Middle East Press On: Turkey, US-Israel Attack on Iran, Trump's War, Iran's Mosaic Defense, Hezbollah Decide Enter War, Iran Violating International Law Striking US Bases in Gulf, 05 March 2026
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
05 March 2026
Genar Poll: Türkiye at peace within itself
Price of war: Consequences of US-Israel attack on Iran
What awaits Iran: Regime change or regime update?
Trump’s other endless war: How a strike on Iran betrays his central promise
EXPLAINER: What Is Iran’s ‘Mosaic Defense’ Strategy?
Why Did Hezbollah Decide to Enter the War? — Analysis
Is Iran Violating International Law by Striking US Bases in Gulf States?
How US-Israeli Iran Strikes Will Penalize Global Prospects
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Genar Poll: Türkiye at peace within itself
BY İHSAN AKTAŞ
MAR 04, 2026
Recent data from Genar Research Company indicates that Turkey possesses a society fundamentally at peace with itself.
Turkish politics may be loud and confrontational, yet the country’s social fabric is far less fragile than is often assumed. Election seasons are intense, rhetoric is sharp and partisan debates can be unforgiving. However, a closer look at voter behaviour reveals that ideological boundaries are far more permeable than surface-level polarization suggests.
Within the electorate of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), one finds Kemalists, nationalists and conservatives alike. The base of the Republican People's Party (CHP) is largely rooted in a Kemalist identity. Yet it also draws support from nationalist, conservative and even Islamist-leaning segments. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a key component of the governing bloc, maintains a strong nationalist backbone, but it is not ideologically monolithic. The Good Party (IP) occupies a centrist nationalist-Kemalist ground, while remaining open to diverse currents. Meanwhile, the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), though often perceived from the outside as homogeneous, is in fact a multilayered structure encompassing democrats, socialists, conservatives and various identity groups.
This picture reveals a fundamental truth: Voter blocs in Turkey are not divided by concrete walls. Varied ideological currents coexist within the same political parties, often under a single organizational roof. Despite the dominant narrative of polarization nowadays, society continues to demonstrate a resilient capacity and a clear instinct for living together.
Terror-free Turkey
It is precisely at this juncture that the concept of a “terror-free Turkey” gains significance. Despite their differing tones, the fact that the four major parties of the country, the AK Party, the CHP, the MHP, and the DEM Party, each articulate a genuine opposition to violence and terrorism indicates that the political system retains the ability to find common ground. Methods, language and political positioning may differ. Yet, there exists a broad consensus regarding the heavy cost terrorism has imposed on Turkey.
The source of this consensus is not ideological uniformity, but social reality. Voter bases are deeply intertwined. A nationalist voter may also carry democratic sensitivities; a Kemalist voter may not be distant from conservative values; a conservative voter may prioritize a strong state and security. This cross-ideological permeability generates societal pressure that compels politics toward compromise.
Thus, what will ultimately shape Turkey’s political future is not a contest over “who is purer” or “more ideological,” but the capacity to hold diverse identities under a shared roof. The goal of a Terror-free Turkey serves as a testing ground for precisely this capacity. If major parties can accurately read this social pluralism and strike a balance between security and democracy, the issue will exceed the level of security policy and evolve into a broader project of social peace.
Electorate’s mindset
In conclusion, Genar’s findings suggest that Turkey’s social fabric is more flexible and more cohesive than its political rhetoric would imply. The language of conflict may be inherent to politics, but the electorate’s mindset is considerably more pragmatic and inclined toward coexistence. This helps explain why the “terror-free Turkey” narrative sounds so widely: Society can converge on common ground far more than is commonly believed.
Moreover, research conducted within the framework of the terror-free Turkey initiative shows that support for the process averages around 70% among voters of the MHP, AK Party, and DEM Party. The support among CHP voters stands at close to 60%. The backing provided by the country’s four major parties reflects a deeper societal alignment on key national issues.
On a related note, when asked whether political parties should act jointly on matters of foreign policy, nearly 70% of respondents expressed a positive view. In many respects, this suggests that Turkish society, shaped by its historical legacy, culture, traditions and religious heritage, remains internally reconciled. It also demonstrates that when it comes to resolving major national challenges, public conscience and political will can go together.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/genar-poll-turkiye-at-peace-within-itself
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Price of war: Consequences of US-Israel attack on Iran
BY MUHITTIN ATAMAN
MAR 04, 2026
The United States and Israel launched a comprehensive military attack against Iran on Feb. 28. The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and more than 40 other high-level Iranian officials were targeted and killed during this attack. In response, Iran has targeted Israeli targets and American military bases located in different Arab countries. As expected and feared, the conflict turned into a large-scale regional war involving 10 states. The U.S. and Israel have virtually set the region ablaze. The Gulf countries, in particular, some of the safest countries in the world, have been in great shock.
In this short piece, I will attempt to highlight some points to clarify the meaning of this attack and the positions of the actors involved.
First and foremost, this attack cannot be justified under any circumstances. According to established norms of international politics, this was an illegitimate act. The two aggressor states have attacked Iran during the holy month of mercy, Ramadan, when Muslims fast.
Innocent people were targeted. More than 100 schoolgirls were killed during the first day of the attacks. Although targeting a primary school is a grave violation of humanitarian law and a war crime, no state has taken any responsibility, and no state has even condemned the act. Therefore, it was an attack that deeply affected all Muslims worldwide.
The U.S. and Israel have violated a long time tradition of international politics by targeting the head of state. No state can treat the leader of another state as a terrorist. If other countries were to implement this, it would cause great chaos in the world. This is a dangerous act.
The U.S. administration, which claimed that Iran was threatening the U.S. and its citizens, could not justify the attack. Everyone knows that Iran is unable to target the U.S. homeland, and it never made such a claim. Iran has indeed been under heavy sanctions imposed by the U.S. for the last four decades, and the two states do not have friendly relations. However, all these realities do not require the U.S. to target Iran.
Most Americans believe that this is not an American war. According to some polls conducted after the attacks, only about one-fourth of the American public supports the attack. If that’s the case, Trump’s plans have backfired, since he has carried out this attack to win the midterm elections that will be held next November, but it seems he will lose the elections because of it.
Another point is that Israel has been planning to hit Iran and to change its regime for years. The Israeli government has persuaded the U.S. administration to attack Tehran. However, it is questionable whether Israel has achieved its ultimate objective either. It seems that the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei contributed to the consolidation of the Iranian regime rather than weakening it.
In addition, the more aggressive Israel becomes, the more difficult it will be for it to consolidate its regional security. The Israeli government has been instrumentalizing all states for its expansionist regional projects. The world public opinion, including the vast majority of the Western population, has turned against it because of its aggressive and unjust policies. All of this eventually undermines Israel’s security.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Gulf countries were dragged into war by the U.S. and Israel, and there are two important points to be discussed about this.
On the one hand, this war is not theirs to fight. Therefore, although they are targeted by Iran, the Gulf states are hesitant to declare war against Iran. So far, they only tried to defend their territories.
On the other hand, the Gulf countries will pay a heavy price in the midterm. After being targeted by Iran, investors will hesitate to come to the Gulf. That is, the new conflict has severely damaged the image of the area. This conflict has once again demonstrated that the U.S. prioritizes the security of Israel over the security of the Gulf.
Lastly, this conflict has once again demonstrated how ineffective the EU and its member states are. EU officials and European countries did not criticize the American and Israeli attack against Iran. On the contrary, they have bandwagon to the U.S and criticized the policies of the Iranian government. They no longer have any meaningful will or influence in international politics.
All in all, all states involved in the conflict will pay high prices. It will take a long time for the aggressor states and the attacked states to recover from the negative impacts of the conflict.
The oil and natural gas trade has been negatively affected. The closure of the Hormuz Strait led to a rise in oil prices, which will hurt the European countries the most.
Iran has weakened in the region. It will take a long time to recover from the losses it has suffered.
The U.S. and Israel have spent billions of dollars during these attacks, which damaged their comparative advantages vis-à-vis China and Russia. Eventually, they will fail to take control of Iran, and none will gain from this war.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/price-of-war-consequences-of-us-israel-attack-on-iran
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What awaits Iran: Regime change or regime update?
BY ORHAN SALI
MAR 05, 2026
In the wake of recent developments in Iran, one question dominates the debate: As the post-Khamenei era begins, will the system collapse or will it adapt and carry on in a different form? Who will become the next leader? And perhaps most importantly, what does the Iranian people actually want?
For years, Iranian society has felt trapped between two poles. On one side stands the idea of returning to a Western-leaning monarchy. On the other side, the rigid theocratic structure of the current clerical regime.
Today, a significant segment of Iranian society appears to be searching for a “third way” beyond these two options. Neither a foreign-backed monarchy nor a continuation of the status quo. What is being demanded is something more national, more independent, yet also more accountable.
The strength of this sentiment is evident. Yet there is still no clear, broadly representative leader capable of embodying it.
And here lies the critical question:
Can a genuinely “national figure” emerge from within Iran who is capable of persuading both reform-minded segments of society and institutions rooted in the state tradition?
This does not appear easy. The current establishment may be unwilling to open space for a strong, system-transcending national figure. Western actors, meanwhile, may hesitate to fully embrace a leader who operates independently of their strategic preferences.
So while the idea of a “third way” is compelling, the political architecture capable of carrying it forward remains undefined.
Names associated with the Shah’s era occasionally resurface in international discussions. Yet inside Iran, there is little evidence of a broad and unified social base ready to rally behind a monarchical restoration.
Among Persians and other ethnic communities such as Turks (Azeris) and Kurds, there are no strong signs of a widespread and cohesive demand for a return to monarchy. A Pahlavi-style restoration, therefore, appears to rest on a limited domestic foundation.
The most plausible scenario today is not the total collapse of the system, but its internal transformation.
In other words, a regime update.
What would that mean? Preserving the existing state structure, rebalancing the distribution of power, adopting a more pragmatic foreign policy posture, and allowing a more controlled opening domestically.
Put differently: not revolution, but evolution.
Model of Najaf or Qom
Within the Shiite world, two governance approaches stand out: the Najaf model and the Qom model.
The Qom-centred model is built on the doctrine of "Velayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). In this system, the supreme leader is both the highest religious authority and the ultimate political decision-maker. Religious and political authority are fused. Elected institutions do not represent the final source of power. Strategic decisions remain under the control of the supreme leader. Iran has been governed under this framework since 1979.
The Najaf approach, by contrast, does not place direct political authority in the hands of the religious establishment. Clerics provide guidance, but they do not directly exercise executive power. Religious authority plays a moral and advisory role. Political decision-making operates through elected institutions. The relationship between religion and state is more indirect. This model does not exclude religion from public life, but it does not position clerical leadership at the head of executive governance.
If Iran were to embark on a regime update, it could entail a partial shift from the Qom model toward something closer to the Najaf approach.
Under such a recalibration, religious legitimacy would be preserved. Political decision-making could become more collective and more limited in scope. International tensions might be reduced. The domestic system could regain breathing space.
This would not amount to a Western-style liberal transformation. But it would represent a revision within Iran’s own theological and political tradition.
Iran now stands at a three-way crossroads: A hard regime change accompanied by chaotic rupture, a monarchical-style restoration, or a controlled transformation from within.
The third scenario, self-preserving reform, appears the most likely.
Ultimately, two variables will determine the outcome, which are the scale of public pressure and the configuration of power balances within the state.
Iran may either attempt to continue unchanged and absorb the risks, or it may choose to update its system in search of a new equilibrium.
The decisive question is this: Will Tehran see this moment as a threat to resist, or as an opportunity to adapt?
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/what-awaits-iran-regime-change-or-regime-update
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Trump’s other endless war: How a strike on Iran betrays his central promise
March 4, 2026
By Peter Rodgers
In international politics, starting a war is often easier than ending one. History has repeatedly shown that great powers can pull the trigger with a political decision, yet the trajectory, scope, and ultimate outcome of a war rarely remain under the sole control of its initiator. The United States’ attack on Iran sits precisely at this dangerous juncture: a war of choice launched by Washington, but one whose expansion, duration, and ultimate cost will now be shaped by Tehran. This is not merely an analytical warning; it underscores one of the deepest contradictions in Donald Trump’s foreign policy. A president who rose to power promising to end “endless wars” has now placed the United States on the threshold of what could become the longest and most complex Middle Eastern conflict of a new generation.
The first key point is the distinction between a “pre-emptive war” and a “preventive war”—a distinction with enormous legal and strategic implications. A pre-emptive war occurs in response to an imminent and immediate threat; a preventive war, by contrast, is launched against a potential future threat. The U.S. strike on Iran falls into the latter category. There was no clear evidence of an immediate threat to American territory. Iran was neither on the verge of deploying a nuclear weapon nor preparing an imminent attack against vital U.S. interests.
When a country wages war to prevent “what might happen,” the definition of victory becomes ambiguous. And a war without a defined victory condition rarely has a defined end.
The Trump administration appears to be pursuing objectives that go beyond degrading Iran’s military infrastructure: regime change. Yet this is precisely the arena in which modern history has repeatedly recorded American failure. Military force can destroy facilities, eliminate commanders, and cripple infrastructure; it cannot, on its own, construct a new political order. Regime change is not the product of bombardment but of internal collapse, alternative authority, and organized political presence. Unlike many previous U.S. targets, Iran is an institutionalized state with multilayered power structures. Even a scenario involving the removal of senior leadership would not necessarily result in systemic collapse; it could instead consolidate authority in more cohesive security actors. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya share a common lesson: toppling a government is easier than building a stable order afterward. Washington appears, once again, to have overlooked the second phase.
The most important analytical proposition is this: the United States started the war, but its continuation lies largely in Iran’s hands. In asymmetric conflicts, the weaker party often holds the strategic advantage of time. Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to prevail; it needs only to raise the costs, prolong the timeline, and widen the theatre of confrontation. Tehran’s options are numerous: expanding the conflict through regional actors; exerting pressure on energy routes and the global economy; conducting limited but sustained strikes aimed at political attrition in the United States; transforming the war into a multi-front crisis that becomes increasingly difficult to control. In such a scenario, Iran’s measure of success would not be battlefield conquest but turning the war into a chronic dilemma for Washington. This mirrors the pattern the United States experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan: military superiority without political victory.
In both of his presidential campaigns, Trump pledged to extricate America from the “endless wars of the Middle East.” That message reflected deep fatigue within American society after two decades of military intervention. Yet a war with Iran stands in direct contradiction to that promise. Why? Because unlike limited operations, a confrontation with Iran has the capacity to become a protracted and chronic crisis.
In other words, a war intended to project American strength could divert Washington’s strategic focus away from its principal competition with China and Russia—the very strategic error U.S. planners have warned against for years.
While U.S. national security documents emphasize that the future of global competition will be shaped in the Indo-Pacific, re-entering a massive military commitment in the Middle East would disperse strategic resources. Competition with China demands sustained economic, technological, and military concentration. Prolonged regional wars erode precisely that focus. Iran may not be able to defeat the United States outright, but it can keep it occupied—and in geopolitics, tying down a superpower can at times be nearly as consequential as defeating it.
Wars are usually launched under the assumption of control. Leaders believe they can calibrate escalation. Yet after the first strike, the logic of war replaces the logic of politics. Each attack invites retaliation. Each retaliation demands a new response. In this cycle, decision-makers gradually become captive to their own commitments. Withdrawal carries political costs; continuation carries strategic ones. This is how wars become “endless”—not necessarily because of the original plan, but because of the inability to exit without appearing to fail.
The U.S. strike on Iran may initially appear as a demonstration of strength, but the real danger lies in what follows. Washington has pulled the trigger, but it is no longer the sole actor shaping events. From this point forward, Tehran will influence the rhythm of the conflict—by choosing the timing, location, and intensity of its responses. This dynamic has defined many modern wars: great powers initiate them, but regional actors prolong them. If this trajectory continues, the United States may find itself trapped in the very cycle Trump once promised to end—a costly, grinding war with no clear horizon of victory. History may record this moment not as the beginning of a swift triumph, but as the point at which the United States once again entered a war far easier to begin than to leave. For ultimately, starting a war requires only one side; ending it always depends on the other—and now it is Iran that holds the decisive vote.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260304-trumps-other-endless-war-how-a-strike-on-iran-betrays-his-central-promise/
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EXPLAINER: What Is Iran’s ‘Mosaic Defense’ Strategy?
March 5, 2026
What Is Iran’s “Decentralized Mosaic Defense” Strategy?
Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, recently put a clear label on a concept Iranian planners have discussed for years: “decentralised (decentralized) mosaic defence”—often described as a wartime design meant to keep the system fighting even if senior leadership, communications, or major hubs are hit.
At its core, mosaic defence is built around dispersion and redundancy. Rather than relying on one central “brain” that can be disabled, authority and capability are distributed across multiple geographic and organizational nodes, with overlapping chains of command and pre-planned contingencies.
According to Reuters, Iranian sources described how the Revolutionary Guards had delegated authority far down the ranks and built “successor ladders” so units can keep operating if commanders are killed.
In a televised interview also cited by Reuters, Iranian deputy defence minister Reza Talaeinik said each figure in the command structure had named successors “stretching three ranks down” ready to replace them.
Why Araghchi Says “20 Years” Of US Wars Shaped It
Araghchi framed the doctrine as a product of watching the United States fight—then struggle to finish—major wars on Iran’s borders. Araghchi wrote:
“We’ve had two decades to study defeats of the U.S. military to our immediate east and west. We’ve incorporated lessons accordingly.
Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralized Mosaic Defence enables us to decide when—and how—war will end.”
That “study” shaped Iranian planning in two ways:
First: don’t fight the enemy’s favourite war. The US advantage is high-end airpower, ISR (intelligence/surveillance/recon), and precision strikes. Mosaic defence tries to make those strengths less decisive by ensuring there is no single headquarters, city, or leader whose loss collapses the fight.
Second: make war politically and operationally exhausting. The doctrine is designed for endurance—survive the initial shock, keep retaliating through multiple channels, and raise the costs of a prolonged campaign. This is the essence of the message Araghchi is trying to send: Iran intends to shape how—and when—the conflict ends, not just absorb blows.
How It Works In Practice: “If One Part Is Hit, Others Keep Moving”
Mosaic defense is often explained with a simple idea: “decapitation is not a silver bullet.” The goal is to keep the “body” functioning even if the “head” is struck—by building a system where commands can pass quickly, units can operate semi-independently, and retaliatory capacity is not concentrated.
Reuters’ reporting adds concrete operational detail. It says decentralization has been part of the IRGC’s doctrine for over 20 years, developed after observing the collapse of Iraqi forces in 2003—a cautionary lesson about what happens when a centralized military is shattered quickly.
In this structure:
Provincial and sector commands can keep fighting with “general instructions given in advance,” rather than waiting for real-time direction from top political leadership.
Succession planning is built in so leadership losses don’t freeze operations; Talaeinik’s “three ranks down” line is meant to reassure that replacements are immediate.
The coercive/security architecture is also designed to function internally during wartime.
This is why analysts describing the doctrine emphasize overlapping chains of command and dispersed stockpiles—it’s not just decentralization, but redundancy everywhere.
Deterrence, Not Just Defence—and the Risks
Araghchi’s messaging is strategic in itself: it says, in effect, “You can hit us hard and still not end this quickly.” The doctrine is intended for both domestic reassurance and outward deterrence: Iran’s warfighting capacity is portrayed as “a web designed to endure, adapt, and retaliate,” rather than a pillar that collapses if broken.
Other top Iranian officials have echoed the “long war” framing. Gulf News quoted Ali Larijani as saying: “Iran, unlike the United States, has prepared itself for a long war.”
But mosaic defence has a downside: delegation increases unpredictability. Reuters noted that empowering mid-ranking officers can build resilience yet also raise the risk of miscalculation or escalation, because more actors can initiate actions under broad guidance.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/explainer-what-is-irans-mosaic-defense-strategy/
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Why Did Hezbollah Decide to Enter the War? — Analysis
March 5, 2026
A Regional War Expands
Hezbollah’s decision to enter the ongoing regional confrontation did not occur in isolation. The latest escalation began when the United States and Israel launched major strikes against Iran, triggering waves of Iranian retaliation across the region.
The conflict quickly expanded beyond Iran itself. Iranian retaliatory strikes targeted US military assets and positions across the Gulf. The war rapidly assumed the character of a wider regional confrontation involving multiple actors aligned along competing geopolitical blocs.
Within this context, attention turned to Lebanon, where Hezbollah—one of the most powerful non-state actors in the Middle East—began limited military operations against Israeli positions along the border.
The central question quickly emerged: why did Hezbollah enter the war?
The answer lies in a combination of military, political, and strategic considerations that go far beyond the immediate battlefield.
Did Hezbollah Violate the Ceasefire?
A central claim advanced by Israel and some Western governments – and even anti-Hezbollah factions in Lebanon itself – is that Hezbollah’s actions represent a violation of the ceasefire arrangements that followed previous rounds of conflict along the Lebanese border.
However, the reality on the ground presents a far more complex picture.
For months, Israel has carried out continuous violations of Lebanese sovereignty through airstrikes, drone surveillance, artillery fire, and cross-border incursions.
According to Lebanese government figures and reports by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Israel has committed thousands of violations of Lebanese airspace and territory since the ceasefire arrangements took effect.
Lebanese officials have repeatedly documented Israeli overflights, drone operations, and missile strikes inside the country. UNIFIL has also confirmed frequent violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft.
These actions have not been merely symbolic. Israeli strikes have caused civilian casualties and extensive destruction of homes and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.
Villages near the border have experienced repeated bombardments, forcing families to flee and damaging agricultural land and civilian property.
At the same time, Israeli officials have openly signalled that they have no intention of withdrawing fully from Lebanese territory or halting military operations.
Several Israeli leaders have stated publicly that Israel intends to maintain military pressure on Hezbollah and potentially establish a longer-term security presence along the border.
In this context, Hezbollah’s response—limited strikes against Israeli military positions—cannot easily be framed as the violation of a functioning ceasefire.
Rather, Hezbollah and its allies argue that no real ceasefire existed, given the scale and persistence of Israeli violations.
Did Hezbollah Violate Lebanese Consensus?
Another argument advanced by critics inside Lebanon is that Hezbollah’s intervention undermines national consensus and drags the country into a war it cannot afford.
Lebanon’s government, which maintains close ties with Western governments and the United States, has repeatedly blamed Hezbollah for escalating tensions.
However, the government has struggled to provide a convincing explanation of how it interprets Israel’s continued attacks on Lebanese territory.
While condemning Hezbollah’s actions, Lebanese authorities have largely failed to respond militarily—or even diplomatically in an effective way—to Israeli strikes.
The Lebanese state has not fired a single bullet at Israeli forces despite repeated attacks inside its territory. This has deepened the political divide within Lebanese society.
Lebanon has long been fractured along sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical lines. Some factions align closely with Western and Gulf states, while others view themselves as part of the Axis of Resistance, which includes Iran, Hezbollah, Ansarallah in Yemen, Palestinian resistance factons and several Iraqi factions.
Within this divided political landscape, there has never been a unified national consensus regarding confrontation with Israel.
For many Lebanese—particularly in communities that have historically borne the brunt of Israeli attacks—Hezbollah’s military posture is viewed as a form of deterrence rather than escalation.
So Why Did Hezbollah Enter the War?
Hezbollah’s decision to join the conflict appears to reflect a broader strategic calculation.
From Hezbollah’s perspective, the Israeli war was likely to expand regardless of its immediate actions.
Israeli leaders have repeatedly declared their intention to reshape the regional balance of power and weaken Iran and its allies.
For Hezbollah, the prospect of Iran being significantly weakened carries profound implications.
If Iran’s position in the region were severely damaged, Hezbollah could find itself facing Israel largely alone—while simultaneously confronting pressure from the United States, Western governments, and regional Arab powers aligned with Washington.
In such a scenario, Hezbollah could be isolated militarily and politically.
Entering the war now, while Iran remains actively engaged and regional allies are mobilized, allows Hezbollah to operate within a broader coalition rather than as an isolated actor.
It also ensures that Hezbollah retains influence over the eventual diplomatic outcome of the conflict.
Wars in the Middle East often conclude not with decisive military victories but through negotiated exits once the architects of war decide to pursue a political strategy.
By participating in the conflict, Hezbollah guarantees that it will have a seat at the negotiating table when such an exit strategy eventually emerges.
Does This Mean the Axis of Resistance Has Been Reborn?
Some analysts have framed the current coordination between Iran, Hezbollah, Ansarallah, and Iraqi factions as the “rebirth” of the Axis of Resistance.
But the reality may be more nuanced.
The Axis of Resistance was never destroyed. Instead, each actor within it has often had to adapt to its own domestic political realities.
Hezbollah operates within Lebanon’s complex sectarian political system. Iraqi factions must navigate Baghdad’s fragile state institutions. Ansarallah governs large parts of Yemen under conditions of war and blockade. Hamas remains focused on defeating the Israeli-US scheme aimed at disarming resistance and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from Gaza,
These differing political contexts often limit how openly each actor can coordinate with the others. Yet recent developments suggest that the axis is functioning in a coordinated manner.
Iranian strikes across the region, Ansarallah’s operations in the Red Sea, and Hezbollah’s engagement along the Lebanese border indicate a level of strategic alignment.
The current conflict has therefore revealed not the rebirth of the axis but its continued operational existence.
Our Strategic Analysis
Hezbollah’s intervention reflects a calculated strategic move rather than an impulsive escalation.
Israel’s continued military pressure on Lebanon, combined with the wider war against Iran, created conditions in which Hezbollah perceived long-term risks in remaining passive.
By entering the conflict in a limited but coordinated manner, Hezbollah seeks to shape the strategic environment before the war reaches a stage where diplomatic negotiations become inevitable.
In doing so, Hezbollah is signalling that the future of Lebanon—and the broader regional balance of power—cannot be determined without its participation.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/why-did-hezbollah-decide-to-enter-the-war-analysis/
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Is Iran Violating International Law by Striking US Bases in Gulf States?
March 4, 2026
A Legal Question in the Midst of War
As the regional conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran rapidly escalates, new legal questions have emerged regarding the expanding battlefield. Following US and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory in late February, Tehran launched retaliatory operations targeting American military facilities across the Gulf region.
The Palestine Chronicle consulted several legal sources and experts in international law to examine a central question now debated in diplomatic circles:
Are Iran’s strikes on US bases located in Gulf states legal under international law, or do they violate the sovereignty of those host countries?
The answer, legal scholars suggest, is not as straightforward as it may appear in political rhetoric. It requires examining the frameworks of the UN Charter, customary international law, and the legal responsibilities of states that allow their territory to be used for military operations.
Before addressing the legal arguments, however, it is important to understand the broader context of the unfolding war.
What Is Happening in the Region?
On February 28, 2026, tensions between Iran and the US-Israeli alliance erupted into a direct military confrontation after coordinated strikes targeted Iranian infrastructure, military facilities, and civilian targets. In response, Tehran launched a large-scale counter-offensive.
Iranian operations have not been limited to Israeli or US forces directly engaged in the attacks. Instead, several American military bases located across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have reportedly come under Iranian missile and drone strikes. These installations include facilities used for logistics, surveillance, and aircraft operations.
The expansion of the battlefield beyond the immediate combatants has triggered a major legal debate: If US forces launch attacks on Iran from bases located in other countries, does international law permit Iran to strike those bases in return?
Does Hosting a Foreign Military Constitute an “Act of Aggression”?
Under what is often referred to in Western discourse as the “rules-based international order,” host states are frequently portrayed as neutral actors merely providing logistical support to allies.
However, international law contains a more explicit definition of aggression.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) defines acts of aggression in several forms. Article 3(f) states that aggression includes:
“The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.”
From a legal standpoint, this provision carries significant implications. If a Gulf state allows its territory to be used as a launch platform for attacks on Iran, it is not simply hosting foreign forces. It may be considered legally responsible for enabling an act of aggression.
In such a case, the host state risks losing the legal protections normally associated with neutrality. Instead, it could be seen as a participant in the conflict, even if indirectly.
Is Iran’s Response Protected by Article 51?
The UN Charter’s Article 51 recognizes what it describes as the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” when a state is subjected to an armed attack.
Legal scholars often interpret this provision through what is sometimes referred to as the “source of fire” principle.
If a missile, drone, or aircraft that attacked Iran originated from a specific military base, that base becomes the operational source of the threat. Under this reasoning, international law does not require a state under attack to respect the territorial boundaries of a third country if those boundaries are being used to shield ongoing military operations.
In such cases, the key legal question becomes whether the host country is “unwilling or unable” to prevent its territory from being used for attacks.
If a state permits its territory to function as a launch point for strikes against another country, and fails to stop those operations, the targeted state may argue that it has the legal right to neutralize the threat at its source.
What Are the Mandatory Limits of Self-Defense?
Even if Iran can invoke the right to self-defense, international law imposes strict conditions on how that right can be exercised.
Two principles are particularly central: necessity and proportionality.
The Rule of Necessity requires that any use of force in self-defense must be necessary to halt or prevent an ongoing attack. If the military action is primarily intended as retaliation or punishment, rather than to stop a continuing threat, the legal justification weakens.
The Rule of Proportionality limits the scale and scope of the response. Military action must be restricted to what is reasonably required to neutralize the threat.
In practical terms, this means that certain targets could fall within the boundaries of lawful self-defence. For example:
A strike directed at hangars, radar installations, or personnel directly involved in attacks on Iran could potentially meet the proportionality requirement.
However, the legal argument would weaken significantly if Iranian forces targeted civilian infrastructure such as oil facilities, power grids, or unrelated military assets belonging to the host state.
In such cases, the response could be interpreted as exceeding the limits of lawful self-defence.
Does “Co-Belligerent” Status Change the Legal Framework?
Another concept raised by international law experts is that of co-belligerency.
Once a state knowingly allows its territory to be used for offensive military operations against another country, it may effectively enter the conflict itself. In such circumstances, it no longer qualifies as a neutral party under the legal framework established by the Hague Conventions governing neutrality in war.
By providing bases, airspace, or logistical infrastructure for military operations, the host state may be seen as placing its territory and resources at the disposal of one side of the conflict.
If that threshold is crossed, the theater of war may legally extend into that state’s territory.
This interpretation significantly complicates the narrative that Gulf states are merely passive hosts for foreign military deployments.
A Crisis of Responsibility?
The expanding war between Iran, the United States, and Israel is raising complex legal questions about sovereignty, neutrality, and the limits of self-defense.
While Iran must still operate within the boundaries of necessity and proportionality to maintain a legal claim to self-defense, the responsibility for the widening battlefield does not lie solely with Tehran.
International law suggests that states cannot provide their territory as platforms for military operations while simultaneously claiming the protections reserved for neutral actors.
If foreign military forces are allowed to conduct attacks from bases located within their borders, those bases may become legitimate targets under the logic of self-defense.
In that sense, the legal crisis unfolding in the Gulf reflects a broader breakdown in the norms governing sovereignty and war.
Under the strict lens of international law, a state cannot supply the instruments of war while expecting the privileges of peace.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/is-iran-violating-international-law-by-striking-us-bases-in-gulf-states/
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How US-Israeli Iran Strikes Will Penalize Global Prospects
March 4, 2026
By Dan Steinbock
On February 28, US President Trump announced the start of Operation Epic Fury. In a surreal twist, he described the mission’s primary objective as defending the American people by eliminating “imminent threats” from the Iranian regime.
Trump specifically cited the need to eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions, destroy its military infrastructure, and undermine Iranian-backed groups in the region. He delegated regime risk to the Iranian people, urging them to “take over your government.”
With Israel, the US hoped to “decapitate Iran’s leadership”, particularly Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, and President Masoud Pezeshkian. This has been the US-Israeli dream since the Islamic Revolution almost half a century ago: to rule and divide the polity and fragment the economy, to dominate the energy resources.
In the absence of the US-Israel escalation in the region since early 2025, the 86-year-old Khamenei would likely have retired. But that was no option to either the US or Israel. His death was deemed vital to serve as a demonstration effect.
Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as a reformist in the July 2024 Iranian presidential election. The first reformist to hold the presidency in Iran in some two decades, he campaigned on a platform of moderation, pledging to relax the strict enforcement of hijab laws, improve relations with the West, restart nuclear negotiations to ease economic sanctions, and end Iran’s international isolation.
In the US and Israel, Iranian reformism is seen as a threat. Development, women’s rights, Western ties, eased sanctions, international cooperation – it all worked against the goal to control Iran’s energy resources and restructure the Middle East. Hence, their preference for a pro-US Iranian proxy, including Raza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah of Iran.
The strategic objective of Epic Fury is full counter-revolution, not peaceful reform and development.
Undermining diplomacy for (another) illegal war
Following joint military strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian nuclear and military facilities on February 28, 2026, several countries officially urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) to convene for an emergency session.
France was the first council member to request a Security Council meeting. President Emmanuel Macron warned of “grave consequences for international peace and security”. Jointly, Russia and China requested a briefing, characterizing the strikes as an “unprovoked and reckless act of military aggression.”
During the session, UN Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the escalation and called for an immediate ceasefire.
In the Global South, many leaders were shocked by the Trump administration’s disregard of Iranian life, severe violation of international law and Iran’s sovereignty, especially after US participation in Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its ongoing ethnic cleansing in the West Bank.
In a historical view, none of this is new. Since the 1970s, US administrations have progressively opted for illegal wars and unilateralism at the expense of international law and multilateralism. What is new is that today all gloves are off. The deployment of brutal force is open, blatant and unapologetic. Since might is right, any criticism must be regarded as potential subversion.
Moreover, these strikes against Iran are not just about the Middle East. They are a prelude – a demonstration effect toward China/Taiwan and Russia/Ukraine theaters.
Overnight, the Trump administration, once again without an exit strategy, managed to drag the international community ever closer to a Cold War escalation.
It’s the Oil (and Gas), Stupid
Iran was the fourth-largest crude oil producer in OPEC in 2023 and the third-largest dry natural gas producer in the world in 2022. What makes Tehran so attractive to the US is that Iran is the world’s third-largest oil and second-largest natural gas reserve holder.
In mid-January, when the American Petroleum Institute (API) gathered oil industry leaders and lobbyists for a summit, Bob McNally of the Rapidan Energy Group, a veteran industry insider, pushed hard for the overthrow of Iran’s leadership. “Iran holds the biggest promise,” McNally proclaimed. “If you can imagine our industry going back there, we would get a lot more oil, a lot sooner than we will out of Venezuela.”
During the first term of President George W. Bush, McNally served in the White House as Bush’s Special Assistant. In 2008, he served as Mitt Romney’s energy advisor, and in 2010, he advised Senator Marco Rubio. As Trump’s Secretary of State, Rubio has played a critical role in the ongoing regime change efforts in both Venezuela (the world’s largest proven oil reserves) and Iran.
Despite its abundant reserves, Iran’s total liquids production is limited because the oil sector has been subject to underinvestment and international sanctions for several years.
Efforts at external destabilization soared prior to US-Israeli strikes. On February 24, Damon Wilson, the head of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), revealed during a House oversight hearing that NED “began supporting the deployment and operation of about 200 Star links early on” amid the violence that swept through Iran last month. But he was abruptly interrupted by the ranking member of the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, Rep. Lois Frankel, who told Wilson: “You know what, I’m going to interrupt you – we’d better not talk about it.”
In the US, mainstream media did not disclose the story. Only a few progressive outlets did. For its part, NED didn’t.
The war scenario
Here are the operational facts. The conflict started with the USIsrael-coordinated strikes, which hit nuclear, missile, and leadership targets across Iran. Expectedly, Iran retaliated with missiles and regional proxy attacks against Israel and US bases, including the Gulf states hosting U.S. military bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem in Kuwait, Al Dhafra in the UAE, and the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.
Reportedly, the US-Israeli campaign had planned for weeks-long sustained operations. According to the Israeli Defense Force, the joint attack consisted of over 200 fighter jets attacking 500 targets in the largest attack in Israeli Air Force history.
In Friday, early casualties (initial phase) featured 200+ killed in Iran, hundreds injured (initial estimates). Against US and Israeli assurances, civilian incidents have already been reported (e.g., school strike casualties).
These strikes will penalize global economic prospects, which are already constrained by geoeconomic fragmentation (sanctions blocs, supply-chain bifurcation), coupled with extremely high oil market sensitivity (Hormuz risk premium).
From the standpoint of the global economy, the US-Israel attack against Iran occurs amid elevated geoeconomic fragmentation. Second, the US military doctrine builds on a phased escalation ladder from coercion to paralysis to political outcome.
Phase 1: Shock. Leadership targeting, nuclear/missile suppression and psychological dominance.
Phase 2: System Paralysis. Aiming at air defense destruction, IRGC command disruption and economic isolation escalation.
Phase 3: Political Outcome. With the strategic objective of internal collapse or negotiated capitulation.
The problem is that these military phases ensure no political resolution.
Trump’s Four-week Scenario
In the United States, President Trump has ducked reporters because the rationale for the US-Israeli Iran attacks – Iran’s planning for a preemptive attack against American interests – has proved untrue, as the US intelligence community has acknowledged.
In the Sunday interview with the British Daily Mail, President Trump disclosed a possible timeline for the war with Iran, suggesting fighting could go on for a month: “It’s always been a four-week process. We figured it will be four weeks or so. It’s always been about a four-week process so – as strong as it is, it’s a big country, it’ll take four weeks – or less.”
So, let’s model the 1-month scenario occurring against the backdrop of elevated geoeconomic fragmentation (not Cold War II). In this case, US strategy of a phased escalation ladder is working imperfectly. As a result, the most realistic path is controlled escalation without regime collapse in Iran.
The scenario comes with new risks because in this scenario US and Israel seek to degrade Iranian strategic capacity enough to force a deterrence reset, while avoiding ground war. Iran responds asymmetrically but avoids actions that trigger US invasion. The likely outcome is military success, but political stalemate and economic shock in a very challenging historical moment.
Political Turmoil, Economic Uncertainty, Market Volatility
In terms of duration, the US-Israeli attacks will use the first week to shock and demonstrate, with precision strikes on nuclear infrastructure, IRGC bases, and air defenses. Iran launches missile salvos toward Israel and US regional bases. Meanwhile, cyber operations expand in both directions.
In political terms, there is an Iranian domestic rally-around-flag effect. Gulf states quietly support the US, but call for de-escalation and hedge bets. In economic terms, oil jumps abruptly, with a 20-30% risk premium, and shipping insurance spikes in the Gulf and the Red Sea.
During the next 2-3 weeks, US-Israeli attacks seek to achieve system paralysis in Iran. If by then there is no tangible elite fracture inside Iran, the neutrality of the Global South increases, and Western alliance cohesion begins to show signs of strain, escalation risks compel the US and Israel on a diplomatic defensive. So, the fourth week will see negotiated stabilization pressure on both sides. The result could be an effective ceasefire without agreement.
But in economic terms, the unwarranted 1-month war would result in an energy shock, with oil prices soaring to $115-140, gas prices rising due to shipping risk, and strategic reserves partially released. In shipping and trade, Red Sea and Gulf insurance premiums could double or triple, while delivery times lengthen due to inventory shocks.
The macro effect is elevated inflation as energy prices are coupled with rising costs in transport, food, and manufacturing, central banks delaying the anticipated rate cuts, and global growth decelerating. In financial markets, emerging markets would suffer from capital outflows. Civilian economies underperform as defense and energy sectors outperform. Risk assets may not crash but will exhibit extraordinary volatility.
Escalation Multiplies Risks
Total deaths could soar to 15,000-35,000, a third or half of them civilian. The number of injured would surge to 60,000-120,000. Whereas the number of displaced persons could amount to 2-4 million.
Global inflation add-on could amount to 1-1.5 percentage points. Middle East GDP could suffer a -5-8% penalty and global growth prospects would be downgraded by -0.7%.
Like the Trump trade wars, it would produce no economic winners. But it could push the global economy closer to the edge. It would be as unwarranted as the proxy wars in Ukraine, Gaza and elsewhere in the Middle East. And ultimately, civilians would pay the bill and defense contractors’ insiders would reap the profits.
https://www.palestinechronicle.com/how-us-israeli-iran-strikes-will-penalize-global-prospects/
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