality who were in Ayodhya during the demolition of the Babri Masjid were honoured.

Reasons for Muslimophobia

A deeper analysis of the Hindu right’s historical Muslimophobia would reveal that the main reason for it was not Islam but a sense of political insecurity born out of exaggerated fears of a Muslim demographic threat. These anxieties came to the fore in 1905 when Bengali Hindus vehemently opposed the partition of Bengal into the provinces of ‘Bengal’ in the west and ‘Eastern Bengal and Assam’ in the east. They apprehended that it would reduce them to a minority in the western province and launched such intense protests that the British were forced to revoke the decision in 1911.

In Punjab, too, it was feared that the Punjab Land Acquisition Act of 1900 would force Hindus—‘sons of the soil and its most ancient inhabitants’—out of agriculture and into other competitive professions, because of which they were in danger of becoming a minority not just in Punjab, but in all of India.58 The bogey of Muslim political domination was raised again when the Indian Councils Act of 1909 introduced separate electorates for them. While the cry of ‘Hindus in danger’ was raised by certain Punjabi Hindus led by Lajpat Rai, Lal Chand and Munshi Ram, others sought to convince the Hindus of the importance of Shuddhi and Sangathan. That apart, petitions for cow protection were circulated, and steps were taken to form separate associations for the Hindu and Muslim press.

What is astonishing is that even a great liberal-minded jurist like B.R. Ambedkar suspected the loyalty of Muslims. His fear was that with the Indian army being predominantly Muslim in its composition, and with most of these Muslims being drawn from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), in the event of a foreign invasion from the north-west by a Muslim neighbour  like Afghanistan, Muslims might join the invader rather than defend India, and would almost certainly disobey orders if India were to ever decide to invade Afghanistan.

Ambedkar, therefore, wanted Hindus to welcome Pakistan’s separation from India so as to have a ‘safe army’. He also rhetorically asked them whether it was better to have the Muslims ‘without and against or if they should be within and against’. The best option, therefore, was to concede the territory of Pakistan, for that was ‘the only way of getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army’.

Ambedkar had another important reason for conceding Jinnah’s demand for a separate Muslim state. He felt that without Pakistan, the ‘communal problem’ would involve 65 million Muslims, while after its creation, it would involve only 20 million Muslims in India. This would greatly reduce the proportion of Muslim to Hindu seats in central and provincial legislatures in India, which would fall even further once weightage was cancelled. It would also ‘free the Hindus from the turbulence of Muslims as predominant partners’. In fact, long before Hindutva parties accused the post-Partition Congress of Muslim appeasement, Ambedkar had warned the party, saying that its policy of appeasement and concession would only exacerbate Muslim aggressiveness, for they would interpret it as a sign of Hindu defeatism. The Hindus might thus find themselves in the same fearful situation that the Allies found themselves in as a result of their appeasement policy towards Hitler.

Notwithstanding Ambedkar’s shocking views, one would have expected the Hindu right’s unfounded worries of Muslim ascendancy to end or subside after India’s independence. But they continued to be highlighted periodically. In September 2004, the VHP working president of north Gujarat region, Chinubhai Patel, expressing alarm at the 36 per cent rise in the decadal growth of Muslims reported in the 2001 census, said that the community was ‘conspiring to convert “Hindu Rajya” into Muslim country’ and urged the Hindus to get united and organized in ‘defeating’ the ‘purpose’ of the Muslims. VHP leader Ashok Singhal brought up the issue again in February 2014 by warning Hindus that their population was fast declining and if it continued at that pace, they would become a minority in India. He wanted Hindus to have five children so as not to let Muslims and Christians outnumber them through conversion or marriage with Hindu girls. More recently, BJP leader Surendra Singh said that Hindutva will become endangered in the next fifty years unless population control laws are enacted in the country. On 15 August 2019, in his Independence Day speech, Prime Minister Modi also flagged the issue of population explosion and said that having a small family was a form of patriotism. His comments came a month after BJP Member of Parliament Rakesh Sinha introduced the Population Regulation Bill 2019 in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian Parliament.

The bill inter alia states that whoever, in contravention of the small family norm, produces more than two children will receive reduced benefits under the Public Distribution System (PDS), will be eligible for loans from financial institutions but at higher than the  existing interest rates, and will receive lower interest rates on saving instruments. Besides, such a citizen shall be disqualified from being chosen as a member of either the house of Parliament or of the state legislature or of any body of local self-government, i.e. panchayat or municipalities. Three years later, in April 2022, Sinha withdrew his bill when the federal Union Health Minister, Mansukh Mandaviya, said that ‘population control should happen by creating awareness among people and it should not happen by force and being made compulsory’.

Significantly, just a few days before this bill was introduced, hundreds of people gathered in Delhi along with some BJP leaders, including Union Minister Giriraj Singh, to demand a Population Control Law to ‘tackle the problem of declining Hindu population and to stop the rise of non-Hindu population’.

It is astonishing that, Hindu leaders who speak in support of population control laws in India frame the discussion provocatively in terms of Muslims conspiring to numerically overwhelm the Hindus or to aggravate poverty. For instance, the chief minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, urged Muslims in his state to adopt ‘decent family planning’ norms to bring down poverty and control social problems. On 5 October 2022, speaking at a programme in Nagpur on the occasion of Vijayadashmi, the RSS chief, Mohan Bhagwat, warned that ‘population control and religion-based population balance is an important subject that can no longer be ignored’, because ‘population imbalances lead to changes in geographical boundaries. Alongside the differences in birth rate, conversions by force, lure or greed and infiltration are also big reasons.’ Once again, the RSS chief did not clarify what he meant by ‘religion-based population balance’ and which religion or religions he was referring to.

Given this reality, medical anthropologist Nayantara Sheoran Appleton was forced to go on record stating that the idea of a ‘population explosion’ lends credence to the country’s already surging anti-Muslim sentiment which, she pointed out, is based on false concerns that the population growth of Muslims in India is quickly outpacing that of Hindus.

Similar concerns were expressed by another disinterested non- Muslim commentator, Gurdeep Singh Sappal, against the CAA, passed in December 2019. He wrote that under this law, the majority of Hindus and other non-Muslims would have nothing to complain about when their citizenship was confirmed, but Muslim citizens who failed the citizenship test could go to detention centres or perhaps live as disenfranchised and disempowered people.

 

Other Parts:

Muslimophobia in India: Reasons and Remedy (Part One)

Muslimophobia in India: Reasons and Remedy (Part Two)

 Muslimophobia in India: Reasons and Remedy (Part Three)

URL:   https://newageislam.com/books-documents/muslimophobia-india-remedy-part-two/d/129862

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