Will There Ever Be A Debate On Blasphemy Law? : New Age Islam's Selection, 12 March 2016
• Being Islamic and nuclear
By Reema Shaukat
• The price of terrorism
By Express Tribune
• If reconciliation fails in Afghanistan — I
By Michael Kugelman
• If reconciliation fails in Afghanistan... — II
By Michael Kugelman
Compiled by New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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Will there be ever be a debate on blasphemy law?
By Usama Khilji
March 12, 2016
The Supreme Court decision rejecting Qadri’s appeal was also seen as historic as the judge clearly ruled that criticism of the blasphemy law is not tantamount to blasphemy
Mumtaz Qadri, the police bodyguard of former governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, was executed on 29th February 2016 for killing Taseer with 27 bullets on 4th January 2011. The assassination followed the governor’s call to reform of Pakistan’s blasphemy law. The execution shows the State’s rejection of violent extremism and mob justice, but also raises concerns about the reform of the blasphemy law, rights of minorities, and the death penalty.
Governor Taseer, a member of the then-ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was one of the few politicians who had openly supported reform of the blasphemy law. In the lead-up to his death he had requested a presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi, the first Christian woman in Pakistan on death row for blasphemy for allegedly insulting the Prophet (pbuh) on the farm she worked in Punjab. Taseer echoed what activists had been saying for years: that the blasphemy law is flawed and is abused to settle personal scores, mostly against members of religious minorities.
Pakistan inherited the blasphemy law from the Indian Penal Code promulgated by the British Raj in 1860 to deal with communal violence, mostly between Hindus and Muslims. Until changes to the blasphemy law were introduced by military dictator Zia-ul-Haq in 1980, there were only eight reported incidents of its use, none of which were against non-Muslims, according to a report by the Islamabad-based Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). However, Zia’s amendments led to a spike in the number of cases of blasphemy between 1977 and 2012 to 328, as per the CRSS. He also introduced specific clauses targeting the Ahmedis, who were declared non-Muslims through the Second Constitutional Amendment, and the death penalty for insulting the Prophet under 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. There are currently 18 people on death row for blasphemy.
As the case of Taseer’s assassination demonstrates, extreme religious segments in Pakistan are not willing to even discuss reforming the law, and there is strong and often violent resistance to any such move. Clement Shahbaz Bhatti, the then federal minister for minority affairs and the only Christian and non-Muslim member in the PPP-led cabinet, also called for reforms of the blasphemy law and pardon for Aasia Bibi. He was killed by the Taliban on 2nd March 2011, two months after Taseer’s assassination. In 2013, angry mobs set fire to dozens of houses in a Christian neighbourhood in Lahore over allegation of blasphemy by one of the Christian residents, who pleaded innocence and insisted the accusations were motivated by a property dispute. Simply an allegation of blasphemy is often enough to land someone in jail, with trials taking years.
Qadri’s execution was enabled by the fact that Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif lifted the eight-year moratorium on the death penalty as part of the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism chalked out after the 16th December 2014 terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar that left 162 dead (132 of which were children). However, local activists and international bodies such as the UN and Amnesty International alike have called for reinstating the moratorium on the death penalty, arguing that executions do not curb violence.
Many in Pakistan have hailed the decision of president of Pakistan not to accept Qadri’s plea for mercy as an important symbolic gesture showing that the State will not tolerate vigilantism. The Supreme Court decision rejecting Qadri’s appeal was also seen as historic as the judge clearly ruled that criticism of the blasphemy law is not tantamount to blasphemy. This was an important decision considering the amount of support Qadri had from religious groups that showered him with rose petals at his court appearances and exerted pressure on the judiciary.
The news of Qadri’s hanging resulted in some protests in the urban centres of Pakistan, with protestors burning posters with images of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Thousands gathered from all over the country at his funeral in Rawalpindi’s Liaquat Bagh, the same park where former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in 2007. Some people wore “I am Qadri” signs around their necks, and #IamMumtazQadri was one of the top trends on Twitter on the day of his funeral for the second time (the first being when Supreme Court upheld the Qadri’s death penalty). However, police booked 7,000 protestors and religious leaders for misusing loudspeakers and hurling threats to the State at protests in Karachi against the hanging of Qadri.
Terrorist organisations also reacted violently to the hanging, with a suicide bomber killing 17 people at lower courts in Shabqadar in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on 7th March 2016. Jamat-ul-Ahrar, a splinter group of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack, and explicitly specified that they had targeted the judiciary for handing the death penalty to Qadri.
On 8th March 2016, Salmaan Taseer’s son Shahbaz Taseer, who was kidnapped shortly after his father’s assassination, was found near the city of Quetta in the Balochistan province by the police. The timing of his release has raised questions, with some reports saying that he was unaccompanied when found because ransom was paid to the militant groups holding him, while the AFP quoted militant sources saying that Shahbaz could no longer be held due to a military operation around the tribal areas where he was being hidden.
The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority (PEMRA) issued guidelines to the dozens of Pakistani TV news channels not to cover the execution of Qadri, threatening to cancel their licences if they disobeyed, a move which many say had the backing of the military. PEMRA is reported to have imposed fines on the two channels that defied the ban on coverage of the funeral. However, social media was buzzing with anger, some at the protests, but most at the execution. The assassination of Governor Taseer created an environment of fear, and most people who believe the law requires reform have since avoided speaking about it. Whereas the NAP includes curbing hate speech and glorification of terrorists on the media, social media platforms don’t afford such government control, though the government has in the past requested social media entities such as Facebook and Twitter to take down content that was considered blasphemous or critical of the state.
A turning point?
With the execution of Qadri, ban on coverage of the funeral, and booking of cases against pro-Qadri protestors, the State seems to be strengthening its writ that in the past has been challenged by militancy and mob violence in the name of religion. Considering the spillover effects into society over years, has the Pakistani state realised the danger of nurturing religious extremist groups (the same ones that it has used for strategic purposes since U.S.-backed support for Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s)? Will recent events lead to discussions about possible amendments to the blasphemy law to prevent its abuse? How will the government deal with renewed opposition to reform from religious parties? How will it deal with Aasia Bibi’s case, whose death sentence is due to be appealed once again in March? Does this execution promise a safer Pakistan for religious minorities?
The Pakistani state must continue to lead the narrative against violent militancy without any exception, and maintain strong rule of law whereby mob justice, hate speech, and militant activity on any grounds is deemed completely unacceptable, in the true spirit of the NAP. This project will also require broader long term changes, such as a revision of school textbooks that paint religious minorities unfavourably and teach a warped version of history, and regulation of religious seminaries that inculcate extreme religious ideologies promoted by Arab powers such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.
Usama Khilji is an activist and Chevening Scholar from Pakistan pursuing an MSc in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/12-Mar-2016/will-there-be-ever-be-a-debate-on-blasphemy-law
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Being Islamic and nuclear
By Reema Shaukat
March 12th, 2016
In the late 1990s, when Pakistan was struggling to streamline its democratic identity through the political process, India detonated its second nuclear device in Pokhran, complicating the environment in the region. Meanwhile, the US was playing an important role between the two countries to sponsor a wide-ranging and reasonably objective agenda for Pakistan-India talks, which went into a stupor as a result of the Indian detonation. One thing was crystal clear. Pakistan’s reciprocal nuclear tests established nuclear parity, though at a cost that still haunts us unnecessarily. Thereafter, the US found it a good time to close down the parallel dialogue conducted by them with Pakistan and India.
Since Kashmir is the core foundation for the rallying of a nuclear programme by Pakistan, the solution of this long-standing issue lies, essentially, in asking Pakistan to lower its nuclear guards. Without doing so, the situation will not improve as desired by India and other global powers. The Kashmir conundrum is further convoluted when it is pooled in with ‘terrorism’ and the lack of international pressure on India regarding the religious fanaticism of the RSS. Such a one-sided approach by the global powers is not likely to address the nuclear deterrence phenomenon.
During her stints in power, Indira Gandhi cited Hidutwa as a right-wing threat to India’s solidarity and integrity, a challenge she believed had the support of the West — in earnest, the US. Indira Gandhi’s idea of Hindutva, a great challenge supported by the US, proves correct today because the US has compelled the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members to accommodate India without catering for related nuclear protocols and relaxing regulations.
Yet again, new proposals are being mounted on Pakistan to restrict its testing and deployment of short- and long-range missiles, accept protocols of fissile materials being cut-off and even to unilaterally sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without waiting for India. In exchange, officials and think-tanks in the west, specifically in the US, have been offering to support Pakistan’s desire to be treated as a ‘normal’ state in its quest for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. To press further this demand from Pakistan, the US has asked Australia and Japan to accelerate supplies to India under a previously finalised civil nuclear deal. Pakistan’s early warnings that the Indian build-up would oblige it to enhance reliance on its nuclear and missile capabilities has already been brushed aside by the US which, regrettably, has continued attempts to restrict Pakistan’s defensive response rather than India’s aggressive armament. In view of this growing asymmetry, the National Command Authority has rightly reiterated the national resolve to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability in line with the dictates of Credible Minimum Deterrence to deter all forms of aggression, adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race.
The subsequent quest for membership of the NSG is a fool’s errand. In Western eyes, Pakistan will never be a normal state as long as it is an Islamic and nuclear power. It is unlikely to be granted entry into the NSG without major concessions. In the Indo-Pacific field, China is not the only regional giant that is investing in nuclear systems, but it is chiefly India that is also at various stages of development, especially of short-range battlefield nuclear weapons aimed at Pakistan and China. India has hence enacted the necessary defense procurement reforms needed to equip Cold Start, with the tacit support of a variety of regional and global powers. The US and UK are in forefront in empowering India while Australia, Japan and Israel have provided necessary technology and expertise to enable India to carry out interdiction operations inside Pakistani territory under its well-articulated doctrine. Most importantly, Cold Start has already received political support required for it from the incumbent government led by Mr Modi. The US’s raised eyebrows at Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals and the subsequent agreement on providing F-16s, indicates its carrot-and-stick approach towards Pakistan.
Since the doctrine is not absolute, it must be continuously checked in light of improvements in technology and changes in the threat environment. From a military standpoint, the doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons must be operationally credible so as to enhance deterrence. Pakistan’s need for a doctrine in specific regard to tactical nuclear weapons is rooted in these challenges, which are all genuine due to growing Indian conventional and nuclear capabilities. In such a situation, Pakistan has no option but to continue its nuclear doctrine while enhancing strategic relations with China and Russia.
Reema Shaukat works for the Islamabad-based think-tank Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies
tribune.com.pk/story/1064112/being-islamic-and-nuclear/
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The price of terrorism
By Express Tribune
March 12th, 2016
The harm caused by terrorism is most frequently measured by the number of lives lost, the number of people injured and the amount of damage to property caused in a particular attack. After an incident, benevolent tendencies take over and compensation packages are announced for those who have lost loved ones or become unable to work as a result of their injuries. However, the news cycle soon rolls on and there is little follow-up on these promises to see if they have actually been fulfilled. The deadliest of attacks soon pass out of collective conscious, not because of callousness or short attention spans but because the sheer number of victims turns them into faceless statistics that are no longer viewed as individuals with shattered lives. Once in a while, when cases are followed up it is revealed that the lives of those affected have never recovered their previous normalcy. Health, careers and relationships all suffer and this suffering is only compounded when promises of compensation remain unmet, sometimes years after the fact.
It has come to light that around 26 individuals who were either injured in the All Saints Church attack of 2013 or are related to the victims have not received monetary compensation. Both the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Sindh governments had promised relief funds, but these individuals are still waiting for their cheques to arrive despite numerous requests. Allegations of misappropriation have been denied both by the church and government, which claim that funds were distributed based on hospital records. It has further been claimed that some individuals abused the system by receiving relief funds falsely or more than once. It is evident that there is a breakdown in communication, which has caused delays and opportunities for fraudulent claims. If the government is truly committed to helping the victims of terrorism, the system of funds distribution needs to be streamlined and made more efficient. It must be the responsibility of authorities to ensure timely distribution of funds to deserving individuals rather than adding the burden of lodging repeated claims to their already battered lives.
tribune.com.pk/story/1064107/the-price-of-terrorism/
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If reconciliation fails in Afghanistan — I
By Michael Kugelman
March 11, 2016
Washington is banking on a peace deal to end the Afghanistan war — a highly ambitious objective that is a long shot at best
In Washington, it’s a term that sends shivers down policymakers’ spines — often invoked to describe an unknown or undesirable alternative to a policy that is problematic and often overly idealistic, yet that officials nonetheless desperately want to succeed.
In 2007, soon after U.S. authorities had announced a high-stakes troop surge in Iraq, a group of governors visiting Washington asked a popular question of the day: “What’s Plan B?” The White House offered a befitting response: “To make Plan A work.” More recently, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry articulated a variety of messy and complicated Plan B options, should a new and fragile ceasefire in Syria not hold — from a partition arrangement to deeper collaborations with the Syrian opposition.
And then there’s Afghanistan.
Ever since U.S.-led forces stormed into the country in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate al-Qaeda sanctuaries, Washington’s exact objectives have been difficult to discern. For the Obama administration, Plan A until 2014 consisted, broadly speaking, of using military force to beat back, if not defeat, the Taliban insurgency and bring some semblance of stability to Afghanistan in order to ensure that al-Qaeda could never shelter there again.
In 2014, foreign troops ended combat operations in Afghanistan with the war still raging. Consequently, Washington’s post-2014 hopes for Plan A rest on an elusive political aim: full-throated support for, and furious efforts toward, a reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. While Washington seeks to support such a process, it continues to advise and assist beleaguered Afghan troops. Unfortunately, for Washington, betting the farm on a peace process could amount to a big strategic mistake — and yet the alternatives are no more promising.
In effect, Washington is banking on a peace deal to end the Afghanistan war — a highly ambitious objective that is a long shot at best.
Unsuccessful efforts to engage the Taliban in talks extend back more than 10 years. To be sure, there have been periods of promise. In July 2015, Taliban representatives launched formal negotiations with Afghan government officials in Pakistan. However, the talks were quickly torpedoed by the news that Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar had been dead for several years. In recent months, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and China have formed a Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) to prepare the grounds for peace talks. For weeks, the QCG has insisted that direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban are just around the corner — until March 5, when the Taliban released a statement saying they currently had no intention to participate in talks.
There are three good reasons to fear that Washington’s Plan A is more likely to fail than succeed.
First, the Taliban have little incentive to lay down their arms and seek a peace deal, given their strong performance on the battlefield. One may argue that this position of strength could actually incentivise the Taliban to join talks, given that the movement could enjoy a favourable bargaining position. For now, however, the Taliban leadership has refused. At any rate, Kabul is unlikely to accept the large demands of an emboldened Taliban — which may include receiving ministerships. There’s no indication Kabul has even accepted the Taliban’s preconditions for talks — which include the departure of all foreign troops.
The second reason to be sceptical about a successful peace process is the fragmentation of the Taliban, and the influential internal interests that are rigidly opposed to talks. Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor, who is said to support the idea of reconciliation, is opposed by powerful anti-peace factions that would likely remain active on the battlefield if peace talks were to begin — and even if a peace deal were to be announced. There may need to be an intra-Taliban reconciliation process before there can be one with the Afghan government.
The third reason to be sceptical is Pakistan. For one thing, some within the Afghan political class resent the prominent role that the QDC has accorded to its mistrusted neighbour. For another, by no means is Pakistan guaranteed to bring the Taliban to the peace table — a core justification for its inclusion in the QDC. Quite simply, Pakistan is losing leverage it has long enjoyed with the Taliban — leverage derived from the sanctuaries it has granted to the Taliban in North Waziristan. Taliban triumphs in Afghanistan have allowed them to carve out new de facto sanctuaries in that country. Additionally, a Pakistani military offensive in North Waziristan (targeting other militant groups) has driven Afghan Taliban forces into Afghanistan, further dampening the appeal of a Pakistan-based sanctuary. From a broader regional stability perspective, these developments are all the more concerning given that some Pakistani Taliban factions are also now holed up in Afghanistan, and use the country as a base for attacks on Pakistan — including the December 2014 school massacre in Peshawar.
Keep in mind as well that while Mullah Mansoor is believed to be close to the Pakistani security establishment, some Afghan Taliban factions harbour no love for Pakistan. As I wrote two years ago, interviews with Taliban detainees, conducted by NATO interrogators back in 2011, revealed that many didn’t trust Pakistan and resented the tight control exerted on them by Pakistani intelligence. And this doesn’t even get to the question of Pakistan’s questionable commitment to peace, given its pursuit of policies meant to support and strengthen violent forces in Afghanistan that aim to minimise India’s footprint. Recall that back in 2012, Afghanistan’s High Peace Council launched a “Peace Process Roadmap to 2015” plan that, like the current QDC model, involved a central Pakistani role. This initiative, suffice it to say, failed to achieve its purpose.
This all underscores that the time has never been riper to pose that uncomfortable question: If not reconciliation in Afghanistan, then what?
Washington is unsurprisingly mum on the matter, but its implied answer is patience — give peace talks more of a chance, and especially, as U.S. diplomats have told me privately, because there is no better alternative. Interestingly, this was the very position articulated to me by a senior Pakistani official in Islamabad last month, who insisted that a reconciliation process can be successful so long as there are no short-term deadlines.
A position of strategic patience has some merit, but it is at best shaky. For instance, in time, the Islamic State’s growing — where some disaffected Taliban fighters have thrown their support behind the group and are engaging Taliban forces in battle — could compel the Taliban to step off the battlefield and negotiate an accord (that said, at this point Taliban forces are successfully fighting off their Islamic State-aligned foes). Additionally, perhaps down the road Mullah Mansoor could solidify his hold on power and impose enough organisational discipline to get rival factions behind him in support of reconciliation (given the extent of Taliban fragmentation, however, such an outcome is unlikely). Finally, the Taliban may in due course become less rigid about their preconditions for talks. The group, at least rhetorically, has telegraphed a willingness to be flexible — as seen in a statement following a Pugwash conference in 2015, when it said that women should enjoy the right to knowledge, work, and ownership. Of course, such tactics should be taken with grains of salt; the Afghan Taliban often decry attacks on civilians (including Pakistani Taliban attacks on polio workers in Pakistan) even as it continues to attack civilians. Additionally, years ago, mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan often resorted to conciliatory messaging to trick the Soviets.
(A version of this article appeared in print in War on the Rocks on March 10, 2016)
(To be continued)
Michael Kugelman is the senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org and on Twitter @michaelkugelman
dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/11-Mar-2016/if-reconciliation-fails-in-afghanistan-i
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If reconciliation fails in Afghanistan... — II
By Michael Kugelman
March 12, 2016
So long as militancy-friendly realities in Pakistan endure, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is unlikely to die
The problem, however, is that the stakes are too high to wait it out. Afghanistan’s stability hangs in the balance, and by the thinnest of threads. The Taliban’s clout now extends far beyond their traditional bastions in the south and east — where they are retaking territory — and into the country’s northern reaches. Alarmingly, Afghan forces are now effecting what Kabul describes as “strategic retreats” from areas of Taliban strength or outright control. Reports abound of Afghan troops abandoning their bases, and of undisciplined militias unable or unwilling to fulfil the security responsibilities that Kabul has outsourced to them. The Taliban are not about to take Kabul, but their writ extends to areas far beyond it.
For the White House, the sole advantage of waiting reconciliation out is that it can run out the clock and wait for the next administration to deal with the mess.
There’s little the United States can do in Afghanistan at this point to improve the situation on the ground in a major way. That’s because any policy alternatives to political reconciliation are either insufficient or unrealistic.
Major troop level increases or the return of large numbers of ground troops in a combat role are off-the-table options — at least until after the next presidential election. At any rate, more than 100,000 foreign troops failed to stabilise the country in previous years. Additionally, at the height of the war, one in five NATO troops were based in a single province, Helmand, and yet today the Taliban have retaken significant swaths of the region. Stepped-up training and advising for Afghan forces, or drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Haqqani Network targets, would be helpful but far from a game-changer. Some have also suggested that Washington cut all military aid to Pakistan to undercut its ability to provide material support to the Taliban and Haqqani network. However, even those that support such a move would acknowledge that it is unlikely given the realities of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship.
Broadly speaking, maintaining residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan is essential because they provide psychological boosts to Afghan forces and help plug war-fighting capacity gaps. Still, residual troops are no silver bullet for escalating instability.
Ultimately, a successful Plan B — one that weakens the insurgency in a meaningful way — will require Afghanistan and its neighbours to step up in a big way. Unfortunately, however, the parameters of such a policy have long been proposed — and little progress has been made. Kabul must take major steps to strengthen an economy that has suffered from the withdrawal of foreign forces and is further threatened thanks to international donor fatigue. It must also do more to combat corruption. A weak economy and widespread graft boost recruitment to the insurgency — particularly so long as the Afghan government fails to convince impoverished and aggrieved potential recruits that it is a better alternative to the Taliban. Kabul also must somehow find additional ways (beyond the support it already receives from foreign troops) to strengthen its security forces — a hopelessly tall order given the range of problems that afflict them. The recent acquisition of four Russia-made attack helicopters from India — a transaction I analyzed for War on the Rocks in December — is an encouraging step forward, yet does little to address more fundamental challenges such as illiteracy and rampant desertions within the Afghan forces.
Meanwhile, Russia and Iran — both plagued by epidemics of heroin sourced from Afghanistan that provides major financial windfalls to the Taliban — should help Kabul implement stronger anti-narcotics measures. Security permitting, gas-rich Central Asian states should propose small pipeline projects to enhance Afghan energy security, which would strengthen the country’s economy. China should ensure that its extractive projects in Afghanistan bring real benefits to local communities. India should consider further arms sales to Afghanistan, while weighing the very real risk of provoking Pakistan’s ire. Again, these measures, as beneficial as they could be, have been proposed, with little actual progress, time and time again. Sadly, there’s little reason to think they’ll be any more successful in the coming months — and especially with a smaller foreign troop presence and the threat of a smaller foreign aid presence.
As for Pakistan, its policies have enabled a raft of terrorist groups to flourish on its soil. Many of these groups — particularly the Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba — have partnered operationally with the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, and enjoy the capacity to keep doing so. Meanwhile, even as Afghan Taliban fighters opt for new sanctuaries in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network remains ensconced in Pakistan — from the Kurram tribal agency to, possibly, the Islamabad area, where one Haqqani leader was shot dead in 2013. So long as militancy-friendly realities in Pakistan endure, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is unlikely to die.
In effect, there are no good options for the United States in Afghanistan — all possible Plan Bs are as problematic as Plan A. And sadly, it is the Afghan people who will suffer the most. Many of them, in fact, are already so desperate that they are leaving the country.
Afghanistan’s ever-worsening security situation has fuelled a fresh and ferocious human exodus. In recent months, the country has issued an average of 2,000 passports daily — a threefold increase from previous months. With Iran and Pakistan — historically the two most common destinations for Afghan refugees — no longer as accommodating, Afghans are now pouring in to Europe. Last year, Afghans comprised 21 percent of refugee sea arrivals in Europe (out of more than 500,000 overall), and more than 30,000 have already arrived in Greece this year.
This is a daunting challenge that the United States can actually help tackle in a meaningful way. Washington — and other NATO partners with troops in Afghanistan — should ensure that Afghans are included in European Union quotas that distribute refugees among member states. Washington should also tear away the red tape that has kept several thousand Afghans who worked for the U.S. government and military in Afghanistan from receiving special visas to enter America.
The United States can’t save Afghanistan, but it can better support those who have fled it. This would be a Plan B that is undoubtedly modest, but also practical and actionable — and therefore well-worth pursuing.
(Concluded)
(A version of this article appeared in print in War on the Rocks on March 10, 2016)
Michael Kugelman is the senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org and on Twitter @michaelkugelman.
dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/12-Mar-2016/if-reconciliation-fails-in-afghanistan-ii
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