Middle East Press On: Turkey's Monetary Policy, Lebanon, Israel, Hezbollah, US Israel War on Iran, War Becoming Global Economic Crisis, New Age Islam's Selection, 12 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
12 March 2026
When Türkiye's monetary policy meets global geopolitics
Caught in the middle: Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah
Analysis: Why the GCC must avoid entanglement in the US-Israel war on Iran
Starmer's dilemma over UK's role in Iran war
Israel and the United States: Looking forward to Armageddon
Iran’s Long Memory: The Hidden Force Shaping Today’s War
Radwan’s Comeback — Did Hezbollah Outplay Israel?
Is the Iran War Becoming a Global Economic Crisis? A Media Roundup
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When Türkiye's monetary policy meets global geopolitics
BY MAKBULE YALIN
MAR 12, 2026
To maintain a sense of intellectual continuity, I would like to begin by revisiting some reflections from my article dated Dec. 25, 2025, titled "Why Economic Forecasts Will Fail More Often in 2026." At that time, I drew attention to the fact that we were entering a year when economics would evolve from a technical discipline into a field of psychological equilibrium, causing forecasts to falter more frequently. The global economy is no longer primarily shaped by market cycles. Instead, it is driven by geopolitical decisions, policy interventions, and sudden shocks. Models designed for a predictable world are now being asked to explain an economy governed by uncertainty. As trust in global trade and monetary policy deepens, or rather, as the crisis of confidence deepens, and the economic costs of security-driven preferences rise, forecasting errors become inevitable.
My observations regarding Türkiye were particularly significant. Scarcely three months ago, I noted that 2026 would serve as a "threshold to test whether hard-earned trust can be preserved," emphasizing the vital importance of managing expectations and "policy confidence."
The first major threshold this year is the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, scheduled for today. The decision to be announced at this meeting, and its subsequent impact on the disinflation process, will represent far more than a mere interest rate adjustment. It will be a decisive moment for the very credibility we seek to maintain.
Economic policy as choice
At this juncture, it is worth opening a conceptual parenthesis: What exactly is economic policy? In the complex global climate of 2026, this discipline is no longer a mere optimization of figures; it is a delicate art of balance struck between conflicting interests, diverging goals, and societal expectations.
The oldest yet most contemporary dilemma in economic history is the tense relationship between "growth" and "price stability." While the growth performance, so highly praised in international reports, serves as "lifeblood" for producers and exporters, an inflation rate that remains far from its target signifies a systematic loss of purchasing power for households and fixed-income earners. Here, the government’s policy priorities serve as an arbiter. However, it must not be forgotten that growth achieved in an environment where inflation cannot be reined in risks turning into a self-consuming "illusion" in the long run.
In a modern economy, success is measured not by the individual technical excellence of institutions, but by the dialogue and coordination between them. It is imperative that the steps taken by the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) toward the disinflation target are in full harmony with fiscal policy. If budget discipline loosens or public spending drifts in a different direction while the Central Bank attempts to cool demand, "policy confidence" suffers a severe blow. Trust is built when institutions look at the same data and speak the same language.
Every economic policy choice grants an advantage to one segment of society while imposing a "cost" on another. The real test for politics here is to ensure the fair distribution of this cost and to persuade broad segments of society to accept today’s sacrifices for "tomorrow’s stability." It is at this very point that today's decisions will transcend being mere matters of "basis points." It evolves into a communication manifesto, demonstrating the state’s will to manage these conflicts of interest and its determination to preserve "hard-earned trust."
EBRD paradox
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)’s recent upgrade of Türkiye’s 2026 growth outlook to 4.0% serves as a significant validation of the economy’s inherent "muscularity." However, this optimism, when paired with EBRD President Odile Renaud-Basso’s urge to "stay on course" in the fight against inflation, confirms the very dilemma I outlined at the beginning of this piece.
While the EBRD applauds our growth resilience, it simultaneously points to how energy shocks from the Strait of Hormuz and the Iran conflict have pushed monetary policy toward a "high-risk" junction. The 12% spike in crude prices is the unmistakable sound of the "Grey Rhino" that standard models failed to anticipate.
This brings us back to today's decision: To be swayed by international growth praise while ignoring the looming energy-driven inflation would be to risk shattering the most fragile asset of 2026, "policy confidence." As Renaud-Basso emphasized, the real challenge is to maintain the anchor of price stability even when the winds of growth are blowing in our favor. Today's decisions will provide a global answer as to just how sturdy that anchor truly is.
Numbers, risks
The greatest risk in economic management is losing the warnings whispered by the numbers within the noise of theoretical models. Lest we forget, the CBRT's Inflation Report on Feb. 12 painted a remarkably sanguine picture, basing its assumptions on oil prices at $60.9 for 2026.
Today, however, we are confronted by a "Hormuz moment" and a geopolitical storm centered in Iran that has effectively stripped us of the luxury of a "wait-and-see" approach. This is a concrete manifestation of the structural fracture I highlighted in my January article, the very reason forecasts are failing so frequently.
While the market was pricing in a trajectory with interest rates sliding down to the 28-30% band by year-end, the sharp surge in energy prices has disrupted the entire equation. For an energy-importing economy, the course of oil is not merely a cost item; it is the "soft underbelly" of both the current account balance and the disinflation process. The "prudence mode" signalled by Governor Fatih Karahan in February has now become an absolute necessity.
In this context, my projection for today's MPC meeting is clear: CBRT will pause its rate-cutting cycle. Taking any further step toward "easing" before the waters in global energy markets settle, and before the inevitable revisions are made in the May 14 Inflation Report, would risk shattering our most precious asset: "policy confidence."
The market is currently testing not just what the CBRT will do, but how firmly it can stand behind its own messaging. With the baggage of past "decisions disconnected from reality" still lingering in memory, the March 12 decision will be far more than a technical adjustment of a rate, it will be a declaration of how resolutely the CBRT can hold its course against the global storm.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/when-turkiyes-monetary-policy-meets-global-geopolitics
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Caught in the middle: Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah
BY MUSTAFA YETIM
MAR 12, 2026
Lebanon once again confronts a new phase of regional polarization and a deepening war with the U.S.-Israel joint invasion in the region, threatening the already fragile regional stability.
On the one hand, the so-called “resistance bloc,” with Iran at its center and including non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, mobilizes its capabilities to repel military intervention in the face of existential threats. On the other hand, the U.S. and Israel launch new aggressive military incursions every day in different points of Iran and Lebanon.
Back in the fight
Perceiving the possible loss of Iranian leadership and the potential collapse of the Iranian state as a red line in its local and regional positioning, Hezbollah was forced to end its "silent waiting period" and adopt a more aggressive strategy, even though it needed time and space to recover from the strategic, military and organizational setbacks it suffered in its latest conflicts with Israel.
In this new chaotic period, while Israel attacks Iranian territory with its air force alongside the U.S. to cripple Iranian missile capacity and deterrent power, it has also begun to express its intention to invade Southern Lebanon to significantly weaken Hezbollah, which is Iran’s strongest and most established non-state ally in the region.
In other words, since the outbreak of the new cycle of the Iran-Israel confrontation at the end of February, Israel appears to be following a two-pronged war strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to confine Iran within its own territory by crippling its military capabilities. On the other hand, it aims to suppress Iranian-backed non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah, by becoming directly involved in Southern Lebanon. In this sense, Israel intensified its aerial bombardments and intelligence-based attacks against Hezbollah targets and Lebanese territory in general.
Yet, despite its weakened and tarnished deterrent capability and its declining hegemonic position within Lebanon, Hezbollah at the moment appears to demonstrate a certain degree of resilience against Israeli attacks. In several encounters with Israeli tanks and soldiers, it has been reported that Hezbollah inflicted material damage and military casualties on the Israeli side, in addition to carrying out drone and rocket attacks, particularly targeting Northern Israel.
Therefore, while the initial U.S.-Israeli calculations regarding the “resistance bloc” signaled an imminent outcome of either “victory” or “surrender,” developments on the ground suggest a more complex picture.
Despite many initial setbacks, the Iranian leadership, along with Hezbollah’s new leadership and its reorganized military structure under the leadership of Naim Qassem, appears to have managed the initial phase of the confrontation and now seems intent on re-establishing the deterrence it had previously lost against Israel. As a result, Lebanon has once again become heavily embroiled in the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel.
Caught in the middle
Under such circumstances, the Lebanese state, while attempting to reinforce centralization, the monopoly of force, and its fragile sovereignty, tries to contain both Hezbollah’s military activities and Israel’s invasionist incursions on different fronts.
In this context, the Lebanese government, which was formed following another destructive war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2024, adopted a two-track strategy. Domestically, it declared Hezbollah an outlawed organization, called on it to disarm and announced the arrest of its members. Internationally, it appealed to external actors such as France to prevent a possible Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory.
However, considering the strong interaction between Lebanon and the broader polarization and conflict dynamics unfolding in the Middle East, this new cycle of violence is likely to obstruct the Lebanese government’s efforts to restrain both Hezbollah and Israel.
Actor against authority
Long characterized as a “non-state state,” reflecting the entrenched influence of sectarian non-state actors that conduct autonomous political and military activities, Lebanon once again seems to have certain difficulties sustaining its statehood in the face of emergent destructive impacts.
Hezbollah, the most prominent among non-state forces, consistently resisted calls for disarmament from both domestic and international actors, presenting itself as the primary resistance force against Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanese territories and its recurrent violations of Lebanese sovereignty.
In this context, despite the new government’s attempts to reinforce central state institutions under the newly formed cabinet and recently elected leadership, Lebanon remains on a precarious path, with its future largely shaped by evolving confrontation dynamics and regional power politics.
In addition to spillover risks in the domestic arena and along the Israel-Hezbollah front, if the recent confrontations deepen and expand, concerns about renewed tensions among Lebanon’s sectarian factions may re-emerge, further fueling instability not only in Lebanon but also across the wider Levant region. Such a development could also undermine the already fragile security and stability in neighboring Syria, given the presence of actors with strong transnational linkages across the region.
To conclude, while Lebanon attempts to navigate intertwined domestic and regional challenges, it faces the risk of being entrapped in a new cycle of political fragility and security instability, intensified by its close interaction with regional dynamics, which in turn shape domestic power balances.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/caught-in-the-middle-lebanon-between-israel-and-hezbollah
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Analysis: Why the GCC must avoid entanglement in the US-Israel war on Iran
DR. TURKI FAISAL AL-RASHEED
March 11, 2026
• Iranian strikes on radar systems reveal gaps in the US-led missile defense network protecting Gulf infrastructure
• GCC unity and defense reforms are urgently needed to shield Vision 2030 assets from regional escalation
TUCSON, Arizona: As US President Barack Obama left his country’s embassy in Dublin in his fully armored limousine, his convoy hit an unexpected snag. The vehicle’s underside scraped on a simple ramp and became stuck at the gate — a multimillion dollar machine defeated by an ordinary piece of pavement. The image is hard to forget — enormous investment, but poor design for real world conditions. Our region risks making the same mistake if we pour money into “exquisite” defenses that fail at the critical moment.
The US Defense Innovation Unit, created in 2015 by then Defense Secretary Ash Carter, was meant to prevent exactly that kind of failure in the military domain. It was designed to break through Pentagon bureaucracy and connect the armed forces with fast-moving technologies from Silicon Valley, shifting from slow, traditional contractors to agile private firms. In reality, this has meant experimenting with autonomous systems, microsatellites, and artificial intelligence, while fighting the inertia, over-centralization, and rent-seeking that often plague big defense programs. The core lesson is simple: if you do not reform how you buy and use technology, you end up with very expensive systems that are not fit for the next war.
That next war is now unfolding over our heads. The ongoing US–Israel war on Iran has exposed a dangerous vulnerability in the US-led missile-defense architecture in the Middle East. Iran has executed a sequenced, systems-level campaign that, in a matter of days, blinded and degraded core elements of the US missile-defense network in our region. By destroying the Qatar-based AN/FPS 132 early-warning radar and at least three AN/TPY 2 X band radars linked to THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan, Tehran has turned what was designed as a layered, redundant sensor web into a patchwork with serious gaps.
This tactical success has strategic consequences. It accelerates the depletion of high-end interceptors, exposes critical bases and energy infrastructure, and destabilizes key partners such as Jordan. It also erodes US deterrence credibility in the Indo Pacific, because the same finite interceptor stockpile is supposed to help defend Taiwan and Japan. In other words, the Middle East is consuming systems that Washington also counts on for other theaters — a risk Gulf policymakers must factor into any calculation about escalation.
Iran’s approach follows a three-step logic familiar from suppression of enemy air defenses, but applied to missile defense. First, “kill the eyes” by striking early warning radars. Second, “kill the aim” by targeting fire control radars that guide interceptors. Third, “destroy the batteries” by hitting the launchers themselves. Each step attacks a different dependency in an integrated system. Once enough eyes and aim points are removed, the remaining batteries operate in a fog, with compressed and uneven timelines for detection, classification, and engagement. There is no safe “rear area” if long range missiles and drones can reach radars in places like Jordan, which many once assumed were relatively secure.
For years, the US doctrinal concept in the Gulf has been layered missile defense: early warning from the AN/FPS 132 in Qatar and space-based sensors; upper tier defense by THAAD guided by AN/TPY 2 radars; lower tier coverage by Patriot PAC 3; and a maritime layer from Aegis equipped destroyers. On paper, this looked robust. In reality, Iran has shown how quickly a determined adversary can degrade it, especially when it can attack multiple layers at once.
Worse, Tehran is exploiting a cost exchange crisis. Cheap drones and relatively low-cost ballistic missiles are being mixed in large salvos, forcing defenders to fire interceptors that cost millions of dollars per shot at any track that might be lethal. The political and moral cost of a single “leaker” — a missile that gets through and causes mass casualties — pushes commanders to “engage everything.” Over time, that is a losing game, especially for states that rely heavily on imported interceptors and have limited local production capacity.
For Saudi Arabia, this is not an abstract debate. Vision 2030 rests on three interlinked pillars: diversifying the economy, transforming the Kingdom into a global investment hub, and building an “ambitious nation” with secure, resilient infrastructure. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is pursuing an ambitious energy transition, aiming to source around half of its power from renewables by 2030 and to build more than 100 GW of new solar and wind capacity while maintaining its role in oil and gas. All of this depends on the basic condition: physical security for legacy oil facilities, new gas and petrochemical projects, and a rapidly expanding network of renewable plants, industrial zones, and transmission corridors.
The 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attacks were an early warning. Iran and its proxies temporarily knocked out roughly half of Saudi crude production and about 5 percent of global daily supply, despite existing air defenses. Today, the Kingdom’s new “air defense shield” — a mix of Patriot, THAAD, and AN/TPY 2 radars to protect Riyadh, Eastern Province oil facilities, and key military sites — is partly dependent on the same regional sensor and interceptor web that Iran is now degrading. As US high-end interceptors are consumed to defend bases across the Gulf, there is growing pressure on the availability and prioritization of defensive assets for Saudi energy and power infrastructure, especially if the conflict widens.
This creates a dangerous trap for the Gulf Cooperation Council. A scheme appears to be unfolding in which the US and Israel, driven by their confrontation with Iran, risk pulling the Gulf deeper into a direct clash with Tehran without fully accounting for our long-term security and development priorities. External actors know that their war with Iran will, one way or another, eventually end. They also know that a prolonged Gulf–Iran confrontation would drain our resources, destabilize our societies, and open the door to deeper foreign intervention under the pretext of “assistance.”
We have seen this movie before. During the Iran–Iraq war, “disaster capitalism” thrived on chaos, arms sales and reconstruction contracts, while regional states paid the human and economic cost. The most dangerous outcome of escalation today is not necessarily regime change in Tehran, but the possible disintegration of the Iranian state into prolonged anarchy. That would unleash refugee flows, militia spillover and sustained disruption in energy markets, directly threatening Saudi stability, Vision 2030, and the security of the entire Gulf.
In this context, the GCC has no choice but to close ranks. The recent GCC positions on the Iran–Israel war has emphasized de-escalation and diplomacy, reflecting a growing recognition that war on Iran’s territory would pose an existential risk to regional stability. Saudi Arabia’s clear declaration of support for Kuwait against potential Iraqi threats has shown what principled solidarity can look like; that spirit must extend to every GCC member and every emerging crisis. Unity is not a slogan. It is our first line of defense against being pressured, divided and targeted one by one.
What should a Saudi-centered response look like? First, we need more autonomous sensor coverage and command and control networks that do not collapse if a handful of US owned radars are destroyed. Second, we must protect and, where possible, localize stocks of critical interceptors, while investing in layered defenses that combine high-end systems with cheaper interceptors and passive protection (hardening, dispersal, deception). Third, we must deliberately shield key Vision 2030 assets — oil, gas and power infrastructure, as well as strategic industrial zones — as priority targets for defense planning, not afterthoughts.
At the same time, the GCC must resist being dragged into a direct US–Israel war on Iran. This does not mean accepting aggression or remaining silent in the face of violations of our sovereignty. It means insisting that any response serves our security, our economies, and our long-term vision for regional stability, rather than the short-term agendas of others. It means rejecting blackmail, hidden agendas and opaque “coalitions” that treat Gulf states as logistics hubs and targets rather than partners.
We stand at a fork in the road. One path leads to escalation, exhaustion and dependence — a future where our defense budgets balloon while our development goals shrink, and where Vision 2030 becomes a casualty of someone else’s war. The other path demands courage, discipline and regional unity: saying “no” to being used, “yes” to self-reliant defense innovation, and “always” to protecting our people and our development first.
In the end, the choice before the GCC is stark: either we become the ramp that wrecks someone else’s armored car, or we build the road that safely carries our own future forward.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636093
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Starmer's dilemma over UK's role in Iran war
MOHAMED CHEBARO
March 11, 2026
It is not easy being UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer these days. For that matter, it is not easy being any leader whose country is traditionally allied with the US.
Should Britain join the US and Israel in their strikes against Iran or should London sit this war out and preserve a defensive posture, maybe later carving out a role in trying to mediate an end to the conflict?
The Iran war and all its ramifications are testing the special relationship between the UK and the US. President Donald Trump was furious, it has been reported, when the British prime minister felt compelled to teeter and delay giving approval for US planes to use UK bases for their Iran sorties, as is the norm. It seems that Starmer hesitated and did not automatically rally behind his American allies.
For a few days, the US air force was locked out of the UK’s strategic Indian Ocean airbase of Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in England. Starmer later changed his mind and gave his authorization after British interests and bases were not spared reprisal attacks from Iranian drones and missiles. His approval hinged on a legal argument that the Iranians were endangering British lives in the Middle East and therefore the bases could be used for specific and limited defensive purposes. This permits not only the Americans but also the UK, if needed, to launch attacks against Iranian targets.
Away from the tit-for-tat of Trump calling Starmer “no Winston Churchill” and the UK press responding that Trump is “no Roosevelt,” the future of the not-so-special relationship looks to be at stake. However, it is not only the US’ ties with Britain that are under threat, but most of its European allies too. Just over a year into the second Trump presidency and political and diplomatic relations all over the world seem to have shifted from the usual status quo. As far as the US and UK are concerned, it seems that the two sides are singing from a different hymn sheet.
The prime minister’s lawyerly perspective seems passe in the “Make America Great Again” world of might makes right. London — like its European allies’ posture regarding the conflict with Iran and before that Gaza and Ukraine — is still paying lip service to the norms of international law, the rules-based world order, diplomacy and multilateralism. For Trump’s White House, foreign policy and the business of the day could not be more different.
Trump’s approach centers on breaking the status quo first, disregarding the rule of law altogether and working to build a new, more convenient set of rules. He is making sure to rally like-minded leaders to approve of this, demonstrating an inclination to the use of force and looking with disdain at those who question it.
Many have blamed the UK government’s hesitance on the US’ use of its airbases on weakness and divisions within Starmer’s Labour government. It was easy for the opposition parties to jump on the bandwagon of criticizing the indecision of Starmer. Even former Labour PM Tony Blair added his weight to the debate, claiming that Britain ought to have rubber-stamped the US action against Iran and taken part in the attacks.
Ironically, this coincided with the airing of a three-part documentary by Channel 4, titled “The Tony Blair Story.” This looked back on and analyzed Blair’s instinctive approach of rallying behind America in its war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, despite popular opposition and a significant Labour rebellion in Parliament.
Blair, like most prime ministers before and after him, naturally sought to uphold the special relationship, even if it tarnished his legacy and standing. As a result, he was called all kinds of names, from “Bliar” to the “poodle” of the US. But make no mistake, in previous conflicts, from the Balkans to Afghanistan and Iraq, and later Syria and Libya, the British posture and synchronization with the US encouraged or discouraged and sometimes aided or influenced America’s actions.
The threat to carry out punitive military action against the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons against its own people in 2013, followed by the retreat of the UK and the US, shows that the relationship is often symbiotic. When then-PM David Cameron deferred the matter to Parliament, President Barack Obama did the same with Congress and ultimately refrained from taking any action, breaking America’s own red line against the Syrian regime, much to the dismay of many allies of London and Washington.
All this is to say that although the special relationship has mattered over time, I am not sure if it still matters. A YouGov poll this week found that 59 percent of Britons opposed the war in Iran, with only 25 percent supporting it.
Not that Trump’s irritation with Britain is of concern to UK voters, nor is the use of British bases essential to the US-Israeli operations in Iran. Starmer, though, has slowly effected a corrective move after Iran’s attacks on the UK base in Cyprus and the legal argument that Iranian drones and missiles are also threatening British civilians in the Gulf countries.
This has led to London and many European nations shifting gear and raising their military preparedness in the region, sending navy ships with air defenses and squadrons of fighter jets to join the effort to provide a defensive shield. This also allows them to maybe act offensively later, as Iran is sowing chaos and widening the conflict, harming UK and European allies and interests and threatening the smooth flow of oil through the region’s strategic straits.
Trump is unlikely to show gratitude for such a U-turn, but what this episode of transatlantic friction shows is historic. It points to a divided Western world. It is a world in which America is reading from a new rulebook, one that is unilateral, even imperial, in its application of might makes right and the pursuit of its own interests and what it alone believes is right.
Meanwhile, there is another world — maybe an older, withering one — that still tries to uphold international law and a rules-based order, working through diplomacy and institutions to preserve peace and stability. Maybe this is the world of Starmer, but it is clearly not the world of Trump.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636052
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Israel and the United States: Looking forward to Armageddon
March 12, 2026
By Jeremy Salt
With a smirk on his face, Netanyahu threatens Iran with “many surprises” beyond the weapons of annihilation already used. If Israel has finally started the war, it can’t finish without the use of a nuclear weapon; there should be no hesitation in concluding that Netanyahu would be capable of reaching for it.
The destruction of Iran would be the endpoint of a campaign he has waged obsessively for four decades. It would remove the greatest obstacle to Israeli hegemony over the entire region, and now that he finally has Iran in his grip, Netanyahu is determined to finish it off.
Whatever it takes, including the use of a tactical nuclear weapon? That definitely cannot be ruled out.
Netanyahu has already been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The evidence against him is overwhelming. If he has not faced justice yet, that is because he has the protection of the US, which has thuggishly threatened the ICC and its chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, if they dare to take the case any further.
In February 2025, the US imposed sanctions on Khan. He was added to the list of ‘Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.’ His bank accounts were frozen and email access blocked. US nationals employed by the ICC in the Hague were warned that if they travelled back to the US they could be prosecuted.
Needless to say, these actions were taken 17 months after October 23, 2023, and a year after the International Court of Justice ruled that the South African charge of genocide was “plausible.” The US was fully complicit in the genocide.
Enjoying immunity for decades, Netanyahu quickly moved from Gaza to genocidal mass murder and assassination in Lebanon. The overthrow of the Assad government in 2024 was the opportunity to occupy more Syrian territory and destroy the Syrian armed forces.
At the same time, through the agency of two other exterminationists, Smotrich and Ben Gvir, Netanyahu ramped up the scale or murders and destruction of Palestinian property on the West Bank.
Soldiers stood by as these crimes were committed, if in fact they did not join in. Again, the US gave Israel its full support. Its ambassador to Israel even looked forward to the day when Israel would engorge most of the Middle East. To their endless shame, and with few exceptions, ‘western’ governments, theoretically bound by moral and legal codes of conduct, did nothing to stop any of this.
Lying is stock in trade for Netanyahu. He has never produced any evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon and could have one ready to be fired within months, weeks, or even days. The IAEA and intelligence agencies disagree with him, but he keeps repeating the lie.
No one believes him. In any case, the lie is told to conceal Netanyahu’s real reason for wanting to destroy Iran. This should by now be evident to everyone. Iran is a powerful state of 90 million people, virtually the last obstacle standing in the way of joint US-Israeli hegemony over all of West Asia.
Israel had good relations with Iran when it had a shah who played the role of regional policeman for the US and its allies. In 1979, he was overthrown and, since then, Iran has been steadfast in its support of the Palestinian resistance. It has oil wealth and has built up an armoury of ballistic missiles that can reach any part of occupied Palestine.
Up till the past two years, Iran was regarded as too big and too dangerous to be attacked directly. The chosen option was bringing down Syria, Iran’s strategic ally and the central pillar in the ‘axis of resistance.’
After 13 years, through the use of terrorist proxies, in a war that resulted in the death of 500,000 Syrian civilians and soldiers, this was finally achieved in December, 2024, leaving Hizbullah and Iran physically cut off from each other and vulnerable to more determined attacks by their enemies.
Netanyahu’s moment for the war that would destroy Iran would seem to have arrived. However, with the US and Israel telegraphing their punches, Iran had time to prepare, militarily by building up its stocks of missiles and drones and politically by cementing its relations with powerful countries, namely Russia and China.
Clearly, their own strategic interests would be threatened by a war on Iran.
Iran is also a founding member of the BRICS alliance, two of whose members, Russia and China, are now providing Iran with satellite intelligence and ‘over-the-horizon’ anti-stealth radar systems.
Iran has also replaced the GPS satellite navigation system with China’s more advanced Beidou-3. Russian weapons supplied to Iran include MANPAD air defence systems, attack helicopters, and Yak-130 combat training aircraft. One was recently shot down by Israel but as a relatively slow-moving trainer, its destruction was hardly a feather in the cap of the Israeli pilot.
Other Russian war material delivered to Iran includes armoured vehicles, advanced sniper rifles (to the IRGC), and SU-35 fighter aircraft. Chinese sales recently negotiated with Iran include the CM-302 supersonic missiles known as ‘carrier killers.’
Both China and Russia are clearly acting in self-defence and not just in defence of international law against its violation by the US and Israel. The collapse of Iran and its takeover by a US puppet government would put Iran’s oil wealth in US hands and directly threaten Russian and Chinese strategic and commercial interests across the Caucasus, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Azerbaijan, Central Asia, India, Iran, and Russia to Europe.
Visiting Tel Aviv in February, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, referred to his “wondrous friendship” with Israel’s genocidal prime minister. As INSTC was an Indian, Russian, and Iranian initiative, Modi’s fast-developing love affair with Netanyahu and Israel has alerted Russia and China to its dangerous strategic implications.
Israel has always obliquely warned that it will use nuclear weapons in the event of an existential threat. That is why they were developed in the first place and why no other regional state can be allowed to have them, giving Israel a permanent stranglehold over the entire region.
An existential threat that was always a propaganda tool now seems to be taking shape in reality. In June 2025, Israel launched a war against Iran, which it could not win. After 12 days of enduring Iranian missile attacks, it could take no more and asked Trump to seek a ceasefire through Omani mediation. Despite its attempts to hide the truth, whatever damage it is inflicting on Iran in the current war, it is suffering significant and unprecedented damage itself.
Israel is a small country with no strategic depth. Iran is a large country with endless strategic depth in terms of size and population.
The ‘shock and awe’ blitz launched by the US and Israel has not worked.
Neither is prepared for a long war. Iran is. Neither the US nor Israel has the stocks of weapons necessary to maintain a long war. From all reports, Iran does.
The Israeli public broadly supports the war, but the American public does not. The Iranian people, on the other hand, have closed ranks behind their government and the military. None of this augurs well for the US and Israel.
The western media war on Iran is based on the threat of nuclear weapons it does not have, while paying no attention to the threat of the nuclear weapons that Israel does have.
In the 1960s, the US could have thwarted Israeli nuclear weapons development by withholding the supply of tanks and fighter aircraft unless Israel signed the NPT.
In the White House, however, President Johnson betrayed the State Department officials negotiating with Israel. He assured the then-Israeli ambassador, Yitzak Rabin, that Israel would get the weapons it wanted without having to sign the NPT, and this is subsequently what happened.
As Israel has never allowed international inspection of Dimona, the number of weapons stockpiled there or elsewhere is not known in the public sphere. According to the estimates of the Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, however, as of June 2025, it had 90 plutonium-based bombs and enough plutonium to make 100-200 more.
Its fleet of F15, F16, and F35 could deliver nuclear ‘gravity bombs’ (i.e., falling to the ground like the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). Its Jericho ballistic missiles and Dolphin-class submarines could fire nuclear warheads from land or sea.
SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) estimates that Israel has 80 nuclear weapons, consisting of 30 gravity bombs and 50 ready for delivery by Jericho II missiles, which are believed to be stored with mobile launchers in caves at a military base east of Jerusalem, that is, in territory certified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as occupied Palestinian territory.
The ’Samson option’ is now complemented by the ‘Hannibal directive.’ Existentially threatened, Israel could, in the last resort, use nuclear weapons and take everyone else down with it.
That is the ‘Samson option.’ The ‘Hannibal directive’ was ordered on July 7, 2023, leading to the killing of an unknown number of Israelis by their own military. The ‘Samson option’ has never been declared, but in the hands of Netanyahu, is Israel drawing closer to that point?
Would Israelis support the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against Iran? All the polls taken in 2023-2025 have shown moral indifference among most Israelis, even to the slaughter of Palestinian children.
Asked what they thought of the performance of the military, the replies were ‘excellent,’ ‘good,’ and ‘should go even further.’
Having supported what much of the rest of the world regards as genocide, even critics of the government have now come in behind Netanyahu. A recent poll by the Israel Democracy Institute showed that 93 percent of Israelis support the war on Iran and 74 percent support Netanyahu.
Opposition leader Yair Lapid has referred to a “just war against evil.” Again, what the rest of the world sees is an unjust war co-launched by an evil human being, the Israeli prime minister.
Public support for the army as an institution has always been high. Israel wins wars. In the public mind, it doesn’t lose them, but what if Israel has launched a war that it can’t win on its own terms?
What effect would this have on the collective Israeli Jewish psychology? What if Israel cannot maintain the war any longer and seeks a ceasefire, but Iran chooses to fight on to destroy the threat to its own existence?
One existential moment would precipitate another. Israel could still ‘win’ by using nuclear weapons. Having committed one genocide already, it is certainly possible that Netanyahu could reach for this last resort.
He speaks as someone on a God-given mission. He repeatedly invokes the Biblical command to destroy Amalek. ‘Victory’ would establish him as perhaps the greatest hero in Jewish history. His Christian Zionist supporters in the US are already looking forward to the Armageddon that he could precipitate.
All of this is completely mad, but history has many examples of madmen who were stopped only when it was too late.
Western governments have to recognize the dimensions of the threat they have created for themselves and their people by taking the side of the US and Israel in this war of aggression.
While Israel and the US are acting together, it seems that, whereas Trump is already looking for an ‘off-ramp,’ Netanyahu is determined to keep going until Iran is destroyed. An extraordinarily dangerous moment for the world is rapidly approaching.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/israel-and-the-united-states-looking-forward-to-armageddon/
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Iran’s Long Memory: The Hidden Force Shaping Today’s War
March 12, 2026
By Romana Rubeo
Beyond the Revolution
Much of the world’s discussion about Iran begins in 1979. The Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and established the Islamic Republic, is often treated as the starting point for understanding Iranian politics, society, and global behavior. Supporters of the revolution portray it as a popular uprising that ended decades of authoritarian rule backed by foreign powers. Critics frame the same event as the birth of another authoritarian system.
Both interpretations, however, share a common limitation: they confine Iran’s story to a relatively narrow historical frame.
The result is a distorted understanding of a country whose political culture and social cohesion have been shaped by centuries—indeed millennia—of collective experience. In the current war that began on February 28, 2026, this limitation has become particularly evident.
Observers who expected Iran to fracture under pressure now confront a different reality. Instead of mass collapse or widespread political fragmentation, the country appears to be experiencing a surge of unity. Large crowds gather in cities across the country. Religious rituals and cultural symbolism have become rallying points. Even segments of society that previously expressed dissatisfaction with the government now emphasize national solidarity in the face of external threats.
To many analysts operating within conventional geopolitical frameworks, this outcome is puzzling.
Limits of Conventional Narratives
Western political narratives tend to frame Iran through a binary lens. On one side stands the legacy of Western imperialism—most famously the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil industry. On the other side stands the Islamic Republic, often portrayed either as a revolutionary resistance state or as a rigid authoritarian system.
This debate is important, but it remains incomplete.
Anti-imperialist analyses rightly emphasize the role of foreign intervention in shaping Iran’s modern history. The CIA- and MI6-backed coup against Mosaddegh remains one of the defining episodes in Iran’s relationship with the West. The coup reinstalled the Shah’s authority and reinforced Western influence over the country’s oil sector.
Yet even this narrative, morally and historically valid as it may be, often stops short of addressing deeper forces shaping Iranian society.
Political theories rooted exclusively in colonialism and anti-colonialism, capitalism and anti-capitalism, tend to overlook broader cultural and civilizational dynamics that influence collective behavior. Nations do not act solely according to political ideology or economic interests; they also respond to historical memory, cultural identity, and social cohesion formed over long periods of time.
This is where a deeper historical perspective becomes essential.
A People’s History Perspective
Palestinian scholar Ramzy Baroud has argued that understanding political movements requires attention to what some historians call the longue durée—the long historical processes that shape societies across centuries rather than years.
Within this framework, political events like revolutions, wars, or protests are not isolated phenomena. They are expressions of deeper historical patterns.
Applied to Iran, this perspective suggests that the country’s current resilience cannot be explained solely by ideological loyalty to the Islamic Republic or by opposition to Western intervention.
Instead, it reflects something older and more deeply embedded in Iranian society: a powerful sense of historical continuity.
Iran is not simply a modern state reacting to contemporary geopolitics. It is the inheritor of one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations, a society that has repeatedly confronted foreign invasions, internal upheaval, and external pressure—yet has consistently reconstituted itself.
This long memory helps explain why moments of national crisis often produce cohesion rather than fragmentation.
Civilizational Foundations
To understand Iran’s political behavior today, one must recognize the depth of its historical experience.
Few nations possess a civilizational timeline as extensive and influential as Iran’s.
Ancient Persia (c. 550 BCE)
The rise of the Achaemenid Empire under Cyrus the Great marked the emergence of one of the world’s first multinational empires. Persian governance developed sophisticated administrative systems and promoted cultural tolerance across vast territories stretching from the Mediterranean to Central Asia.
The empire’s legacy shaped Iranian identity as both imperial and cosmopolitan.
The Parthian and Sassanian Eras (247 BCE–651 CE)
Successive Persian dynasties preserved Iranian statehood while confronting major external powers, particularly Rome and later Byzantium.
These centuries reinforced the idea that Iranian civilization could withstand external pressure while maintaining its cultural continuity.
The Arab Conquest and Cultural Transformation (7th Century)
The Arab-Islamic conquest transformed Iran religiously and politically, yet Persian cultural identity survived and adapted. Rather than disappearing, the Persian language, literature, and administrative traditions became central to the broader Islamic world.
Iranian scholars, poets, and philosophers played a decisive role in shaping Islamic civilization.
The Safavid Era (1501–1736)
The Safavid dynasty established Shi’a Islam as Iran’s state religion, creating a distinctive religious and political identity that continues to influence Iranian society today.
The Safavid state consolidated Iran’s territorial identity and reinforced the link between political sovereignty and religious symbolism.
The Qajar Period and Foreign Pressure (19th Century)
During the Qajar era, Iran faced growing pressure from imperial powers, particularly Britain and Russia. Territorial concessions and economic dependence generated widespread resentment and fostered early nationalist movements.
These experiences deepened Iranian suspicion of foreign intervention.
The Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911)
Iran’s Constitutional Revolution introduced parliamentary governance and modern political institutions. It represented one of the earliest democratic movements in the Middle East.
Although the revolution faced setbacks, it demonstrated the ability of Iranian society to mobilize collectively for political change.
The 1953 Coup and Its Legacy
The overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh by British and American intelligence agencies remains a defining moment in modern Iranian history.
The event reinforced the perception among many Iranians that foreign powers were willing to intervene directly in the country’s political affairs to protect strategic and economic interests.
The 1979 Revolution
The Islamic Revolution emerged from a broad coalition of social forces opposing the Shah’s rule. Religious institutions, nationalist movements, leftist groups, and ordinary citizens participated in the uprising that ultimately transformed the political system.
Regardless of one’s interpretation of the revolution, it represented one of the most significant mass political mobilizations of the twentieth century.
Crisis and Cohesion
Throughout its history, Iran has repeatedly confronted moments of existential pressure—from foreign invasions to internal revolutions.
Yet each crisis has tended to produce a similar response: the reassertion of national identity and collective resilience.
The current war appears to be triggering the same historical pattern.
Rather than fragmenting Iranian society, external pressure seems to be reinforcing a sense of national solidarity rooted not only in politics or ideology but also in shared historical experience.
Understanding Iran today requires moving beyond simplified narratives that begin and end with contemporary geopolitics.
Neither the Western imperial narrative nor the anti-imperialist counter-narrative fully captures the complexity of Iranian society.
Iran’s current resilience is better understood as the product of a long historical trajectory—a civilization shaped by centuries of adaptation, resistance, and renewal.
Only by acknowledging this deeper history can observers begin to understand why, in moments of crisis, Iran often behaves not as a fragile state but as a society drawing strength from its long memory.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/irans-long-memory-the-hidden-force-shaping-todays-war/
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Radwan’s Comeback — Did Hezbollah Outplay Israel?
March 11, 2026
Hezbollah fighters are once again operating in southern Lebanon, raising questions about Israel’s military strategy after more than a year of sustained strikes across the country.
This week, Hezbollah resumed guerrilla-style operations in southern Lebanon, with clashes concentrated around the town of Khiyam near the intersection of the Lebanese, Israeli, and Syrian borders, Reuters reported on March 10, citing Lebanese sources familiar with the fighting.
Those sources said the group had reorganized its forces into small mobile units capable of anti-tank attacks and rapid maneuvering, reflecting a return to the kind of guerrilla tactics Hezbollah used in earlier confrontations with Israel.
The same report indicated that members of Hezbollah’s Radwan force, the group’s elite combat unit, had returned to southern areas after previously withdrawing following the October 2024 ceasefire.
Israeli media reports point in the same direction. Ynet reported on March 9 that Hezbollah had redeployed fighters from the Radwan unit toward southern Lebanon after Israeli strikes targeted what Israel described as Radwan infrastructure and training facilities.
The significance of this redeployment lies not only in the fighting itself but also in where it is happening.
Southern Lebanon — particularly the narrow strip between the Litani River and the Israeli border — is one of the most heavily monitored regions in the Middle East.
Israeli drones patrol the area constantly, supported by satellites, electronic surveillance systems, radar installations, and intelligence networks developed over decades of confrontation.
Yet Hezbollah appears capable of moving fighters back into that space, reorganizing units, and engaging Israeli forces near the border.
This return follows months of Israeli military activity across Lebanon after the ceasefire agreement reached in October 2024.
According to figures cited by UNIFIL and international observers, Israeli forces have carried out thousands of violations of Lebanese sovereignty since that agreement, including airspace incursions, airstrikes, artillery fire, and ground operations north of the Blue Line.
UNIFIL said earlier this year that Israeli military activity inside Lebanese territory continued to raise concerns over violations of Security Council Resolution 1701 and Lebanon’s territorial integrity.
Israeli officials argue that most of these operations targeted Hezbollah infrastructure — weapons depots, tunnels, command posts, and logistical networks.
If that claim is accurate, the present moment becomes particularly striking.
After months of sustained attacks aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s operational capacity, the group appears able to redeploy fighters into the very area Israel has been attempting to reshape. In effect, the battlefield looks as if it has been reset.
Another possibility is increasingly difficult to ignore. Human Rights Watch warned recently that civilians in Lebanon remain at serious risk from Israeli military operations, citing strikes on residential buildings, financial institutions, and civilian infrastructure.
The UN human rights office also reported that Israeli airstrikes on Lebanese cities including Baalbek and Nabatyeh killed civilians and called for investigations into whether those attacks complied with international humanitarian law.
If Hezbollah can still operate effectively in southern Lebanon after months of bombardment, the implication becomes difficult to avoid.
Either Israel failed to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, or a substantial portion of its campaign targeted civilian environments rather than core military infrastructure. The current resurgence of Hezbollah lends greater credibility to the latter assumption.
The latest redeployment also sheds new light on Hezbollah’s behavior during the months following the ceasefire. For much of that period, Hezbollah refrained from responding directly to Israeli violations of the agreement.
Many analysts interpreted this restraint as evidence of weakness. Some argued the organization had been severely damaged by Israeli strikes and assassinations. Others suggested political pressure inside Lebanon had limited its options.
The current developments suggest a different interpretation. What appeared to be passivity may have been strategic patience. The regional environment was undergoing major changes during the same period.
In Syria, the collapse of the Assad government and the rise of a pro-Western militant leadership dramatically altered Hezbollah’s strategic depth.
At the same time tensions between Israel, the United States, and Iran were steadily escalating toward what many expected would become a broader regional war.
In that context Hezbollah may have made a calculated decision to conserve its strength.
Instead of escalating prematurely, the group absorbed Israeli pressure while preserving its core operational capabilities. The latest fighting suggests that calculation may now be unfolding.
Rather than collapsing under sustained Israeli strikes, Hezbollah appears able to re-enter the battlefield on its own terms. For Israel, that possibility carries uncomfortable, to say the least, implications.
For months, Israeli military discourse emphasized intelligence dominance and precision targeting as the foundation of its Lebanon strategy. Yet Hezbollah’s return to southern Lebanon suggests that Israel’s intelligence picture may have been far less complete than publicly presented.
The political implications may prove just as significant.
Much of the Israeli narrative about the war in Lebanon rested on the assumption that sustained pressure would gradually erode Hezbollah’s ability to operate near the border.
But if Hezbollah is again able to deploy fighters in the south and confront Israeli forces, that narrative becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
In that sense, the events now unfolding along the Lebanese border may not simply represent another phase of the conflict. They may represent the moment when a widely accepted narrative about the war begins to unravel.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/radwans-comeback-did-hezbollah-outplay-israel/
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Is the Iran War Becoming a Global Economic Crisis? A Media Roundup
March 11, 2026
Economic Front
By the 12th day of the American-Israeli war on Iran, the economic consequences are spreading far beyond the immediate battlefield.
The sharpest pressures are being felt in energy markets, where oil, gas, diesel, and shipping costs have all come under strain, but the fallout is now extending into aviation, tourism, inflation, manufacturing, and public finances across multiple regions.
The emerging picture is that Iran’s strategic leverage is not limited to missiles, drones, or battlefield endurance.
One of Tehran’s most consequential pressure points has been its ability, directly or indirectly, to disrupt the wider economic networks that sustain the war effort: oil transit routes, Gulf export capacity, transport corridors, and the commercial systems relied upon by the United States, Israel, and states that host or support their military infrastructure.
The result is a widening economic shock now being managed through reserve releases, emergency controls, and market interventions.
Europe Pays
One of the clearest measures of the war’s cost came from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who said Wednesday that 10 days of war had added about €3 billion, or roughly $3.5 billion, to the European Union’s fossil fuel import bill.
She said gas prices had risen 50% and oil prices 27%, underscoring how quickly the conflict has translated into direct costs for major importers.
Reuters also quoted her warning that a return to Russian fossil fuels would be a “strategic mistake,” even as Brussels studies fresh options to curb energy bills.
Reserve Response
Governments are increasingly turning to strategic stockpiles to contain the shock. Bloomberg reported that the International Energy Agency proposed an emergency release of between 300 million and 400 million barrels, which would be the largest reserve release in its history if approved.
Japan announced it would begin drawing on strategic reserves from March 16, while France said reserve use had begun as part of a coordinated international move.
Britain signaled it was prepared to do its part, and Germany reportedly released part of its own reserves.
Oil Volatility
Oil markets have become one of the clearest barometers of the war. On Tuesday, prices fell sharply after President Donald Trump suggested the conflict might end soon, with Brent settling at $87.80 and US crude at $83.45, according to Reuters.
But by Wednesday, prices were climbing again, with AFP reporting Brent at $92.91 and West Texas Intermediate at $88.73, while Reuters said prices had also swung lower earlier on reports of a possible IEA reserve release.
This extreme volatility reflects a market caught between fears of prolonged disruption and hopes of political de-escalation.
Gulf Disruption
The war’s impact on supply has centered on the Gulf.
Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait had cut production by roughly one-third, or 6.7 million barrels per day.
Reuters separately cited Wood Mackenzie as estimating that around 15 million barrels per day in oil and petroleum product supplies from the Gulf were currently affected, warning prices could reach $150 a barrel and that even $200 in 2026 could not be ruled out.
OPEC, for its part, said current geopolitical developments require “careful monitoring,” while Saudi Arabia informed the group that its February supplies to the market had exceeded 10 million barrels per day before the war intensified.
Diesel Threat
Beyond crude oil, diesel is emerging as a particularly dangerous pressure point for the global economy. Reuters quoted traders and analysts saying diesel is structurally the most exposed fuel in this crisis because it underpins transport, agriculture, mining, and industrial activity.
They estimated that disruptions linked to Hormuz could affect between 3 and 4 million barrels per day of diesel supply, with another 500,000 barrels per day lost due to export restrictions from Middle Eastern refineries.
Futures for US diesel reportedly surged far faster than crude itself. That matters because diesel inflation can spread quickly into food, freight, and industrial costs worldwide.
Shipping Shock
Shipping and maritime insurance are also under growing strain. Several news agencies reported that a cargo vessel was struck by a projectile in the Strait of Hormuz, forcing the crew to abandon ship after a fire broke out.
Bloomberg said some tanker owners were avoiding Fujairah, a major UAE oil export hub, and a Japanese shipping company halted docking there.
The Wall Street Journal, according to your material, also cited European shipping officials saying they were still not confident about sending tankers through Hormuz.
In practical terms, even where flows have not stopped completely, fear itself is now disrupting the trade route that anchors a major share of global energy transport.
Gas Strain
The gas market is showing parallel signs of stress.
The Financial Times reported that Shell declared force majeure on some LNG cargoes headed to Asia.
Reuters also cited three sources saying Oman’s OQ Trading declared force majeure on contracted LNG shipments to Petrobangla due to disruptions in Qatari-linked supplies caused by the war.
India has already moved to restrict natural gas and cooking gas consumption, saying the conflict had disrupted LNG cargoes through Hormuz.
This shows the war is no longer only an oil story; it is a broader energy-security crisis affecting both advanced economies and major developing importers.
Flights Grounded
Aviation is among the sectors feeling the shock most immediately. The Financial Times cited Cirium data saying five days of flight disruptions left around 4 million passengers stranded.
The same paper reported more than 80,000 short-term tourism bookings were canceled in Dubai alone in the week ending March 6. Airlines have also started passing fuel costs on to passengers.
Reuters reported that Qantas, Air New Zealand, and SAS raised fares because of the jump in jet fuel costs, while Saudi and Qatar Airways announced extended suspensions or limited schedules across parts of the region.
What began as a war-centered aviation disruption is now becoming a broader commercial and tourism shock.
Tourist Losses
The regional tourism sector is also absorbing heavy losses. The Financial Times, citing the World Travel and Tourism Council, reported that the Middle East tourism sector is losing around $600 million per day in visitor spending because of the war.
That is a significant indicator because tourism links directly to employment, hospitality, transport, retail, and service economies. The effect is especially severe for Gulf transit and tourism hubs whose stability and accessibility are central to their business models.
Market Fallout
Financial markets are reflecting the wider uncertainty. Wall Street opened mixed on Wednesday as investors weighed inflation data against the war’s broader impact. US stocks had already closed mixed on Tuesday amid renewed fears of stagflation and prolonged conflict.
In Europe, stocks initially rose on hopes the war might wind down, but that optimism has remained fragile as oil resumed climbing.
Gold and silver prices also moved sharply as investors sought safe havens, though commodity moves across your source material remained volatile and at times contradictory, reflecting unstable trading conditions rather than a settled trend.
Banking Front
The financial sector is also beginning to feel the pressure of the war. Reuters reported that HSBC temporarily closed all of its branches in Qatar until further notice, citing safety concerns for staff and customers, while Standard Chartered evacuated employees from its Dubai offices and instructed them to work remotely as tensions escalated.
The measures followed warnings from Iranian officials that economic and banking interests linked to the United States and Israel in the region could become targets after Israeli strikes reportedly hit an Iranian bank.
Although HSBC stressed that the move does not reflect a withdrawal from the Gulf and reaffirmed its commitment to the region, the closures illustrate how the conflict is beginning to reach beyond energy infrastructure and transport networks into the financial system itself.
Domestic Pressure
The war’s spillover into domestic economies is becoming clearer by the day. Egypt raised fuel prices by 14% to 17%, citing extraordinary geopolitical conditions.
Greece imposed profit caps on fuel and supermarket goods to prevent profiteering.
Vietnam urged companies to expand remote work to conserve fuel.
In the United States, the American Automobile Association said gasoline prices had risen 16.4% over 10 days, while Reuters reported that the Trump administration told Congress it had already used $5.6 billion worth of munitions in the first two days of the war.
Even before any decisive battlefield outcome, the financial cost is widening across governments, households, and industries.
Strategic Leverage
Taken together, these developments point to a larger reality: Iran’s most powerful strategic cards are not confined to direct military retaliation.
The war has exposed how vulnerable the economies linked to Israel, the United States, and their military and logistical partners are to disruptions in energy flows, maritime trade, aviation networks, and inflation-sensitive supply chains.
Even where Iran has not fully shut those systems down, the mere risk of escalation has forced reserve releases, emergency controls, rerouted shipping, and higher consumer costs across continents.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/is-the-iran-war-becoming-a-global-economic-crisis-a-media-roundup/
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